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Why do states repress? Why are civil liberties curtailed? Explorations of these 
questions have departed from the assumption that security concerns motivate decisions 
that lead to repressive outcomes. If the state is challenged, it will repress. A state, it is 
assumed, must “strike a balance” between security and liberty. But what if those 
assumptions are flawed? If the decisions behind politically repressive outcomes are not 
always motivated by security challenges to the state, then we must ask a different set of 
questions about what can motivate state behavior and repression. This study examines the 
validity of these assumptions. A survey of cases of repressive episodes in the United 
States, using both primary and secondary sources, reveals that the decisions behind 
enacting repressive measures is not as straightforward as these assumptions would have it 
seem. A unique case, situated both contextually and historically by the preceding survey, 
is then explored in depth using data that is rarely available to shed a new degree of light 
on a decision making process. This data is overwhelming primary source information and 
 
 
includes declassified material from a variety of archives, material obtained from Freedom 
of Information Act Requests, as well as uniquely revelatory audio evidence that has only 
recently been made publicly available. After reviewing the case I argue that enough 
evidence exists to suggest the main assumptions of the repression and civil liberties 
literature fails to encompass all motivating factors behind repressive outcomes and a 
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What is the proper balance between liberty and security? This is a ubiquitous 
question in political discourse, particularly during and after times of war. But what if the 
concept of balance that this question thrusts upon the relationship between liberty and 
security is flawed? Are liberty and security truly on opposite ends of a spectrum across 
which government behavior adjusts as a function of threat or could other factors also tip 
this balance? 
The genesis of this study was a graduate seminar in political repression. It was 
during this seminar that I first began to look into something called the Cabinet Committee 
to Combat Terrorism, “Operation Boulder” and the repression of Arab-American activists 
in the early 1970s. Very little had been written about this subject except a few personal 
accounts of some of the activists who had been interrogated, or writings by scholars 
affiliated with Arab-American organizations.  
The debate around trading off liberty for security, particularly as it relates to 
dealing with threats from terrorism is not merely a matter of history but very much a part 
of the post-9/11 present we live in and likely to be a feature of our future as well. The 
Bush Administration’s 2004 “Operation Frontline,” which the government claimed was 
“intended to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist operations leading up to the Presidential 
Election” for example, was a broad inter-agency effort that disproportionately targeted 
residents of the United States from Muslim majority countries. Indeed, through a legal 
settlement, the government agreed to release statistically representative data on 
“Operation Frontline” which revealed that residents from Muslim majority countries were 
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1,200 more likely than others to be targets of the Operation. Despite this overt profiling, 
zero national security related arrests were made. More recently, the headlines have been 
filled with stories about the overreach of the surveillance state after the revelations 
brought forward by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. In the wake of these 
revelations, public opinion on the question of security and liberty has shifted in the civil 
libertarian direction for the first time since September 11
th
, 2001.  
The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism was initiated over 40 years ago and 
was thought to be the Nixon Administration’s response to the murder of Israeli hostages 
at the 1972 Olympic Games in Germany. I had many questions about this. How did the 
government administer this program? How, why and when did they decide to initiate it? 
What did this tell us about how the government perceived threats? What can we learn 
about the nexus of counter-terrorism and political repression? Interestingly, the case 
proves to be truly unique not only because it is likely the first such program of its kind in 
the era of international terrorism but also because an array of data are available that help 
us answer these questions to an extent we would not be able to do in other cases. A 
significant amount of primary source data from this time period has recently been 
declassified and is available in several government archives. What stands out, however, is 
the availability of data on private, high level discussions on national security, thanks to a 
concealed tape recorder, that gives us insight into ostensibly private oval office 
conversations between President Nixon, vital cabinet members and aides during this time 
period. Along with this data, I have also obtained previously unavailable data on this 
program through two Freedom of Information Act requests to the Department of Justice’s 




All of this data allows for tremendous insight into the initiation of this program, 
what motivated it, how it was administered, what role different levels of government and 
agencies played, and how it translated into the political repression of individuals and 
groups. 
In the following, I seek to explain how the decision to enact post-Munich counter-
terror policies came to be and thus I will explore the historical context, in which the 
decision was made, the immediate events which preceded and caused the decision to be 
made, the interests that were in play and the rationale of the decision makers. 
The first chapter reviews the literature on political repression/civil liberties 
curtailment and points out voids in the theories, assumptions and understandings of the 
phenomenon and introduces the case study approach in the following chapters. Chapter 
two is a survey of four different repressive episodes in modern U.S. history that situates 
the main case of this study historically and contextually. Chapter three is the first of five 
focused on the main case and it outlines how US policymakers perceived their interests as 
it relates to key foreign policy matters tied to the case. The next chapter, four, explores 
the challenge Congress presented to the Nixon administration before the decision to 
create the CCCT. Chapter five discusses terrorism, how it was understood at the time, 
and the degree to which the security apparatus perceived a threat from terrorist elements. 
Chapter six reviews how interest groups, backed by a foreign state, developed and 
executed pressure in Congress that would play a key role in the decision calculus. The 
seventh chapter then details the decision to establish the Cabinet Committee to Combat 
Terrorism in 1972 and how all previously mentioned factors coalesced to effect decision 
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making. Chapter eight discusses the measures enacted and the repressive effect they had 
on the Arab-American community. The ninth and final chapter analyzes the case and 
attempts to draw out lessons it offers for our understanding of political repression, the 
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Chapter 1- Getting Started 
 
“One explanation for state repression is that authorities use it to stay in power, but the 





This chapter introduces the question that this dissertation attempts to shed light 
on; are the assumptions about why states repress, which are prevalent in the repression 
literature, flawed? I begin by reviewing the literature on repression and explain how such 
assumptions exist in the literature across divides in both methodology and scope. It is 
likely that given what we know about state behavior and a state’s interests, security 
threats may not be the only motivators that lead to repressive outcomes. While the 
quantitative repression literature has been most unable to test this assumption, one study 
which I highlight did find error terms suggesting there was more to explaining state 
repressive behavior than threats from challengers. To explore the reasons behind this, that 
study and this study as well, follows a case study approach to trace the processes through 








Problem Statement  
 
The study of repression (i.e., human rights or civil liberties violations) has been 
focused on what causes repressive outcomes by attempting to understand what accounts 
for variation. While this approach is important, it has largely been based on limited 
assumptions about the decision calculus behind repression. Most of the literature assumes 
the state is both a unitary actor and reacting to a threat when it chooses to enact 
repressive behavior. Little or no work has been done to investigate the precise decision 
making process behind state repression and work in this area will either reinforce or, 
more likely, challenge the assumptions which much of the literature has been based on. 
The problem is the processes through which these decisions are made are still unclear. 
Two main assumptions in the theory from which these hypotheses are derived warrant 
further investigation. The first is the assumption that the modern state, a complex entity 
made of various authorities, is a unitary actor capable of making decisions weighing costs 
vs. benefits in a way similar to an individual. The second is that the costs of the decision 
to repress are based entirely on the direct repercussions of the repressive action and the 
benefits are based on the potential pacifying affect of repression on dissent. In other 
words, repression is a function of threats to the state’s security.   
A recent paper appropriately characterizes the aforementioned problem in 
literature: “The theoretical literature on government repression has mostly taken a choice 
theoretic perspective wherein either the protest group optimally chooses a protest tactic in 









The literature on repression forms a vast subfield of comparative politics. The 
major focus of this literature has been on the dynamics of the relationship between 
repression and dissent
2
 and the relationship between regime type and repressive 
behavior.
3
 Underlying both areas of research is a straightforward theoretical explanation 
for why repression happens: When faced with a behavioral threat, real or imagined
4
 the 
state employs some form of repressive action. But the decision calculus has been limited.  
Early literature dealt mostly with repression in autocratic regimes
5
 but the 
empirical reality of repressive action varying over time and space in different regime 
types fueled research within diverse political contexts. The assumption of earlier 
literature was that more democratic regimes had various avenues for the expression of 
dissent, which would in turn; mitigate threats to the state posed by challengers. Various 
studies testing the relationship between democracy and repression yielded conflicting 
results. While many of the earlier studies of this relationship found that democracy had a 
significant and negative relationship with repression
6
 later studies revealed interesting 
results indicating that repression is largely unaffected by democracy until democracy, as 
measured, crosses a fairly high threshold
7
.  
The next and logical extension of this literature was the investigation of the 
relationship of disaggregated components of democracy and repression. The hypotheses 
are derived from a rational choice like theory about decision-making. If the costs of 
repressive actions outweigh the benefits, the state is less likely to repress. Elements of 
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democratic regimes thought to effect repressive behavior include elections and executive 
constraints
8
. The operationaliztion and testing of these variables as they relate to 
repression in the most recent literature concludes that executive constraints have a more 
significant negative effect on repression than participatory elections.
9
 Interestingly, one 
study of note finds an opposite effect when specifically looking at the use of torture
10
 .  
Knowing what we know about the complex nature of states and the frequency of 
overlapping interests in developed political systems, it is likely that both of these 
theoretical assumptions are flawed. For example, states have interests which transcend 
the domestic realm and involve other states. While a great deal of attention has been paid 
to linkages between domestic and international issues as it relates to state behavior in the 
international arena
11
, little focus has been placed on how this issue-linkage dynamic 
could affect domestic state behavior vis-à-vis repression. Interests on the international 
level can be tied to or effect interests and decisions at the state level. Perhaps the 
availability of certain types of data has allowed the hypotheses which rely on these 
theoretical assumptions to dominate the literature. Using data coded from human rights 
reports, often written by organizations like Amnesty International or federal agencies like 
the US State Department, researchers have assembled a number of cross-national times-
series data sets that code levels of repression for each nation-state on an annual basis
12
. 
These data sets are then analyzed for correlation with a variety of other measures that 









 , international conflict and so on. Using these models, scholars have been 
able to cast a wide net and analyze general relationships between big concepts, but an 
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understanding of the processes through which state repressive behavior is initiated or how 
the decision calculus behind repression is linked to larger international issues is lacking.  
The assumptions made in a literature heavy in cross-national time-series analysis 
remain impossible to challenge in any rigorous empirical fashion without a start-to-finish 
process tracing of a decision to enact repressive measures or without examining the 
interests which weighed into that decision making process. In moving away from the 
broader approach to analysis that is inherent in large-N studies in comparative politics, 
studying repressive behavior in depth at the campaign level allows for a much better 
understanding of the mechanisms that create repressive outcomes.  
The qualitative work on repression has also been rich but largely assumes the 
same choice theoretic approach. Robert Goldstein’s exhaustive study of repression
17
 in 
the United States contains this assumption within the very definition he uses when he 
writes that the state uses repression to target those who are “viewed as presenting a 
fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key governmental policies” . 
Similarly, Alan Wolfe, who also looks at repression in the United States, views 
repression as motivated by the perception or reality of a threat to state authority by 
“organizations and ideologies that threaten their power.
18
”  
More recent qualitative literature has advanced in methodology but the core 
assumption in question remains static in the theory. Vincent Boudreau’s comparative 
study of repression in Southeast Asia anticipates that “state survival…drives repression” 
and that repression is “a response to specific social challenges to specific authorities”
19
. 
Mohammed Hafez’s work on the dynamic relationship between repression and rebellion 
in the ‘Islamic World’ differentiates between ‘preemptive’ and ‘reactive’ repression. 
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Hafez still assumes both are initiated by the state because of a threat to the regime with 
the difference being that the threat is imagined or perceived in the case of the former 
while the threat was actually experienced in the case of the latter
20
.  For Jillian 
Schwedler, who tests the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in Jordan and Yemen, 
liberalization is a method of political control which can have democratic and repressive 
outcomes that allow the regime to better monitor and control the activities of opposition 
groups. Ultimately, however, the decision to liberalize, as the decision to repress, is still 
motivated by “some real or perceived challenge” to the power of the regime
21
. All of 
these undertakings make important contributions to our understanding of repression but 
they also maintain the longstanding assumption about the decision calculus in the vast 
majority of the repression literature. 
  Further, a small group of scholars have begun to move toward studies of deeper 
scope by focusing on single countries
22
. This more recent approach to the field, which is 
a return to the earliest attempts in the literature, is an important step toward refining 
theoretical assumptions and aids the effort to generate new testable hypotheses. Still, 
perhaps studies that focus on repression at the campaign level will be the deepest in scope 
and offer the most potential for an accurate tracing of causal mechanisms.  
There is also a significant amount of literature specifically focused on repressive 
episodes in U.S. history. Political repression in the United States is as old as the United 
States itself. In the formative years of the republic, before the Supreme Court’s powers of 
judicial review had been established in Marbury v. Madison, the Alien and Sedition acts 
were passed by Congress in 1798. These acts were opposed by the anti-Federalist 
advocate for the Bill of Rights, Thomas Jefferson as well as James Madison. Together 
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Madison and Jefferson secretly wrote what became known as the Virginia and Kentucky 
resolutions, political statements made by each state’s legislature, holding the Alien and 
Sedition acts unconstitutional. The resolutions argued for states’ rights and this argument 
would tragically culminate in a civil war almost a century later which would leave over 
600,000 Americans dead. It was not until after this argument was settled, in the wake of 
the American civil war that three new constitutional amendments would be passed and in 
particular the 14
th
 amendment which guaranteed due process and equal protection. It is at 
this point, in 1870, where many chose to begin their studies of political repression and 
civil liberties in modern America.  
Some works have focused on extended time periods
23
.  Others have focused on 
specific time periods like during World War I 
24





, the Second World War
27
,  the McCarthy era of 1946-1959
28
  and 
so on.  
A recent review covering the state of the field of repression concludes by 
identifying topics for future research: 
The first topic that requires more detailed attention is why repression takes 
place. A standard cost-benefit analysis motivates much of the work in this 
area, but very little attention has been given to the appropriateness of this 
framework. For example, what are the “benefits” of repression? Why do 
authorities believe that repressive action will lead them to their objectives, 
and does repression actually produce intended benefits? The answers are 
not clear. One explanation for state repression is that authorities use it to 
stay in power, but the literature contains not one systematic investigation 
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of this proposition. Similarly, although authorities are supposed to use 
repression in order to extract resources and protect specific exploitative as 
well as profitable relationships, neither of these motives has been 
examined rigorously. Other components of the theoretical model require 
similar treatment. For example, it is often claimed that governments use 
repressive action as long as there are limited costs involved. But what is a 
cost that is unacceptable to a political leader predisposed to repressive 
behavior? The degree of wealth generated by society is frequently viewed 
as a cost because repression drains available resources, but this presumes 
an understanding of how expensive state coercion is, as well as an 
understanding of how much individuals and organizations will be willing 





Stop, hey, what’s that sound? 
 
One important study that critiques some assumptions of  the large-N scholarship 
suggests that there is a great need to look at cases precisely because data used by scholars 
studying repression maybe capturing more than what is expected
30
.  Overwhelmingly, 
large-N repression studies use quantitative data created through the coding of repressive 
events reported via human rights organizations or news articles. Duvall and Shamir create 
models of repressive disposition which they then use to project expected repression 
scores given the number of challenges to the regime and test for correlation with the 
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observed repression scores. What they find is that in a number of cases there are 
significant error terms suggesting that there is more than meets the eye. The error terms 
should not be ignored, as they often are, because, as the 1970s protest-era song states 
“there’s something happening here”. Duvall and Shamir proceed by analyzing cases to 
explain what accounts for the error terms and show that deeper analysis reveals 
explanations for various points of divergence in the different states and different 
moments in time. 
Most of the literature on repression has conceived of state repressive behavior 








Similarly a common notion advanced in the literature on civil liberties in America 
is that there is a balance that must be struck between national security and civil liberties. 
Debates often rage over where this balance should be. To an extent, this debate is framed 
in American discourse by the very Constitution itself which, in Article 1, Section 9 states 
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases 
of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” This sets up a spectrum where 
ultimate security and ultimate liberty are on opposite ends. Where the balance on the 
State 
Challenger 
Figure 1. Basic Repression/Threat Model 
10 
 
spectrum is at any given time is based on the extent of the threat to security. The greater 







The underlying assumption in both the repression literature and in the discourse 
on civil liberties is that threats to state security are the prime, if not only, motivators of 
state behavior as it relates to limiting liberties. The validity of this assumption remains 
largely unquestioned and untested.  
 
Aims and Arguments 
 
 It is important to be clear about what this work is not, as well as what it actually 
aims to do. This work is not an attempt to put forward a grand theory of repression or a 
broadly generalizeable explanation for why repression occurs. Likewise, while adopting 
an in-depth case study approach, this work is not a criticism of quantitative methodology 
in general but rather seeks to enhance our understanding of the usefulness of assumptions 
the quantitative approach cannot challenge due to the scope at which it engages data.  
In the following pages I investigate whether common assumptions in the literature 









Figure 2. Basic Liberty Security Model 
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surveying several cases of some of the most well know repressive moments in 20
th
 
century American history I will demonstrate that the decision calculus behind repressive 
outcomes is often far more complex than has been assumed. Then I will explore one 
particular case in great detail, closely tracing the interests that weighed into a decision 
that led to repressive outcomes and exactly how that decision was made. After presenting 
this case in great detail, I argue that enough evidence exists to suggest that 1) It is 
analytically useful and often necessary to separate repressive intents from repressive 
outcomes to fully understand the process through which decisions result in repressive 
behavior 2) that threats from challenger groups are not the sole motivators of repressive 
behavior and that in fact motivating factors can come from elsewhere both inside and 
outside of the domestic political system wherein repressive outcomes result and 3) that 
only through thick description and careful, detailed analysis of decision making can this 
be fully understood. 
 
Cases for Analysis 
 
Surveying Repressive Episodes in US History 
The following chapter will survey several episodes of political repression/civil 
liberties curtailment in the United States including the repression of anti-War activists 
during World War One, the internment of Japanese during World War Two, the 
repression of communists and others during the second red scare and the repressive 
activities of the FBI during the COINTELPRO era. This survey serves two purposes; the 
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first is to provide insight into the reasons why these repressive campaigns took place and 
the second is to situate the main case of this study contextually and historically. 
 
The Main Case 
In the fall of 1972, President Richard Nixon established the Cabinet Committee to 
Combat Terrorism (CCCT) and immediately thereafter Arab-American activists 
throughout the United States began to be investigated by federal law enforcement, 
questioned, harassed, arrested and/or deported. Due to the scale and scope of targeting the 
community quickly understood a government initiated operation that placed undue 
scrutiny upon them was underway.  
 
Why this case?  
It will be shown in the following chapter that the decision making process behind 
repressive campaigns is complex. Despite the availability of a great deal of information 
on the decision making process, particularly for historical episodes which have far more 
declassified information available, questions may remain about motivations that are not 
captured by the available historical data. In many cases, memos between and by decision 
makers offer an important view into the decision making process. In addition to primary 
resources such as these, we can supplement our understanding of the motivations of the 
actors by looking at their public statements as well as their published or unpublished 
memoirs and correspondence. Beyond that, however, rarely can we glean greater insight 
into the decision making process. There is often great documentation of decision making 
at the highest levels of government where such decisions are made, but there may also be 
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some information omitted from the written record and available only in private 
conversation. Such conversations, which may shed additional light on to motivations, are 
rarely, if ever available. Usually, those pursuing historical research are left with the same 
sentiments of the old adage “Oh, to be a fly on that wall.”  
But what if we really could be a fly on the wall as such decisions are made in 
candid conversations that are not reflected in the written and declassified record? This 
case provides us with precisely that opportunity.  
While one can always speculate about the decision making process at the highest 
level of government, there are few instances where verbatim records of that process, its 
genesis, evolution and execution are readily available to researchers. This case also 
allows us to look further and deeper than any other repressive campaigns for which 
classified information has become declassified because of the very rare live secret tape 
recordings of decisions between the highest ranking officials in government in the White 
House. 
This documentation, extracted from a variety of archives, will allow for a 
comprehensive and near complete tracing of the decision making process and allow us to 
question whether the theoretical assumptions that much of the repression literature is 
based on applies in a way we would not be able to do without such data. Ultimately, a 
thorough examination of this case will help generate more nuanced thinking about the 





Methodology & Data  
 
I will be conducting a historical analysis of the decision behind repressive 
measures against the Arab-American community which began in September of 1972. 
Issues linked to this decision which took place prior to September of 1972 will be 
investigated to provide the necessary context. I will seek to understand which actors 
made the decisions to initiate, what interests influenced those actors and their decisions, 
how this came to pass and why. The primary focus of this study is understanding what 
weighed into the decision calculus and I aim to highlight the costs and benefits as 
understood by the actors making the decisions in an attempt to understand how this 
relates to the theoretical assumptions in the literature. Further, I will also seek to 
understand how different actors within the state, including individuals and agencies, were 
involved in the decision making process. 
To conduct a historical analysis of this case, I will rely on primary source 
documents or recordings that have been recently declassified in an array of archives 
including the Digital National Security Archives, the National Archives and the Nixon 
Library. I will also rely on material released in response to requests under the Freedom of 
Information Act from relevant departments or agencies like the Department of Justice and 




In sum, further investigation of the decision calculus behind repressive outcomes 
is needed and the reasons behind such decisions are often taken for granted in the 
literature on repression and civil liberties. This study seeks to shed light on this question 
through a detailed, process tracing approach. The main case of this study, which occupied 
chapters three through eight, will focus on the reasons behind the Nixon Administration’s 
decision to enact the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. First, however, this case 
will be situated historically and contextually by the next chapter which surveys four of 








When we have these fits of hysteria, we are like the person who has a fit of nerves in 
public – when he recovers, he is very much ashamed – and so are we as a nation when 
sanity returns. 
 
-President Harry S. Truman 
 
 
The last chapter introduced the question and explained how the repression 
literature largely assumes that the state represses due to challenges perceived or 
experienced by the state. In this chapter, I survey several significant repressive episodes 
in modern U.S. history including the repression of anti-war activists and enemy aliens 
during World War One, the internment of Japanese during World War Two, the second 
red scare and the COINTELPRO program. In each case survey, I provide historical and 
contextual background to the moment around the decision, I ask why (what was intended) 
the decision was made and I then explain what the impact was (what was the outcome). 
This chapter serves to provide some historical context for the main case that 
follows but also allows us to ask whether the assumptions in the repression literature fit 
the historical evidence around the decisions that led to these particular repressive 
episodes. If the assumption that the state represses because it faces a security threat from 
the challenger is true, than in each of these cases, the historical evidence should show that 
the decision makers decided to enact repressive measures due to the perception or 
experience of that threat. What I find however, is that in each of these cases, the historical 
evidence does not support this assumption. In each case, motivators other than pure 
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security threats were the main factors that weighed into the decisions which ultimately 
lead to repressive outcomes. While these four cases do not represent the universe of 
cases, they are among the most prominent and significant repressive episodes in modern 
US history. At minimum, the evidence suggests that a deeper, detailed exploration of a 











As Europe descended into war in 1914, the United States, an ocean away, had 
recently elected Woodrow Wilson President. Opposition to the war in the US was strong 
and Wilson had effectively campaigned and won his second term in 1916 based on the 
slogan “he kept us out of the war”. During this time, US trade with the allies had 
increased significantly and shortly after his second term began in 1917, Wilson would 
lead the US into the war in Europe to fight alongside the allies against the Germans and 
the Central powers.  
The American public was not entirely supportive of the war effort. Despite the 
wide publication of the Zimmerman telegram which did stir outrage, many still objected 
to the war and debate in Congress over the formal declaration of war was fierce. Unlike 
WWII, where only one member of the House of Representatives voted against declaring 
war, the WWI declaration was opposed by 50 votes in the House of Representatives.  
American public opposition to the War was concerning to Wilson and led him to 
issue Executive Order 2594 establishing the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The 
Committee, comprised of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and journalist 
George Creel would be a propaganda outfit aimed at shifting public opinion in favor of 
the war. The committee did this through widely disseminated images, planting stories in 
the press and setting up a division of “four minute men” which would give short, four 
minute public speeches prepared by the CPI.  
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It was during 1917 that the ranks of several organizations that were either openly 
against the war or non-committal began to swell. These included the Industrial Workers 
of the World (IWW), the Non-Partisan League (NPL) and the Socialist Party of America 
(SPA). The IWW, which did not take a formal position on the war, saw its membership 
increase by 30,000 in the months after the declaration of war. The SPA, which was very 
clear about its opposition to the war, demonstrated significant electoral gains in at various 




Why it happened? 
While anti-war parties and movements did not pose a threat to the state in the 
sense that they could viably carry out a rebellion or overthrow of the government, they 
did pose a threat to American public support for the war which would complicate the war 
effort. The US’s entry into the war was motivated by several factors. These included 
strong cultural and economic ties with the allies who were already engaged in the war, 
provocative German behavior including the intercepted Zimmerman telegram and the 
sinking of American ships that were supposed to be understood as neutral, and Wilson’s 
own personal desire to reshape the global political order in the wake of the war.  
In his address to Congress in April of 1917, when he sought a congressional 
declaration of war, Wilson began to lay the groundwork for associating dissent with 
disloyalty. From the outset of the war, he stated the Germans had “filled our unsuspecting 
communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues 
everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without our 
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industries and our commerce.” Should there be disloyalty, he went on to say, “it will be 
dealt with a firm hand of stern repression
32
.” 
For Wilson, there seemed no difference between dissent and disloyalty. His 
Manichean outlook on this matter was reflected in a hyper-nationalist speech he gave on 
Flag Day, June 14
th
, at the Washington Monument in 1917. His focus was on the 
intentions of “the masters of Germany” who he described as a “sinister power that has 
stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us.” He went on: 
The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted in this country 
than in Russia and in every country of Europe into which the agents and 
dupes of the Imperial German Government can get access. That 
Government has many spokesmen here, in places both high and low. They 
have learned discretion; they keep within the law. It is opinion they utter 
now, not sedition. They proclaim the liberal purposes of their masters, and 
they declare that this is a foreign war, which can touch America with no 
danger either to her lands or institutions. They set England at the center of 
the stage, and talk of her ambition to assert her economic dominion 
throughout the world. They appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation, and 
seek to undermine the Government with false professions of loyalty to its 
principles. 
 
But they will make no headway. ….. For us there was but one choice. We 
have made it, and woe be to that man, or that group of men, that seeks to 
stand in our way in this day of high resolution, when every principle we 





Wilson believed that the war was an American national interest of the highest 
order and whatever challenged or complicated the war effort, including domestic dissent, 
was opposed to it. For this reason, repressing domestic dissent was as reasonable and as 






The Federal Government, led by Wilson, established several laws and 
proclamations that were effectively used to silence dissent against the war and repress the 
anti-war movement. These included the Espionage Act of 1917 which Wilson signed into 
law the day after his Flag Day speech as well as the Sedition Act of 1918. Other federal 
laws used for repressive purposes included Proclamation 1364 of 1917, Executive Order 
2587A of 1917, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, and the Immigration Act of 
1918. 
The Espionage act was composed of several bills prepared by the executive 
branch and in particular the Attorney General’s office. Up to 20 years in prison and a 
$10,000 fine (equivalent to $185,000 in 2015 USD adjusted for inflation) for making 
false statements with the intent to “interfere with the operation or success of the military 
or naval forces” or attempt to cause “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of 
duty.” Additionally, the Espionage Act permitted the Post Office to exclude from the 
mails anything that violated the act or advocated “treason, insurrection or resistance to 
any law.” Wilson had heavily lobbied Congress to include provisions in this act as well 
that would grant the President the power to directly censor the press. While Congress 
granted the President sweeping powers under this act, the ability to censor the press 
proved too contentious and Wilson ultimately signed the bill into law without those 
provisions.  
The Sedition Act of 1918, as it is commonly know, was actually an extension of 
the Espionage Act of 1917 and expanded its powers to cover a much greater scale of 
“offenses”. These included anyone who would: 
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…willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, 
or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or 
the  Constitution narrative of the United States, or the military or naval 
forces of the United States ...or shall willfully display the flag of any 
foreign enemy, or shall willfully ...urge, incite, or advocate any 
curtailment of production ...or advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the 
doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated and whoever 
shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with which 
the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of 
the United States therein…  
 
Altogether, as Robert Goldstein notes, “over twenty-one hundred were indicted 
under” the Espionage and Sedition Acts, “invariably for statements of opposition to the 
war.” Over 1000 were convicted and over 100 were sentenced to jail terms of 10 or more 
years. Not one was convicted of actual spy “activities”. Goldstein emphasizes the extent 
to which prosecution under these acts silenced dissent: 
Men were prosecuted for making statements such as the following: “We 
must make the world safe for democracy, even if we have to bean the 
goddess of liberty to do it;” “Men conscripted to Europe are virtually 
condemned to death and everyone knows it;” “I am for the people and the 
government is for the profiteers.” One man was sentenced to twenty years 
in prison for stating in a private conversation that atrocity stories were lies 
and that the war was a “rich man’s war and the U.S. is simply fighting for 
the money” and that he hoped the “government goes to hell so it will be of 
no value.” Another man got twenty years for circulating a pamphlet urging 
the re-election of a Congressman who had voted against conscription…. 
The producer of a movie called “The Spirit of ‘76” was given ten years in 
jail after it was alleged that by showing British atrocities during the 
American Revolution he tended to raise questions about the good faith of 
America’s war-time ally. Probably the most incredible case was that of 
Walter Matthey of Iowa, who was sentenced to a year in jail, for, 
according to Attorney General Gregory, “attending a meeting, listening to 
an address in which disloyal utterances were made, applauding some of 
the statements made by the speaker claimed to be disloyal, their exact 




Executive Order 2587A, which was issued by Wilson on April 7
th
, 1917 paved the 
way for a purge of government employees who “would be inimical to the public welfare 
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by reason of his conduct, sympathies, or utterances, or because of other reasons growing 
out of the war.” This lead to the monitoring and firing of public servants and as the New 
York Times reported in July of 1917, just three months after Wilsons executive order, 
“suspected individuals have been subjected to strict surveillance and discharges from 
public service among this class have been frequent.
35
” The order also empowered the 
Civil Service Commission (CSC) to deny the opportunity of entrance exams to anyone 
deemed suspicious under the criteria above. Approximately 900 people were denied such 
opportunities by the CSC in the four years after the order.  
There was also a growing effort to eliminate all things German. Sourkraut was 
being called “Liberty Cabbage” and campaigns to rid schools of teaching German grew. 
In fact, at one point in 1918, legislation was introduced into Congress to compel the 
changing of names of U.S. towns or cities which included the word “German” or “Berlin” 
to strike “a blow at German sentiment”. The bill submitted by Representative J.M.C. 
Smith of Michigan would ensure that “the names of all cities, villages, countries….in the 
United States…named Berlin or Germany, be changed from the name Berlin or Germany 
to the name of Liberty, Victory or other patriotic designation
36
”.  
Provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act required all foreign language 
newspapers to submit for approval translated versions of their publications that included 
anything on the US government or the war in Europe. This forced most German 
newspapers to either adopt a pro-Government slant on the War or not write about it at all. 
Many publications simply could not afford to comply with the regulations and shut down 
all together. The number of German language dailies halved within two years after 1917 





Of course the German language press was not the only publications subject to 
Post Office oversight. Numerous publications were banned from the mails, some for 
questioning US war policy and others for critical views on US allies in the War. These 
included “Lenin’s Soviets at Work; an issue of The Public, for urging that more of the 
wartime budget be raised by taxation and less by loan; the Freeman’s Journal and 
Catholic Register, for reprinting Jefferson’s opinion that Ireland should be free; the Irish 
World, for stating that Palestine would be retained by Great Britain on the same footing 
as Egypt, and that the trend of French lives and ideals for a century had been toward 




The Immigration Act of 1918 gave the Department of Immigration sweeping 
powers and permitted the exclusion and deportation of all alien persons who were 
members of seditious organizations. It also reversed a previous provision that allowed 
that aliens who had been residents for more than 5 years could not be deported and vastly 
expanded the definition of an anarchist alien who could be anyone who would “write, 
publish, or cause to be written or published, or who knowingly circulate, distribute, print 
or display” anarchist views or even be in possession of such material. In some cases, even 
naturalized citizens were stripped of citizenship
39
.   
This law was aimed at the IWW, who along with the SPA bore the brunt of 
repressive state action during this period among organizations. Strikes among labor 
groups like the IWW were often deemed seditious activity and were regularly broken up 
by federal troops. The Post Office had banned almost all IWW mail and the Department 
of Justice undertook massive federal raids on IWW offices and their headquarters in 
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Chicago before indicting over 160 members through a federal grand jury. Charges 
alleged that IWW organized strikes were a conspiracy to hinder the war effort. Raids of 
IWW sites and arrests and indictments of members across the country followed
40
.  
Likewise, prosecution under the Sedition Act led to numerous arrests of SPA 
leaders. Indictments “were returned against virtually every major SPA leader.” These 
include Milwaukee SPA head and Senate candidate Victor Berger, party secretary 
Adolph Germer, SPA newspaper editor Louis Engdahl and Irwin Tucker, a major SPA 
pamphleteer who were sentenced to 20 years each. Most infamously, SPA leader and 
candidate for President on multiple occasions Eugene Debs was arrested and sentenced to 
10 years in prison in 1918 for giving an anti-war speech. He would run for President for 
the 5
th
 time in 1920 from his prison cell
41
.  
In addition to the Espionage and Sedition Acts, Wilson’s Proclamation 1364
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established regulations for the conduct and control of enemy aliens making all enemy 
aliens subject to summary arrest. All males aged 14 or older could not at any time be in 
the possession of weapons, aircraft or wireless devices or documents written in code and 
any such property found in enemy alien possession was subject to government seizure. 
Further, enemy aliens could not be within half a mile of any military installation or 
manufacturer of munitions for the war effort. Nor could enemy aliens write, print or 
publish any attack or threat against the Government of the United States or any of its 
branches or against its measures or policies. The President would have the authority to 
designate certain localities off limits to enemy aliens. In the fall of 1917, Wilson 
expanded this order to include mandatory registration of enemy aliens with the 
26 
 
Government, expulsion from Washington DC,  the requirement permission to travel 
within the US or change residency and barred access to all ships other than public ferries.  
Hundreds of summarily arrested German-Americans ended up in internment 
camps. Among the internees were a number of German classical musicians including 
Karl Muck, the conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, whose crime was 
apparently refusing to play the American national anthem. At the War Prison Barracks, 
No. 2, in Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, Muck conducted a concert in captivity.  Years later 
and in the midst of the Second World War, another man who was also in the Barracks 
then, Erich Posselt, wrote a letter to the Music Editor of the New York Times
43
. “Your 
readers might be interested in hearing about the last concert Karl Muck conducted on 
American soil, more than a year after he had been interned as a “potentially dangerous” 
enemy alien (so official phraseology had it at that time)” He continued: 
Karl Muck held out for a long time; he felt he had been treated rather 
shabbily by the American authorities, and had sworn he would never 
conduct in the United States again. Eventually, however, we succeeded in 
convincing him that “Orglesdorf’, as the interned German merchant sailors 
called Fort Oglethorpe, was really a German town and he agreed to 
conduct one more concert.  
 
None of us who attended will ever forget the occasion. The mess-hall was 
packed with two thousand listeners. The orchestra numbered more than a 
hundred men, picked musicians and all. The front benches were reserved 
for the army offices, the censors, a few doctors in uniform. Behind, wave 
upon wave, was the sea of the nameless eager faces of the prisoners….In 
that moment of breathless silence preceding the first note it was as if an 
electric current had run through the entire unkempt audience in overalls 
and shirtsleeves, in heavy camp boots that seemed frozen to the floor. 
Muck waved his magic wand and jubilantly the “Eroica” rushed at us, 
lifted us on wings and carried us far away above war and worry and 




In total, the regulations put forward in Wilson’s proclamations affected some 
600,000 German Americans of which 6,300 were arrested and 2,300 interned in 
concentration camps. The management of these policies would fall under the purview of 
the Justice Department’s War Emergency Division which created an Alien Enemy 
Bureau. The task of heading this Bureau would be given to a 22 year old who had just 












As was the case with the First World War, the United States had managed to stay 
out of the fighting in Europe in the early years of the Second World War. That would 
change on an infamous December day in 1941 when Imperial Japan attacked the 
American island of Hawaii. War planners however had long anticipated the likelihood of 
militarily engaging Japan. So too did leaders in the Japanese-American community which 
as early as August, 1941, several months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, began to ask 
Department of Justice officials about the possibility of being deported or sent to 
concentration camps if war broke out
44
.  
By the 1940s, Japanese-Americans had been in the United States for decades. The 
population was concentrated in Hawaii and the West Coast of the continental United 
States. Unlike their Chinese counterparts who were banned from immigrating to the US 
after the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, Japanese were able to immigrate to the United 
States and did so in growing numbers, particularly after the sweeping changes the Meiji 
Restoration brought to Japan.  By 1907, a Gentlemen’s Agreement between the US and 
Japan limited immigration and with the restrictive 1924 Immigration Act, the flow of 
Japanese immigrants to the US was brought to a halt. Perhaps the most significant reason 
why the 1924 Immigration act was passed was due to pressure from agricultural interest 
groups and xenophobia in California which saw the Japanese population as an economic 
and even cultural threat. A report by the California State Control Board to the Federal 
Government was highlighted in the Sunday LA Times in 1920. Under the headline “The 
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Jap Menace in California” the article presented “the chief points made in an exhaustive 
report” in “condensed form” which it claimed in a bold subheading, amounted to 
“starling proof of the coming domination of state by yellow hordes from Far East.” The 
points of emphasis in the State Board’s report show just how central economic 
competition and agricultural interests were: 
California has 3,893,500 acres of land under irrigation. The 
Japanese control 458,056 acres of this, and are reaching for more. In San 
Joaquin county 95,829 of its 130,000 irrigable acres are controlled by 
Japanese farmer. The agriculture of twenty-nine counties is dominated by 
Japanese. Americans cannot buy or lease farm lands in Japan, and can 
only take short leases on residential property. Japanese own outright 1036 
city lots in this State. Since they cannot buy land now the Japanese men 
become guardians of their American-born children and by large acreage in 
their names. The little brown men monopolize the Pacific Coast Fisheries. 
Of these fishermen, 28 per cent are Japanese. Their boats are worth 
$1,397,000. The boats of all other fishermen are worth $2,055,000. The 
Japanese farm hand won’t work for a white man. He helps his own race, 
takes more out of the soil than he puts back into it, and when the land is 
run down he moves to a better farm. The value of their farm crops in this 
State for a single year is $67,000,000….Dispatches from Tokio say there 
is no scarcity of land in Japan…Balanced against the fact that the little 
brown men as yet own but a small percentage of the tillable land in this 
State is the fact that they are sidestepping the alien land law by 
establishing guardianship for infant Japanese and securing control of vast 




In 1907, just as the Gentleman’s Agreement was taking effect, some 30,000 
Japanese came to the United States. After the restrictions in the Immigration Act of 1924 
however, only 3,500 came in the 19 year span from 1931-1950.  
These legal restrictions created specific patterns in Japanese immigration that 
resulted in fairly well-defined generational groups within the community. The Issei were 
first generation immigrants born in Japan. This group came primarily before 1924 due to 
the Immigration Act. Japanese-Americans born after 1924 were born in the United States 
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to Issei parents. This second generation was called the Nisei. The Nisei were better 
equipped with English and to American cultural norms than their parents and it was 
thought that loyalty to the United States in the case of war with Japan might follow these 
generational divisions.  
On February 19
th
, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
9066 “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas”. It stated that “the 
successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage 
and against sabotage.” The order gave the Secretary of War the authority to round up, at 
his “or the appropriate military commander’s” discretion “any person” including US 
citizens.  
 
Why it happened? 
 
The factors that lead FDR to make this decision were varied. Even before the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many questions existed about the potential loyalty of 
Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. There was, at this time, a general military miscalculation 
regarding the disposition of naval forces at the base. The assessment was that the 
Japanese did not have the capability to launch a large and sustained attack thousands of 
miles from Japanese shores and it would likely be Japanese attacks on US territories like 
the Philippines that would spark war. The fear in Hawaii was suspicion of sabotage from 
the local Japanese-American population whose sympathies may lie with Imperial Japan. 
For this reason, aircraft were kept in close proximity in Pearl Harbor to mitigate the 
chance of sabotage. Ironically this only made it easier for the Japanese to eliminate 
31 
 
aircraft in one fell swoop once the attack began. No sabotage took place, however the 
suspicion of the Japanese-American community was deep. 
In 1940, a small and secret intelligence agency approved by President Roosevelt 
and headed by a former State Department diplomat named John Franklin Carter
46
, 
undertook several information gathering operations. One of these would be spearheaded 
by Curtis B. Munson who was dispatched to assess the loyalty of the Japanese on the 
West Coast. Munson had the help of “the Naval and Army intelligences and the F.B.I.” as 
well as “from time to time” the “British Intelligence”. He also had assistance on British 










 naval districts collecting 
information
48
. His report would break down loyalty of Japanese-Americans by 
generation. The Nisei, the second generation, was the “weakest from a Japanese 
standpoint.” They are, Munson wrote, “universally estimated from 90 to 98% loyal” to 
the United States. He adds “the Neisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty.” This 
second generation “was not oriental or mysterious” rather they were “very American and 
are of a proud, self-respecting race.” In fact they suffer, in Munson’s estimation, “from a 
little inferiority complex and a lack of contact with the white boys they went to school 
with.” 
Even the Issei, Munson wrote of the first generation which was born in Japan, is 
“considerably weakened in their loyalty to Japan.” They live and expect to die in the 
United States and many “are fearful of being put in a concentration camp” and “would 
take American citizenship if allowed to do so.” 
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Munson was categorical in his analysis. “There is no Japanese ‘problem’ on the 
Coast,” he wrote. And while he did leave room for the possibility of sabotage “financed 
by Japan and executed largely by imported agents” he stressed there would be “no armed 
uprising of Japanese.” Eerily foreshadowing the future, Munson even mitigated the 
likelihood of espionage among Japanese-Americans unless there would be “a terrific 
American Naval disaster.” 
In concluding, Munson wrote: 
For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at 
worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or 
irresponsible mobs. We do not believe that they would be at least any 
more disloyal than any other racial group in the United States with whom 




Carter sent the Munson report to President Roosevelt on November 7
th
, 1941, 
precisely one month before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Not every perspective 
the President received was in agreement with Munson on this matter however. The 
Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, had warned as early as 1933 of the danger of 
Japanese-Americans in Hawaii
50
. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Knox personally 
inspected Hawaii and after 36 hours there returned to Washington to declare at a mid-
December cabinet meeting that “there was a great deal of very active fifth column work” 
going on in Hawaii and he recommended that “the Secretary of War take all the aliens out 
of Hawaii and send them off to another Island.
51
” These assertions where rejected by the 
Attorney General Francis Biddle and J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI whose vast intelligence 
collection on domestic constituencies did not point to any disloyalty among the Japanese. 
33 
 
This created a division between the military and domestic law enforcement on the issue 
of what to do with Japanese-Americans.  
Munson and Carter, having learned the Secretary of the Navy was pushing for 
internment, hurried to oppose this action by reasserting their findings and putting together 
an alternative plan. The idea was to promote Nisei into position of control over Japanese-
American property and organizations. This would allay the albeit remote concern about 
the capacity of the Issei to act on any disloyal intentions the pro-internment camp 
believed they had. The plan was received warmly by Roosevelt who urged Carter to 
discuss it with Biddle and Hoover, both of which concurred. Carter had also begged 




During this time members of the War Department were lobbying Roosevelt to 
move in the opposite direction, toward internment. Little progress was made on 
Munson’s plan, in part because the interagency effort did not move quick enough and in 
particular because the Army had forwarded the plan to its West Coast commander, 
General John DeWitt, who refused to implement it. DeWitt had other plans and was part 
of the effort lobbying the President for internment. Roosevelt himself was consumed with 
war planning, celebrating Christmas to convey a sense of normalcy to the American 
public in a time of crisis, and hosting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the 
first Washington war conference from December 22
nd
 to January 14
th
.  
By the time Roosevelt was done making more pressing decisions with his ally 
about invading Africa and sending US bombers to British bases, the Munson plan had all 
but fallen apart and pressure to move toward internment was now not only coming from 
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the War Department but also from the general public. Anti-Japanese hysteria was 
sweeping the West Coast
53
. 
Racial tension between Asian immigrants and Whites on the West Coast has a 
long and disturbing history which surely played into this moment. Along with a general 
nativist and xenophobic atmosphere, economic competition factored into the animosity. 
Most Japanese in California were involved in agriculture and White farmers’ groups in 
southern California saw this as an opportunity to get rid of their Japanese competition. 
The same motivations that factored into the Immigration act of 1924 were still very much 
present and while the act worked to cut off the influx of Japanese immigrants, those who 
had already come had established themselves in the farming industry with a great degree 
of success. Groups like the Western Growers Protective Association, the Grower-Shipper 
Vegetable Association and the White American Nurserymen of Los Angeles were 
organized interest groups of White Farmers lobbying for the removal of the Japanese-
American population.  When you look into the numbers, it was easy to see why White 
farmers were so frustrated by the Japanese. The Japanese worked harder and more 
efficiently than their White counterparts and had brought farming skills from Japan where 
efficiency was paramount due to limited land resources. Despite operating only 3.9% of 
all farms in California, they produced “90 percent or more of the snap beans, celery, 
peppers and strawberries for the market; 50 to 90 percent of all the artichokes, snap beans 
for canning, cauliflower, celery, cucumbers, fall peas, spinach and tomatoes; 25 to 50 
percent of the asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes, carrots, lettuce, onions and 
watermelons
54
. It should come as no surprise then that as early as December 22
nd
, the Los 







 from the LA Times sums up the hysteria. Japanese-Americans, writes 
W.H. Anderson, are “citizens by the accident of birth, but who are Japanese 
nevertheless.” He goes on: 
A viper is a nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched….So a 
Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents…grows up to be Japanese, 
not an American, in his thoughts, in his ideas and in his ideals, and himself 
is a potential and menacing, if not an actual danger to our country unless 
properly supervised, controlled and as it were hamstrung…I cannot escape 
the conclusion that such treatment, as a matter of national and even 
personal defense, should be accorded to each and all of them while we are 
at war with their race. 
 
Anderson’s opinion was one of a columnist, but his views were rationalized by 
the editorial board of the same paper, the largest print opinion shaper in Los Angeles at 
the time. “The military power exists,” read a January, 1942 LA Times Editorial
57
, to cope 
with “Japanese-menaced sections.” It concludes, “The time has come to realize that the 
rigors of war demand the proper detention of Japanese and their immediate removal from 
the most acute danger spots. It is not a pleasant task. But it must be done and done now. 
There is no safe alternative.” 
Popular opinions and the opinions of interest groups were being amplified by the 
largest papers on the West Coast and letter writing campaigns began to swamp Roosevelt 
and elected officials from California- from the Mayor of Los Angeles to the Governor – 
would come out in favor of internment. Members of Congress from the West Coast also 
began to lobby the White House to take federal action to remove the Japanese. A 
committee of congressional members representing west coast states met with 
representatives of the War and Justice departments and presented a set of policy 
recommendations drafted with the assistance of lobbyists working for the LA Chamber of 
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Commerce. They had sympathetic ears in the War Department but skeptical ones in the 
Justice Department; the latter happened to be the ones in charge of the Alien Enemy 
Program.  
Attorney General Biddle remained opposed to mass evacuation but hysteria on the 
West Coast had reached boiling point by early February 1942. He met with the War 
Department and hoped to issue a joint press release stating that the FBI found no 
evidence of attempted sabotage and that both Departments did not believe evacuation was 
necessary
58
. General Allen Gullion, the Army Provost Marshall who was present at the 
meeting, relayed the tension in a phone conversation that was transcribed and 
documented in the report of the congressionally appointed commission
59
 of investigation 
into internment years later: 
[The Justice officials] said there is too much hysteria about this thing; said 
these Western Congressmen are just nuts about it and the people getting 
hysterical and there is no evidence whatsoever of any reason for disturbing 
citizens, and the Department of Justice, [James] Rowe started it and 
Biddle finished it-The Department of Justice will having [sic] nothing 
whatsoever to do with any interference with citizens, whether they are 
Japanese or not. They made me a little sore and I said, well listen Mr. 
Biddle, do you mean to tell me that if the Army, the men on the ground, 
determine it is a military necessity to move citizens, Jap citizens, that you 
won't help me. He didn't give a direct answer, he said the Department of 
Justice would be through if we interfered with citizens and write [sic] of 
habeas corpus, etc. 
 
  The War Department objected to the press release at the meeting on the grounds 
that they didn’t want to foreclose on the possibility of internment and thus the release 
never came to fruition. Roosevelt also failed to make any public statement of reassurance 
as Carter had begged for. The hysteria continued. 
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Biddle realized he was losing the battle and attempted to lobby the President on 
the matter directly, but while he found some sympathy with the President, he could not 
convince Secretary of War Henry Stimson who had initially been opposed to internment 
but was persuaded by the pro-internment camp in the War Department. Stimson believed 
internment was a military necessity but would reach out to the President for approval, 
hesitating to make the decision on his own. Stimson also understood the constitutional 
implications of this decision. He wrote in his diary that the “racial characteristics” of the 
Japanese are such that “we cannot understand or trust even the citizen Japanese.”  This, 
he believed, was a “fact” but it would “make a tremendous hole in our constitutional 
system to apply it.” 
Roosevelt, overwhelmed with matters relating to the conduct of the war and in 
particular Japanese advances in the Pacific, gave Stimson the green light over the phone 
on February 11
th
, 1942. In the immediate days that followed, public pressure for action 
continued to grow and Biddle, still unaware of the President’s decision, attempted to 
lobby him again on February 17
th
 only to find out that the debate had been ended. Biddle 
called a joint meeting between the War and Defense departments where Executive Order 
9066 was drafted. Two days later it was signed by Roosevelt authorizing the Department 




DeWitt recommended to the War Department on February 14
th
, 1942, that 
specific steps be taken for military security on the West Coast including the removal of 
the Japanese. He was unaware that Roosevelt had already made the decision to approve 
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such measures and would be issuing the executive order days later. The day after that 
order was given by Roosevelt, Stimson put Dewitt in charge of implementing his 
recommendations and “exercise[ing] all powers which the executive order conferred 
upon him and upon any military commander designated by him.” 
Dewitt rationalizes the “evacuation” as he calls it in his final report to the Chief of 
Staff: 
The evacuation was impelled by military necessity. The security of the 
Pacific Coast continues to require the exclusion of Japanese from the area 
now prohibited to them and will so continue as long as that military 
necessity exists. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the enemy crippled 
a major portion of the Pacific Fleet and exposed the West Coast to an 
attack which could not have been substantially impeded by defensive fleet 
operations. More than 115,000 persons of Japanese ancestry resided along 
the coast and were significantly concentrated near many highly sensitive 
installations essential to the war effort. Intelligence services records 
reflected the existence of hundreds of Japanese organizations in 
California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona which, prior to December 7, 
1941, were actively engaged in advancing Japanese war aims. These 
records also disclosed that thousands of American-born Japanese had gone 
to Japan to receive their education and indoctrination there and had 
become rabidly pro-Japanese and then had returned to the United States. 
Emperor-worshipping ceremonies were commonly held and millions of 
dollars had flowed into the Japanese imperial war chest from the 
contributions freely made by Japanese here. The continued presence of a 
large, unassimilated, tightly knit and racial group, bound to an enemy 
nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion along a frontier 
vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be dealt with. 
Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the essence. The evident 
aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his recent successes made it 
worse than folly to have left any stone unturned in the building up of our 
defenses. It is better to have had this protection and not to have needed it 
than to have needed it and not to have had it – as we have learned to our 
sorrow. 
 
DeWitt’s narrative is in stark contrast to the Munson report and the information 
collected by the FBI on the activities of Japanese-Americans and he displays an inability 
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to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese. While Munson believed that previous 
Japanese-American behavior and sentiments indicated that sabotage was very unlikely 
and that cases would be limited an “odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 
‘crackpot’”
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, DeWitt believed that “the very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date 
is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken”
61
. For DeWitt, 
the man in charge of removing Japanese from the West Coast, all Japanese were part of a 
race “bound to an enemy nation” and constituted a menace. DeWitt reasoned along the 
same lines as the columnist W.H. Anderson had written, “A viper is a nonetheless a viper 
wherever the egg is hatched” but when speaking to reporters at a press conference the day 
after testifying before a 1943 congressional committee he put it even more succinctly; “A 
Jap is a Jap.” 
In a period “of less than ninety operating days” 110,442 people of Japanese 
ancestry were forcibly relocated. The areas they were removed from included “western 
Washington and Oregon, California and southern Arizona”. The “compulsory organized 
mass migration”, to use DeWitt’s terminology, was conducted under “complete military 
supervision.”  
DeWitt also made sure to note that “emphasis was placed upon making of due 
provision against social and economic dislocation” and that “agricultural production was 
not reduced by the evacuation.” He claims in his report that 99% of “all agricultural 
acreage” that the Japanese worked on or owned continued to be productive. They found 
“purchasers, lessees, or substitute operators” to take over. The LA Times reported in 
February, 1942 that the Board of Supervisors for the country appointed an “agricultural 
coordinator” who would coordinate the efforts of American farmers to ensure “full 
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The new “agricultural coordinator” was one W.S. Rosecrans, a former head of the 
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, one of the first groups to call for the removal of the 
Japanese with business interests in mind. There was about 20,000 acres of Japanese-
operated farms in the county, according to the news report, and Rosencrans would “serve 
primarily as a clearinghouse for the allocation of American management and labor to the 
lands threatened with idleness”.  A headline in the following day’s paper read “Scores of 
Farmers Seek Land Evacuated by Jap Aliens” and reported how eager American farmers 
arrived at the office of the county agricultural commissioner to “take over” land left idle 
by the Japanese even before Rosencrans had set up his office
63
.  
DeWitt’s final report concluded by noting that “everything essential was provided 
to minimize the impact of evacuation upon evacuees.” The costs of the evacuation, he 
stressed, was low considering what was involved and by the date of his report, June 5
th
, 
1943, the evacuation had been completed and Japanese internees were now under the 
control of the Wartime Relocation Authority (WRA). The WRA was a civilian authority 
responsible for the management of the Japanese internee population and maintained 10 
“relocation centers” across the country. These camps were slated to be closed in 1945 and 
by 1946 all 10 had closed and the WRA’s mission was terminated by then President 
Harry Truman. Of course this did not occur before the lives and liberty of well over 








As far as political repression is concerned, there weren’t many periods in modern 
American history when it was good to be a communist. If any period seemed to be an 
exception to this, it was during the Second World War and specifically after the U.S. 
joined in an alliance with the Soviet Union to defeat the Nazi threat in Europe. Prior to 
the war, the USSR had become the central prism through which Americans saw 
Communism and once Germany broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by invading Russia 
and the German-allied Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Americans found themselves on 
the same side of an existential battle as the Soviet Union.  
In 1942, a series of Communist Party leaders and activists which had been jailed 
for a variety of charges in years prior were pardoned. In one of his famous fireside chats, 
President Roosevelt spoke warmly about Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and US Soviet 
cooperation in December of 1943
64
: 
To use an American and somewhat ungrammatical colloquialism, I may 
say that I "got along fine" with Marshal Stalin. He is a man who combines 
a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I 
believe he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I 
believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian 
people -- very well indeed. 
 
Communist Party membership in the US, which had plummeted before the 
alliance, doubled in this favorable climate reaching about 80,000 members in May of 
1945. Communist Party success was most prevalent in unions and they had come to 
dominate over 20% of unions in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) which 
had backed Roosevelt
65
. This was of course at a time in American politics where the role 
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of unions was very significant. In 1945 union strength reached its peak with 35% of 
Americans being members of non-agricultural unions.  
The political consequences of this were unsurprising yet significant. Republicans 
began to attack Democrats for leaning too far left and for associations with communists. 
In the run up to the 1944 Presidential Election, the Republicans attacked the Democrats 
consistently on this point and the Republican candidate for the Presidency even declared 
that communists were “seizing the New Deal” and “aim to control the government of the 
United States.”  
The effects of these attacks were somewhat tempered by the fact that Roosevelt 
was still popular, the nation was still engaged in a massive war effort that demanded 
unity and the Soviet Union was still a key ally. But the attacks didn’t leave all Democrats 
unscathed. In large part due to the challenge such attacks created for Democrats 
nationally, a movement within the party sought to sideline Vice-President Henry Wallace 
whose positions were thought to be far to the left and too close to the communists. 
Wallace, the Vice-Presidential incumbent and Roosevelt’s preferred candidate, came in 
second in the voting at the 1944 Democratic National Convention to a Senator from the 
state of Missouri named Harry S. Truman.  
Roosevelt triumphed in the election with Truman on the ticket as his new Vice-
President. While the allegations by Republicans that the Democrats were too soft on 
communists did not cost the Democrats the White House, it did cause the party to make a 
change. This exposed vulnerability, happening in what was still a relatively Soviet 
friendly American atmosphere, would pale in comparison to what was to come when the 
war ended.  
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For his part, Wallace took the turn of events fairly well early on. He was loyal to 
Roosevelt and loyal to his New Deal agenda. The President kept him in his cabinet as 
Secretary of Commerce. When Roosevelt died while in office, it became clear that 
Wallace missed his chance to be President by a matter of months and he would now serve 
in the cabinet of President Harry Truman, the man who replaced him. In the earliest days 
of Truman’s presidency, Wallace received many letters from supporters who felt he was 
the legitimate heir to Roosevelt’s agenda but Wallace’s reply was to praise “Truman’s 
good start” and “solicit support for the new President” while “urging supporters not to 
work on his behalf for the 1948 nomination.
66
” 
While the relationship between Wallace and Truman was somewhat tense from 
the start, it took a serious turn for the worse in 1946. By this point the war was over and 
so too was the Grand Alliance. The hopes of an era of US-Soviet cooperation that 
Roosevelt alluded to in his radio address were quickly dissipating. A nation focused on 
war for years began to turn inward and saw many challenges. Also, and perhaps most 
importantly, 1946 was a mid-term election year and would serve as a referendum on 
Truman’s performance in his first term.  
Wallace continued to hold views about the need for US-Soviet cooperation and 
opposed confrontation just as the American honeymoon with Communist Russia was 
ending. As a Secretary of Commerce who once was Vice-President, Wallace was in an 
awkward position in Truman’s cabinet. He had a significant degree of prestige but his 
left-leaning foreign policy views in particular created tension between him and Truman’s 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who held more conservative views and had played a 
role in Wallace’s marginalization at the 1944 convention.  
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This tension reached breaking point when Wallace delivered a speech before 
20,000 people in Madison Square Garden in the fall of 1946. He called for cooperation 
between the two great powers and criticized what he called the “Get tough with Russia” 
approach. The problem was that that approach was precisely the direction Truman’s 
administration was moving in and yet Wallace stated plainly that when President Truman 
reviewed the positions in his speech “he said they represented the policy of his 
Administration.”  Compounding the problem was a Presidential press conference the 
same day. Journalists who had received advanced copies of the speech asked whether it 
did in fact represent Truman’s policy and he replied that it did and that he “approved the 




Pandemonium ensued. Byrnes, who was outraged, offered to resign on the spot. 
Truman knew if the more conservative Byrnes left and Wallace, the last holdover from 
the New Deal cabinet remained, the perception would be cemented that the 
administration’s policy was shifting toward cooperation not confrontation. Instead, he 
demanded Wallace’s resignation in an effort at damage control.  
Wallace, who was put into Truman’s cabinet by Roosevelt, resigned after the 
speech less than two months before the election. From when he first became President, 
Truman noted in his memoirs, he knew Wallace “was not an opponent to be discounted” 
and that Wallace “cherished the idealistic notion the he would be able to stir up a 
following in the country that could elect him President”
68
. With Wallace now out of the 
administration, he could only present this challenge from the outside.  
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The ‘too soft on communists’ attacks from the Republicans that caused Wallace to 
be sidelined in 1944 were given new rounds of ammunition after the speech debacle. The 
notion that communist party influence had reached the highest levels of the government, 
or at least the influence of those with sympathy for communists did, was advanced by 
Wallace’s abrupt departure. Then again, the thinking was, if a cabinet member and 
former Vice-President was this soft on communism; imagine how pervasive this thinking 
must be through all levels of government.  
Hoover’s FBI had been watching Wallace. Wallace’s FBI file begins with 
newspaper clippings about a speech he gave in 1942 while still vice-president, about the 
need for cooperation with the Soviets in a post-war world. Material after this relates to 
possible threats to Wallace’s security while we has travelling that was passed on to the 
Secret Service. But the FBI’s interest in Wallace’s political leanings and affiliations was 
clear. In 1943 the FBI watched Wallace closely during a trip to Central and South 
America. Included in his file was information about “homage paid” to Wallace by a 
Mexican labor leader, a letter to Wallace from the leader of the Chilean Communist 
party, and a report that noted he “completely won over” leftists in Bolivia. The report on 
his trip to Peru included a section highlighted with a pen that quoted Wallace responding 
to a reporter about whether the US saw pan-Americanism and communism on the same 
basis. Wallace was quoted saying “Communism is necessary to effect world peace.” By 
April, an FBI report noted that a source “had information which indicated strongly that 
Vice President Wallace was being influenced by Bolivian communists.” Shortly 
thereafter, Hoover relayed this information to the Attorney General. By early 1944, the 
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Special Agent in Charge in Los Angeles reported to Hoover that an FBI informant which 
attended a speech given by Wallace to a labor group stated: 
…that the influence of the Communist Party in this affair was 
evident on all sides. The general makeup of the audience was of that type 
which are seen at all Communist gatherings, and the applause groups were 
definitely of that type. Many well-known Communists were in the 
audience and all Communist publics were most enthusiastic about the 
meeting, both before and after the meeting. 
 
By 1945, after Wallace was sidelined at the 1944 convention, the FBI’s 
focus on his activities seemed to deepen. In April a ten page report on his 
activities was included in the file and it focused on his “Association with 
Communist Controlled Organizations”, “Contacts with Negro Communist 
Controlled Organization and Individuals,”  “Public Appearances and Speeches 
Before Pro-Communist or Pro-Soviet Groups.
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” Despite all this information on 
Wallace and the particular focus given to his connections with Communists, 
Hoover wrote to the Attorney General in April of 1946 after the SAC in San 
Francisco received calls from a journalist asking if the FBI will be snooping on a 
scheduled Wallace speech there. “I wanted to advise you of this situation” Hoover 
wrote, “and the fact that this Bureau is not conducting any investigation of Henry 
Wallace, of his meeting in San Francisco, or of any of the persons sponsoring this 
meeting.” Hoover was writing to Attorney General Biddle, who was suspicious of 
Hoovers activities, “Because of Mr. Wallace’s propensity for believing such 
stories about the FBI, [he] wanted [Biddle] to know of this situation in order that 






Once Wallace was forced to resign from the Administration, FBI coverage of his 
activities continued. They followed his work and writings as editor of the New Republic 
and when he indicated his intention to run on a third party ticket, well before the 
Progressive Party ticket was officially announced, Hoover passed this information on to 
Truman. Once loyalty programs were put in place by Truman in 1947, empowering the 
FBI and brining them into close coordination with the HUAC, Wallace slammed the 
effort and took a strong position against FBI activities. The FBI tracked this as well, 
noting Wallace had said the country had been in a “rapid drift” toward a “police state” 
and that “Communism is no threat whatsoever to American. It is being used merely as a 
weapon for political purposes.
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By 1948, with a presidential election campaign underway, Attorney General 
Francis Biddle who was skeptical of Hoover had been replaced by Tom C. Clark, who 
would give Hoover more space to operate. By May of 1948, Attorney General Clark, a 
political appointee, directed Hoover to look into specific campaign activities by Wallace 
who was then running on the Progressive Party ticket. Wallace’s campaign had 
distributed 20,000 copies in New York City of a flyer with an “open letter” to the leader 
of the Soviet Union calling for cooperation and bringing an end to the Cold War. Clark 
saw an opportunity to possibly charge Wallace under an “old statute passed around 1795 
which prohibits a citizen in the United States from communicating with a foreign country 
concerning a matter bearing on diplomatic relations.
72
” The charge would rest on being 
able to prove Wallace had made contact with the Soviets prior to his open letter, which 
was a theory advanced by a New York columnist in touch with the FBI who said that 
changes in the open letter and the short turnaround time from one draft to the next 
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indicated that Wallace having advance information from the Soviets. The FBI, Hoover 
told Clark, was of the opinion that an average print shop could turn around 20,000 copies 
in the short period of time but that did not stop Clark from sending the FBI on a goose 
chase that involved finding out exactly which print shop made the copies in an effort to 
establish a more concrete timeline of events. The FBI was able to establish which print 
shop made the flyers and passed the information on the Clark who used a State 
Department employee to ask questions. This was because, as Hoover pointed out to 
Clark, “it would be extremely difficult to make any discreet inquiries at the Parish Press, 
Inc. for the purpose of ascertaining when the order was placed for the preparation of these 
flyers without having such information brought to the attention of Mr. Wallace or sources 
very close to him.
73
” 
Anti-communism became a major issue in many campaigns across the country in 
the 1946 and the election resulted in a significant Republican victory, giving the party 
control of Congress for the first time in 14 years. The FBI’s involvement in political 
targeting was about to grow significantly and the 1946 election set the tone for the 
Presidential election of 1948 where Truman would face an uphill battle. Among those 
who campaigned successfully in the 1946 election by using anti-communism against their 
opponents were two young Republican newcomers who would play a significant role in 
U.S. history; Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy.  
 
Why it happened? 
 
 
By the end of 1946, Truman was facing three central domestic political 
challenges. The first, a threat from his right, was an emboldened Republican opposition 
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wielding the anti-communist weapon with increasing efficiency two years before Truman 
would face re-election. Second, the spilt with Wallace meant a split in his own party and 
the progressive wing of the party would present a domestic political challenge from 
Truman’s left. Third, and perhaps most significantly, Truman faced a challenge from the 
American public. At a time when the United States had opportunities and even 
responsibilities in the wake of a destructive war that left the American homeland largely 
unharmed and Europe devastated, the American public was reluctant to invest in foreign 
adventures.  
The British were economically destroyed because of the war and spending 
priorities had to focus on reconstructing the homeland. The British Empire began to 
quickly recede, leaving vacuums of power in areas across the globe. In 1946, British 
diplomats had informed American counterparts that they would be pulling out of Greece. 
This could leave Greece vulnerable to a possible communist takeover and put the Soviet 
Union in a position where it was closing in on the vital oil resources of the Middle East. 
Truman believed that this would be a severe blow to American national interests and that 
Greece and neighboring Turkey had to be kept under western influence to prevent the 
Soviets from having a perch on the Mediterranean.  
But securing an economic bailout for Greece and Turkey in 1947 would put 
Truman up against his three big domestic challenges. The American public, which had 
just witnessed a multi-billion dollar Anglo-American loan agreement in the summer of 
1946, had no appetite for further spending abroad. Congress, which would be required to 
authorize the spending, was now controlled by his Republican opponents. Truman’s own 
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party, which was undergoing a schism after Wallace’s departure, would be limited in its 
support for a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.  
British Diplomats informed Washington on February 21
st
 that their aid to Greece 
would end on March 31
st
 and they encouraged the United States to assume control. While 
the State Department had been aware of the British intention to end aid, they did not 
expect it to dry up this quickly. The British decision was apparently prompted by a 
particularly harsh winter that had made life in the homeland more difficult. Now, the 
Truman administration would have to move quickly to take over but they would have to 
go through Congress to do it.  
A memorandum
74
 for the Secretary formulated by State Department diplomats 
immediately after the British decision suggested he:  
1. Convince the President of the importance of extending aid and of 
proposing that Congress pass the necessary legislation. 
 
2. Suggest that the President be armed with documents that could convince 
key members of Congress whom he would call into a conference of the 
necessity for such legislation. 
 
3. That in order to gain popular support the President make a speech to the 
country in which for the first time since the war he would tell the people 
of the United States of the dangers to the free world arising from the 
aggressiveness and expansionism of international communism. 
 
In late February of 1947, President Truman along with Secretary of State George 
Marshall
75
 and his assistant Secretary Dean Acheson met with Congressional leaders to 
attempt to sell them the agenda of aiding Greece and Turkey. This group included 
Republicans in powerful positions whose help would be required to authorize the 
necessary spending. During the meeting, the congressional members and in particular the 
Republicans who they needed to convince, were most persuaded when the request was 
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framed in dramatic language about the Soviet threat but they also knew the American 
public would be very reluctant.  
In a memorandum from March 5
th
, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs 
William Clayton wrote that the “United States will not take world leadership effectively 
unless the people of the United States are shocked into doing so.” This sentiment was 
echoed by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, who told the President that to sway the U.S. public in favor aid for Greece 
and Turkey, he couldn’t make an economic case, and instead he would have to “scare the 
hell out of the country
76
.” 
For Truman this represented a triple opportunity in one crisis. By taking a strong, 
high-profile stance against the threat of communist expansion, he could simultaneously 
disarm his main political opponents, the Republicans, from their preferred anti-
communist weapon, marginalize as radicals those to his left in his party, and “shock” the 
people of the United States into a frenzy of fear that would create the necessary 
conditions to pass aid legislation for Greece and Turkey.  
The process of drafting the speech that would become known as the Truman 
Doctrine sheds light on just how calculated the shock value of the speech was. The State 
Department’s initial drafts “reflected a desire to keep the issue of economic 
reconstruction at the center of attention.” It opened with a long “statement defining the 
Greek situation” by stressing the “traditional poverty” in the country and the economic 
toll of war. Mention of “communist-led guerrillas in Greece” was rare and buried in a 
longer section on various problems Greece was dealing with. The objective of this draft 
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was to “place the general declaration of policy entirely in the framework of the economic 
requirements of postwar reconstruction”
77
. 
Truman was not pleased with the State Department’s early draft and thought it 
sounded like an “investment prospectus”, along with his advisor Clark Clifford, President 
Truman edited the speech significantly. Much of the economic text was cut and the scant 
mention of communist guerillas in Greece was expanded and brought to the front to 
“increase attention given to the emergency and military elements of the policy”. 
He delivered the speech on March 12
th
, 1947 and in its final form it had several 
elements that made it compelling: 
..highly structured arguments-infused with crisis terminology-that 
employed anticipatory rebuttals, fear appeals, and periodic use of strategic 
ambiguity; embedded metaphors of disease, violation and chaos that 
operated on a less conscious level to induce fear and an unadorned style 




In the delivered text Truman argued that the United States had to assist “free 
peoples” in struggles against “totalitarian regimes,” or else it would “undermine the 
foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.” 
In general the shift from the State Department’s approach to the final text was a 
shift to “representing American policies” based on “philosophical scruples” rather than 
“considerations of practical self-interest”. The Truman Administration’s insistence and 
reliance on this tactic makes clear that they did not believe the American public would 
get behind it based on an honest statement of their government’s aims
79
.  
Truman opened with two attention grabbing sentences: 
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The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates 
my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. 




If the success of Truman’s speech is to be measured by its effect on American 
public opinion, it should receive more than satisfactory marks. Prior to the war, 
Americans were far less concerned about foreign issues. As the chart below
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 shows, it 
was not until the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor, two years after the start of the war, 
that the vast majority of Americans believed foreign issues were most vital. Polling on 
this question was not done during wartime, but immediately after the war the inward turn 




It was not until Truman delivered his speech that American public opinion on the 
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since the war years. Truman succeeded in using his prestige and power as President over 
shaping American public opinion to secure an environment where Congress could 
approve the needed aid for Greece and Turkey. The President’s speech had “scared the 
hell” out of the American people to open the door to Congressional action. It also opened 
the door to much, much more. 
While the delivery of the Truman Doctrine served its intended purpose, to rile up 
public sentiment against the international communist threat, an executive order issued by 
Truman less than a week later road this wave of fear and directed it inwards as well. 
Executive Order 9835, which became known as the “Loyalty Order” set up a program to 
review the loyalty of government employees.  
Loyalty boards had a history in US government including an immediate history 
preceding this decision. Prior to the war, as concern over Nazi intensions grew, Congress 
established a committee to investigate potential subversives in 1938. This was chaired by 
a Republican congressman from Texas named Martin Dies who was outspoken about 
enemy alien propaganda and it became popularly known as the Dies Committee. But 
while the Nazi threat would be represented among enemy aliens in right-wing fascist 
organizations, the Republican chaired committee targeted left-wing communists and 
ultimately the Roosevelt Administration itself as it alleged the New Deal programs were 
a front for communist subversives.  
During the war years, the Dies committee remained active but generally declined. 
Its appropriations went from $150,000 in 1941 down to only $50,000 in 1943 during the 
relatively positive atmosphere towards communists due to the Grand Alliance
82
. With the 
war over however and the prospect of post-war cooperation diminishing in 1946 and 
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gone by the time of Truman’s speech, it became clear that the work of loyalty boards and 
the issue of internal security would once again come to the fore of American public life. 
The Democrats felt the sting of soft-on-communism allegations in the 1944 general 
election when they still had control of the White House and Congress. After the Wallace 
speech debacle and losing control of Congress to the Republicans in 1946, Democrats 
were primed to be the targets of renewed Congressional hearings on loyalty. Truman 
sought to avoid that by owning the internal security issue as his own.  
Two weeks after the 1946 election resulted in a defeat for Democrats, President 
Truman established a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. Its mandate was to 
determine if the government had the necessary safeguards in place against the hiring or 
continued employment of subversives and it only had two months to conclude its work 
and make recommendations. During this time the Commission sought information from 
the Attorney General in relation to the FBI’s efforts in this area and requested to know 
how many files they had on potential subversives, what evidence was required to open a 
file on such a suspect, and what percent of government employees they believed this 
represented. The FBI and Attorney General Clark were not forthcoming and instead 
Clark simply said the problem “should not be weighed in light of numbers” but rather 
from the perspective that “even one disloyal person” constitutes a “serious threat” to the 
“security of the United States.” 
Truman received the rushed Commission’s report on February 20
th
, 1947 which 
stated that the problem “presents more than a speculative threat” but “based on the facts 
presented” to them, the Commission was unable “to state with any degree of certainty 
how far reaching that threat is.” 
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A month later and just days after announcing a Truman Doctrine in foreign 
affairs, Executive Order 9835 was given marking the domestic Truman Doctrine in 
internal security. This one-two punch ushered in a decisive shift, marking the beginning 
of the Cold War at home and abroad and served Truman’s political calculations. It is fair 
to ask, as many may, to what extent Truman took the internal security steps he did 
because of politics or because of a genuine fear of the threat of subversion.  
The answer to this question was largely given by Truman himself. On February 
28
th
, 1947, just over a week after receiving the Temporary Commission’s report and the 
day after meeting with members of Congress to advance formulation of the Truman 
Doctrine, Truman responded to a letter from the former Governor of Pennsylvania and 
fellow Democrat George Earle, who had informed him he was stepping down as the head 
of the American Anti-Communist Association:  
I appreciated very much your note of Feb. 26 and I am very happy to be 
informed of your decision with regard to the American Anti-Communist 
Association. People are very much wrought up about the communist 
‘bugaboo’ but I am of the opinion that the country is perfectly safe as far 
as communism is concerned – we have too many sane people. Our 
government is made for the welfare of people and I don’t believe there 
will ever come a time when anyone will really want to overturn it. 
 
The White House confirmed the existence of the letter but did not comment on its 
contents. Earle, a staunch anti-Communist who had once advocated for dropping the 
atom bomb on Russia to stop communism, leaked the letter to the press. Doubt about the 
President’s thinking in this letter is mitigated when Truman himself penned the following 




During other periods of hysteria, attacks on the rights of individuals were 
made on other pretexts in total disregard of guarantees under the Bill of 
Rights. But we recovered from all of them. And we will continue to return 
to sanity after each attack because we have freedom of the press, freedom 
of religion, a free educational system, and our people vote in free elections 
giving them control and the right to change their government. When we 
have these fits of hysteria, we are like the person who has a fit of nerves in 
public – when he recovers, he is very much ashamed – and so are we as a 
nation when sanity returns. This is why I never believed that this 
government could be subverted or overturned from within by 
Communists. The security agencies of the government are well able to 
deal quietly and effectively with any Communists who sneak into the 
government, without invoking Gestapo methods.  
 
Despite decrying hysteria in his memoirs, it was Truman’s politically calculated 
rhetoric and actions in both foreign and domestic politics which laid the foundation for 







 given by Truman establishing the loyalty program 
enumerated six types of activities by employees or applicants that would render them 
disloyal. These included 1) sabotage or espionage 2) treason and or sedition 3) 
advocating the illegal overthrow of government 4) intended or unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information 5) serving a foreign government and 6): 
Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any 
foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or 
combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as 
totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a 
policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or 
violence to deny persons their rights under the Constitution of the United 
States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States 




The sixth criterion for determining disloyalty among government employees is 
worth highlighting because it is the only new criterion the Executive Order puts forward 
on its own. The first five criteria were already illegal and could quickly lead to 
termination of government employees. The sixth, however, was now introducing as 
disloyal the mere membership, affiliation or sympathetic association with anyone or any 
group the Attorney General determines.  
In addition to criteria that would consider employees disloyal for their thoughts or 
affiliations, the procedural set up of the program was deeply problematic. Often, vague 
allegations were made against those deemed disloyal with specific evidence withheld due 
to security considerations. Informants who made allegations of disloyalty were often 
allowed to remain anonymous, denying the accused of the right to face their accuser. No 
time limit was placed on the acts, thoughts or affiliations that determined disloyalty 
meaning someone could be considered disloyal for an affiliation they had 30 years prior. 
Further, since each agency had their own procedures and loyalty boards, employees 
would have to prove loyalty multiple times if they transferred from one agency to 
another. Hearing boards were often privy to confidential information about allegations 
against the accused long before the actual hearing when the accused is not present. The 
hearing board also had no power to subpoena anyone who could testify on behalf of the 
accused
84
. The overall effect of these procedures, which differed greatly from those 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment in criminal proceedings, was to put the burden of 
proof on the accused.  
Turning thoughts into disloyalty led to many formal charges in loyalty hearings 
that certainly wouldn’t exist in criminal proceedings. These included charges such as 
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“You have associated for a considerable time with persons who are known communists” 
or “Communist literature was observed in the book shelves and Communist art was seen 
on the walls of your residence.” Questions asked at loyalty hearings were also based on 
thought policing. These included “what do you think of the third party formed by Henry 
Wallace?” and “have you ever had Negroes in your homes?” and “There is suspicion in 
the record that you are in sympathy with the underprivileged. Is that true?
85
” 
The inquisition-like acts of the loyalty boards initiated by Truman’s executive 
order, which coincided with his international Truman doctrine, created an aura of anti-
communism around the White House that would serve to shield it from Republican 
attacks. At the same time, Wallace and his newly established Progressive Party were 
making gains in local elections and managed to get on the ballot in many states including 
California which required nearly 500,000 signatures. Wallace and the Progressives 
emerged as the most vocal opponents of Truman’s international doctrine and would soon 
fall victim to his domestic one.  
Truman’s strong move toward anti-communism both domestically and 
internationally, and the hysteria it created, did not end the Congressional inquisition into 
“subversive activities” but in fact increased it to unprecedented levels while focusing it 
away from the White House and toward Truman’s left-wing opponents. In March of 
1947, the Truman Administration, whose predecessor had often been a target, began to 
cooperate significantly with the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 
chaired by J. Parnell Thomas. Attorney General Clark, in early 1947, reversed a policy 
established by Attorney General Biddle in 1940 which forbade the FBI Director from 
testifying before the committee. Biddle believed that FBI Director Hoover was “a ‘good 
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cheerful soldier’ but flawed by a ‘bias against the reds’”. For his part, Hoover objected to 
Clark overturning Biddle’s policy believing that his speaking against communism would 
only weaken the Bureau’s effort against it but Clark’s reversal stood and Hoover testified 
before the committee. Hoover told the committee, in a widely publicized testimony, that 
communists were a “fifth column if there ever was one”, their goal was the “overthrow of 
our government” and their “allegiance is to Russia.” He also stated that since the 
President’s speech on aid to Greece and Turkey, Communists “opposing the plan had 
been mobilizing, promoting mass meetings, sending telegrams and letters to exert 
pressure on Congress.
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” This was the first expression of a stance the Administration 
would repeat frequently moving forward, that opposition to the President’s foreign policy 
was Communist inspired and due to subversive intentions.  
The hysteria created by Truman and the support the Justice Department was now 
openly lending to the HUAC led to its reinvigoration and effectiveness as a politically 
repressive instrument. After the Dies committee’s budget dwindled in the war years, the 
post-war HUAC became markedly more active after 1947. It had 3 hearing days and a 
budget of $75,000 in 1946 but jumped to 27 hearing days and a budget of $100,000 in 
1947. Hearing days would reach a high of 77 in 1950 and its budget reached $200,000 in 
1949
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. The Justice Department’s behavior also changed in relation to is delivery of 
indictments for contempt of Congress which increased significantly after this point.  
It was also in this climate that the passage of the Taft-Hartley act came. The act 
was aimed at limiting the strength of labor movements across the country after a strike 
filled year in 1946. One provision of the act was designed to curb Communist Party 
influence in the Unions and it denied any of the privileges of the Wagner act
88
 to any 
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labor organization whose officers do not file an affidavit swearing they are not 
Communists or affiliated with any Communists. This put officers who were Communist 
Party members in a position where they would either have to perjure themselves, resign 
their labor union posts, or leave the Communist Party. The National Labor Review 
Board’s strict compliance with the Taft-Hartley act had a devastating impact on 
communist influence in Labor Unions which had grown during the war years.  
Perhaps the most influential consequence of Truman’s shift for communists and 
other political activists even loosely affiliated with them was the publication of the 
Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations. This list, which was effectively 
required by the sixth criterion of Truman’s Executive Order on loyalty, functioned as a 
black list. Robert Goldstein writes that the “effect of being listed was clearly to seriously 
hinder or destroy the organizations involved.” He continues: 
Membership and contributions usually dried up, the Treasury Department 
revoked tax exempt status of at least sixteen organizations that were listed, 
meeting places suddenly became difficult to find, and the list was soon 
incorporated into state and local loyalty programs and became the basis 
for private blacklisting. In 1952, Congress banned members of listed 
organizations from eligibility for public housing (a law quickly declared 
unconstitutional) and barred veterans from using veteran’s benefits to 
enroll in listed educational institutions. 
 
Publishing this list served little or no purpose other than to marginalize and 
repress those on it or affiliated with them. Organizations listed were often listed for 
legally protected activity. In fact, the Attorney General told a Senate committee this 
much when he said that some of the organizations on the list were there for “fostering 
American policy favorable to the current policy” of another state or promoting “the 
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defense of specific individuals” or to provide legal defense or “legal aid groups for 
Communists” or teaching “Communist dogma and tactics.”  
Organizations that were listed did not have a hearing nor could they appeal such a 
listing. Determinations were based on classified information that could not be challenged. 
The Attorney General’s list, as Richard Freedland notes, “had a profoundly suppressive 
effect upon political dissent in the United States.” The impact of publishing the list, he 








As a consequence of the second red scare and the activities of the House Un-
American Activities Committee, a number of important things happened that laid the 
groundwork for the COINTELPRO era. First, J. Edgar Hoover and his FBI had become 
empowered to a point never before seen. The number of people working for the FBI went 
from about 2,600 in 1940 to about 13,000 in 1960
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. This of course corresponded with 
significant budgetary increases as well. One outcome of the Temporary Commission on 
Loyalty that Truman established was the finding that the low percentage of loyalty 
checks some agencies had been doing were a result of budgetary constraints. With the 
FBI taking center stage as the clearing house for all loyalty checks during the massive 
expansion of the loyalty program, its resources naturally had to be increased and its 
capacity as a repository for such data grew immensely.   
Second, when Senator Joseph McCarthy took the step of expanding his 
investigations of communist infiltration into the Army, it gave Republican President and 
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war hero Dwight Eisenhower the opportunity he needed to push for McCarthy’s censure 
in the Senate. Previously, Eisenhower had been reluctant to challenge McCarthy although 
he had privately disagreed with his tactics. During his 1952 campaign for President, he 
held back criticism of McCarthy for fear of jeopardizing McCarthy’s home state of 
Wisconsin in the election. After the election, once McCarthy’s attacks on the Army 
began in 1953, McCarthy’s popularity plummeted and Eisenhower could move against 
him.  
The decline of McCarthy and his approach, which many were beginning to see as 
a witch-hunt, meant that Congress’s capacity to act as a blunt instrument of repression 
against the Communist Party would be limited. For the most part, that era was drawing to 
a close. Recognizing this, the Justice Department continued its efforts against the 
Communist Party and its affiliates through aggressive use of the Smith Act
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. From 1953-
1956 alone, the Justice Department brought the indictments of 42 communist party 
leaders under the Smith Act.  
For a decade since the war had ended, the tide had been turning against 
communists in the United States. With Truman’s foreign and domestic doctrine, the 
growth of the FBI, its fervent cooperation with the HUAC and loyalty programs, and the 
fear-spreading zeal of Joseph McCarthy, the Communist Party’s membership dropped to 
about 22,000 members in 1955, down from a peak of about 80,000 a decade earlier. With 
a rapidly dwindling membership, a leadership constantly facing indictment or already in 
prison, and with the admission and denunciation by Soviet Premier Khrushchev of Joseph 
Stalin’s abuses, the Communist Party in the United States was in a state of disarray and 




Why it happened 
In 1955, the Supreme Court agreed to review a case based on the violation of the 
Smith Act. The Court would review whether prosecution of “advocacy” under the Smith 
Act could include mere expression or education or rather would it have to involve real 
actions or calls to actions. The expectation was that the Court would take the civil 
libertarian position and it would ultimately do so in Yates vs. The United States. What 
this meant was that the legal instrument the FBI turned to to crack down on Communist 
Party political activity as the HUAC committee was weakened would no longer be 
available to them.  
Hoover was also eager to flex the muscle of the much larger and more powerful 
organization he now led. Previously, some of his ambitions were met with great 
skepticism from President Truman. In 1950, for example, as the Korean War was 
beginning, Hoover sent a memo to Truman’s office outlining a plan for the suspension of 
hebeas corpus and the detention of approximately 12,000 individuals which Hoover had 
compiled into a master index of individuals “found to be potentially dangerous to the 
internal security.” The index, Hoover wrote: 
… now contains approximately twelve thousand individuals, of which 
approximately ninety-seven per cent are citizens of the United States. 
Immediately upon receipt of instructions and the master warrant from the 
Attorney General the various FBI Field Divisions will be instructed by 
expeditious means to cause the apprehension of the individuals within 
their various territories. Each FBI Field Division maintains an index of the 
individuals within its territory, which index is so arranged that it may be 
used for ready apprehension purposes. Upon apprehension the individuals 







While the Constitution is clear that suspension of the writ of hebeas corpus could 
only happen in times of rebellion or insurrection, Hoover was suggesting doing so in the 
event of an “attack upon the United States; (2) threatened invasion; (3) attack upon 
United States troops in legally occupied territory; and (4) rebellion.”  
Truman ultimately rejected Hoover’s plan and had been skeptical of Hoover from 
the start of his Presidency. He wrote shortly after taking office in 1945 that he was 
concerned about the expansion of the FBI and that “we don’t want no Gestapo or secret 
police. The FBI is trending in that direction.
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” Thus when President Truman established 
the Central Intelligence Agency, which was responsible for foreign intelligence 
collection, he knew he had to keep it separate from the FBI because it could not be under 
the control of one person. Hoover, was irate over this decision and lobbied hard to have 
foreign intelligence under his control but he ultimately lost that battle. His forthcoming 
cooperation with the HUAC was also done over Truman’s objection. Hoover’s 
relationship with the White House would remain tense for as long as Truman was the 
resident, but when Eisenhower was elected this changed.  
President Eisenhower sought to develop strong ties with Hoover and made it one 
of his top priorities. He wrote in his memoirs that “such was my respect” for Hoover, that 
“I invited him to a meeting, my only purpose being to assure him that I wanted him in 
government as long as I might be there and that in the performance of his duties he would 
have the complete support of my office.” Eisenhower also opened the doors of the State 
Department to an FBI purge of communist leaning “security risks” and by 1953 he 
proclaimed that 1,456 “subversives” had been removed. In May of 1955, Eisenhower 
awarded Hoover the National Security Medal for “exercising exceptional tact, 
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perceptiveness, judgment, and brilliant leadership in a position of great responsibility” 
and because Hoover represented “the highest ideals of federal law enforcement and has 
directed them to realization.
94
” 
Under Eisenhower’s leadership, Hoover was operating in a far more comfortable 
and welcoming environment than in Truman’s presidency and he had the opportunity to 
act on some of his ambitions. When he briefed Eisenhower’s cabinet about the 
COINTELPRO program in 1958, about two years after it was initiated, he described the 
infiltration, disinformation, instigation and preemptive political targeting of the 
Communist Party
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. While this program was not initiated by the President, it certainly 
proceeded, at minimum, with his tacit approval 
Along with Hoover’s ambitions, the growing strength of the FBI, the Supreme 
Court’s decision on the Smith Act and the protection of a more welcoming 
administration, another reason for the initiation of the COINTELPRO program was cited 
in the memo initiating the program itself; the weakness and internal divisions of the 
Communist Party: 
During its investigation of the Communist Party, USA, the Bureau has 
sought to capitalize on incidents involving the party and its leaders in 
order to foster factionalism, bring the Communist Party (CP) and its 
leaders into disrepute before the American public and cause confusion and 
dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members of the CP. Generally the 
above action has constituted harassment rather than disruptions since, for 
the most part, the Bureau has set up particular incidents, and the attacks 
have been from the outside, at the present time, however, there is existing 
within the CP a situation….which is made to order for an all-out 
disruptive attack against the CP from within. In other words, the Bureau is 
in a position to initiate, on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a 
counterintelligence program against the CP, not by harassment from the 
outside, which might only serve to bring various factions together, but by 
feeding and fostering from within the internal fight currently raging
96
. 
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After 10 years since the start of the Cold War and in the immediate wake of the 
second red scare, the Communist Party in the United States was very weak. Hoover and 
his FBI could smell the blood of an organization that they had worked to marginalize and 
with COINTELPRO they were going in for the kill. By the end of 1956, after the 
program was established, the Communist Party had only about 4-6,000 members.  
 
What happened  
 
The counterintelligence program started by the FBI in 1956, simply referred to as 
COINTELPRO, continued until its existence was brought to light amid great controversy 
in 1971. This would be just one year before J. Edgar Hoover, a man whose very name 
was synonymous with the FBI, died. Though it began as an effort to disrupt and destroy 
the Communist Party from within, over the course of its 15 year span the program 
targeted many different groups.  
After the efforts of the program against the Communist Party were judged a 
success, COINTELPRO tactics would be applied to other organizations and movements. 
Each group would be classified under a different sub-program. Initially, the 
COINTELPRO file subjects read “CP USA – Counterintelligence” but soon after files 
would be created with subjects on the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), White Hate 
Groups, Black Nationalists, the New Left, Cuba, Hoodwink
97
 and more. Individual 
groups that were targeted included a wide range from the Black Panther Party, to the 
American Nazi Party, to the Students for a Democratic Society, to Antioch College, to 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to the White Panther Party to individual 
newspaper columnists and faculty members at universities.  
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While groups targeted for disruption by the FBI’s COINTELPRO program 
included those on the right and left of the American political spectrum, there was far 
greater emphasis on targeting groups on the left. The number of groups targeted on the 
left was greater and they were targeted more frequently than those on the right. FBI 
activity against groups on the left became most pronounced in the late 1960s, particularly 
around 1968, when opposition to the Vietnam War was reaching a climax.  
Creating infighting between groups was often the chosen strategy of 
COINTELPRO efforts. In one sub-program, “Hoodwink”, the FBI sought to foster 
conflict between the Communist Party and organized crime elements. A memo
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 from the 
FBI director to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in New York stated: 
New York is authorized to mail the anonymous letter and leaflet set out in 
relet as the beginning of a long-range program to cause a dispute between 
La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). To 
strengthen this alleged attack, add a last sentence to the leaflet: “let’s show 
the hoodlums and the bosses that the workers are united against the 
sweatshops.” 
 
Take the usual precautions to insure this mailing cannot be associated with 
the Bureau and advise of tangible results. New York should also submit 
follow-up recommendations to continue this program. 
 
The party has been the subject of recent bombings, a typical hoodlum 
technique. Consider a spurious part statement blaming the LCN for the 
bombs because of Party efforts on behalf of workers. This statement could 
be aimed at specific LCN members is appropriate. 
 
In developing this program, thought should also be given to initiating 
spurious LCN attacks on CPUSA, so that each group would think the 
other was mounting a campaign against it.  
 
Along with seeking to create conflict between groups or movements, 
COINTELPRO also featured suspicion by association. Associations between activists 
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across groups or movements led to widening the scope of COINTELPRO. For example, 
Communist Party members, or former members, who affiliated with activists in other 
movements, like the civil rights movement for example, led the FBI to focus on new 
activists and groups. A prominent example of how this transfer of suspicion worked was 
the focus on Martin Luther King, Jr. for his affiliation with Stanley Levison.  
Levinson was a leader in the Communist Party in the early 1950s. On June 21, 
1952, a secret security investigation was launched into Levinson by the FBI and they 
began tracking him closely. An April 22
nd
, 1959 memo in Stanley Levison’s massive 109 
part FBI file seems to be the one of the first mentions of King in Levison’s file. The 
memo is a report on a “Youth March on Washington” in support of desegregating schools 
three days earlier during which a FBI informant noted that Levison was “partially 
responsible for the initiation of the mechanics” of the march and had also been involved 
in a similar march a few months prior. The memo further states: 
We may assume that Levison’s connection with captioned activity was at 
the behest of King who was one of the motivating forces behind this 
demonstration. Levison’s activities in the last Saturday’s demonstration 
may also have been at the direction of the [Communist Party] as we do 
know that the CP was extremely interested in the demonstration, giving it 
widespread coverage in “The Worker” as well as issuing instructions to 
the CP throughout the eastern United States, particularly that this activity 
should be supported and individual CP members and their families should 
participate in it.  
 
Hoover had long been convinced that the communists were seeking influence in 
“negro organizations” and wanted to expand the effort against King but his conviction 
had consistently been undercut by the facts collected by the FBI and initially there was 
disagreement in the ranks about the prudence of this move. William Sullivan, Assistant 
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Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division presented Hoover with an extensive 
document on the “Communist Party and the Negro” in August 1963 which found the CP 
had failed spectacularly in this regard, quite contrary to Hoover’s contention. Hoover 
dismissed it by hand writing on the memo, “This memo reminds me vividly of those I 
received when Castro took over Cuba. You contended then that Castro and his cohorts 
were not Communists and not influenced by Communists. Time alone proved you wrong. 
I for one can’t ignore the memos as having only an infinitesimal effect on the efforts to 
exploit the American Negro by Communists” 
 
Sullivan’s response was a complete reversal:  
The director is correct. We were completely wrong about believing the 
evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro 
was not a communist or under communist influence. In investigating and 
writing about communist and the American Negro, we had better 
remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us… Therefore, it 
may be unrealistic to limit ourselves as we have been doing to legalistic 
proof or definitively conclusive evidence that would stand up in testimony 
in court or before Congressional committees that the Communist Party, 
USA, does wield substantial influence over Negroes which one day could 
become decisive.  
 
Sullivan then prepared a new memorandum on September 16
th
, 1963 which 
recommended “increased coverage of communist influence on the Negro” the very same 
coverage his report a month early said was not warranted. Hoover, however, was not 
impressed, writing on the memo: 
 
 No, I can’t understand how you can so agilely switch your thinking and 
evaluation. Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist 
influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infinitesimal. This 
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notwithstanding many memos of specific instances of infiltration. Now 
you want to load the field down with more coverage in spite of your recent 
memo depreciating CP influence in racial movement. I don’t intend to 
waste time and money until you can make up your minds what the 
situation really is. 
 
Sullivan went back to the drawing board and returned with yet another memo on 
September 25
th
 noting Hoover’s “continued dissatisfaction with the manner in which” 
FBI personnel had prepared previous briefs on this matter and that “we certainly want to 
do everything possible to correct our shortcomings” and “clarify a most regrettable 
situation.” What follows is an awkward attempt to square the facts that the FBI collected 
with what Hoover wished them to be. The fact that the CP has failed to control or 
dominate the Negroes has been the “historical position in the Bureau” going back “ten to 
twenty years” is “no reason to assume it is the correct position at this time.” The 
“interpretation” Sullivan offered was: 
Facts by themselves are not too meaningful for they are somewhat like 
stones tossed in a heap as contrasted to the same stones put in the form of 
a sound edifice. It is obvious for us now that we did not put the proper 
interpretation upon the facts which we gave to the Director. 
 
Sullivan added “we are in complete agreement with the Director that communist 
influence is being exerted on Martin Luther King, Jr., and that King is the strongest of the 
Negro leaders….the most dangerous and effective negro leader in the country…we know 
the [Communist] party …plans to intensify its efforts to exploit the racial situation for the 
purpose of gaining influence among the Negroes.”  
In closing, under a subheading “Subject of Deep Concern”, Sullivan repeated that 
the “failure to measure up” to the Director’s expectations is a “very deep concern” which 
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the Domestic Intelligence Division is “deeply disturbed by” and “ought to be”. Hoover, 
after underlining the profuse apology in this section, approved the memo on the next page 
authorizing the enhanced scrutiny of King
99
.  
This episode illustrates not only how scrutiny of some groups led to the scrutiny 
of others but also the extent to which one individual, J. Edgar Hoover, had influence over 
making those connections even in the absence of conclusive facts. It seemed that to 
Hoover, if you didn’t find a communist threat in the facts, it was because you simply 
weren’t looking at the facts right. So long as communist influence on a given group was 
possible, it didn’t matter if it was plausible, likely, or supported by a preponderance of 
previous behavior. As in his remark on Cuba and Castro to Sullivan, just because a 
certain cohort is not communist today, doesn’t mean they won’t be tomorrow. This 
pretext, however flimsy, was used to expand FBI operations against Martin Luther King 
and would be used as well to expand and create several COINTELPRO programs against 
a different set of groups, the New Left.  
With the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, the United States was 
moving deeper into war in Vietnam and likewise the anti-war movement was growing as 
well. A number of new organizations on the left became dominant voices in the anti-war 
movement. In recent history, as witnessed in the Truman era, left-wing opposition to 
American foreign policy was coming from the Communist Party or movements affiliated 
with them. The new anti-war organizations were still on the left but were far more 
detached from the old left. This new left nonetheless came under FBI scrutiny in its 




The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), perhaps the single largest group 
within the New Left that fell under COINTELPRO scrutiny, was defined in the FBI 
program’s files as having affiliations with the Communist Party. A quote from the 
Communist Party General Secretary was featured along with information about the 
removal of an anti-communist proviso from the SDS constitution in 1965 and the 
comments by an SDS spokesman about communists being welcome.  
Similarly, the Southern Student Organizing Committee (SSOC) was described in 
the files as an organization formed in 1966 to “stimulate activity of Southern student 
groups in areas of civil rights, peace, academic freedom, civil liberties, capital 
punishment and unemployment.” The organization published the “New South Student” 
which according to an FBI source “has increasingly espoused and defended the pro-
Communist and anti-United States position on domestic and foreign policy.” The 
description continues with focus on students who attended CPUSA conferences or camps.  
This was a prevalent pattern throughout many of the COINTELPRO files on the 
New Left organizations. These groups were considered potentially subversive not 
because of any illegal actions they took or real threats they presented to the state but 
rather because they had often over exaggerated connections,  to one degree or another, to 
the Communist Party.  
It is impossible to measure exactly what kind of effect COINTELPRO had on the 
various groups that were targeted though there are a number of known results from the 
efforts to create factionalism and disputes. There are numbers available on the extent of 
COINTELPRO which are depicted in the chart below. These numbers come from a report 
issued by the Ford administration Attorney General William B. Saxbe. Saxbe had been 
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briefed on COINTELPRO when he first took over the Department of Justice and directed 
his assistant to prepare a report on the program. A few weeks after raising the matter with 
President Ford, the report
100






According to the report there were twelve types of activities which made up the 
majority of actions taken under the program. The most prevalent was “sending 
anonymous of fictitious materials to members or groups” which amount to almost 40% of 
all activities. Next was “dissemination of public record information to media sources” 
which made up some 20% of COINTELPRO efforts. The rest included leaking informant 
based information to media, advising local law enforcement about civil and criminal 
violations of groups, using informants to disrupt a group, informing employers and 
creditors of members’ activities, informing businesses with whom members have 
dealings, interviewing or contacting members, attempting to use religious and civil 







255 289 362 222 
13 128 77 76 




New Left Black Extreemists 
Actions Taken Under Five Domestic 
COINTELPRO Programs 1956-1971 
Proposed Actions Approved and Implemented Known results 
Chart 2. Actions Taken Under COINTELPRO 
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sham organizations for disruptive purposes and informing family or others of radical or 
immoral activity.  
COINTELPRO was exposed when activists broke into an FBI office in 1971, 
stole a series of files including many COINTELPRO files, and reported them to the press. 
Shortly thereafter the program was discontinued. The following year Hoover, who had 
personally approved almost all COINTELPRO actions and who had started as a 22-year 
old managing the Alien Enemy Bureau during Wilson’s First World War repressive 
wave, finally died. The passing of both Hoover and the COINTELPRO program marked 





Key Factors Influencing Decision Making 
 
Domestic Politics and Electoral Concerns 
 
In the cases surveyed above, domestic politics and electoral concerns played 
important roles the decision making on repression and civil liberties curtailment. This 
was most pronounced in the Truman administration and the Second Red Scare. The shift 
in government behavior was in large part motivated by the administration’s need to deal 
with political attacks from both the left and the right. The decision to announce the 
Truman doctrine both internally and externally, and in the particular tone in which it was 
announced was based in part on domestic political calculations. The domestic political 
threat to Truman’s presidency was perceived to be serious and this perception was 
heightened by the Wallace debacle, its fall out, the victory of Truman’s political 
opponents in 1946 midterm elections and poor polling numbers for Truman’s reelection 
prospects in 1948.  
 
Public Opinion and Interest Groups 
 
During the World War One era, public opinion was a key factor in the decision 
making process around repression. President Wilson perceived public opinion against the 
war to be a threat to the war effort and took several steps to limit the ability of dissenting 
voices to affect public opinion. This took the form of the Committee for Public 
Information, which served as a propaganda arm that aimed to move public opinion in 
favor of the War and Wilson’s policies. It also took the forms of several repressive 
measures aimed at eliminating critical pamphlets and publications from the mails, 
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censoring foreign language press, arresting dissidents and disrupting organizations like 
the IWW and parties like the SPA. 
Public Opinion and interest groups also played a decisive role during the decision 
making process around the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two. 
Interest groups, particularly groups representing the interests of white farmers, worked to 
lobby officials to remove their Japanese competitors. This helped ignite a hysteria among 
public opinion that was reflected in the press and would come to influence elected 
officials in western states that in turn lobbied the Roosevelt Administration. Roosevelt 
himself was consumed with matters of far greater consequence as public opinion grew 
increasingly in favor of removing the Japanese. With his Justice Department and War 
Department at odds over the prudence of such a move, there is little doubt that the 
upsurge in anti-Japanese attitudes and the efforts of representatives helped decisively 
push Roosevelt in the direction of internment.  
During the Second Red Scare, public opinion also played a major role. Unlike the 
situation with Japanese internment where public opinion pushed Roosevelt to take 
repressive action, in Truman’s case, he pushed public opinion to create certain conditions 
from which repressive action followed. Truman’s speech significantly shifted public 
opinion, creating a frenzy that enabled legislative action. The executive order on loyalty 
boards, which soon followed, help shaped this frenzy into a more serious fear. These 
conditions led to the growth of the FBI, the reinvigoration of the HUAC, and paved the 
way for the passage of the Taft-Hartley act. Truman himself may have regretted the chain 





Role of Key Individuals and Agencies 
 
In several instances in the surveyed cases, certain individuals and agencies played 
critical roles in the decision processes that led to repressive outcomes. During World War 
One, Wilson himself played a major role, not only in directly issuing executive orders but 
also by lobbying congress. Wilson paid more attention than most of his peers to 
Congress. In fact, Wilson enrolled in Johns Hopkins University to study history and 
politics and, perhaps ironically, German. His doctoral dissertation focused on the unique 
role of Congress in American government and he wrote in the preface of his dissertation 
that “It is out legislative and administrative machinery which makes out government 
essentially different from all other great governmental systems.” Wilson, more than any 
other President, directly spoke to Congress and used his prestige and the prestige of his 
office to address joint sessions of Congress on multiple occasions to argue for 
congressional support of his agenda. He often made symbolic speeches at key moments 
to support his aims like the speech he gave on Flag Day in 1917 where he warned about 
domestic opposition to the war being a function of “agents and dupes of the Imperial 
German Government” just a day before signing the Espionage Act of 1917 into law.  
Similarly during Japanese internment, individuals like Stimson and especially 
Dewitt played major roles in enabling the ultimate decision to intern. Dewitt, with the 
backing of the War Department, failed to implement the Munson plan and push instead 
for evacuation. The division that arose between the War and Justice departments over this 
issue also highlighted how important the agencies are in the decision making process and 
how differences in opinion may be significant. The Justice Department was opposed, 
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while the War department was advocating for internment. Ultimately, Roosevelt sided 
with the War Department after getting a final and decisive push from public opinion.  
Attorney General Thomas Clark in the Truman Administration also played an 
important role in creating the conditions necessary for repressive outcomes. He was 
charged with implementing certain elements of Truman’s loyal order and produced a list 
of subversive organizations. Clark’s Justice Department cooperated with Congress’ 
HUAC and strengthened its repressive hand. Perhaps Clark’s most significant personal 
contribution in this area was his opening of the door to Hoover’s direct cooperation with 
Congress’s anti-communist efforts. In contrast with his predecessor, Francis Biddle who 
was wary of Hoover’s anti-communist bias and prevented him from appearing before 
Congress, Clark reversed this policy and pushed Hoover to the fore.  
Hoover as well played a central role, most directly in the case of COINTELPRO 
where his direct personal decision dictated the majority of the programs. Hoover’s 
personal views, as evidenced by the remarkable correspondence with Sullivan, was 
sufficient on its own to dictate bureau policy even when the facts dictated otherwise. 
Presidents were wary of Hoover, particularly Truman who had watched Hoover’s power 
grow to previously unseen levels, and many politicians were afraid of him precisely 
because of the vast data collection efforts he directed on the lives of a wide range of 
Americans.   While Hoover’s personal actions were most influential in the 
COINTELPRO episode and to a lesser extent the Second Red Scare, Hoover was in fact 
the only actor of any significance who had been involved in the repressive apparatus, in 






One element common in all of these cases was threat exaggeration. Key actors at 
various levels and in multiple instances characterized the threat facing the nation in a 
greatly exaggerated manner. During World War I, Wilson used his speeches to declare 
that the “sinister intrigue” of the “Imperial German Government” involved “agents and 
dupes” and was being conducted “no less actively” in the United States, an ocean away 
from the European continent, than “in Russia and in every country in Europe.” These 
“agents” were “in places high and low” and have “learned discretion.” Such 
characterizations were propelled with the help of the Committee for Public Information 
which, among other things, prepared widely disseminated posters with the heading 
“Destroy this Mad Brute”. The poster showed a massive ape-like monster standing in 
America wearing a picklehaube labeled “militarism” holding an anguished half-naked 
white maiden in one hand and a huge club in the other hand. The club was labeled 
“Kultur”, the German word for culture. The implication was clear, the threat was in 
America, it was monstrous, it wielded German culture as a weapon and would prey on 
the vulnerable.  
Similarly during World War Two, DeWitt and others exaggerated the threat from 
Japanese-Americans to justify interning them. Despite reports, both from Munson and the 
FBI, which were supported by the Attorney General and made clear that there was no 
threat from Japanese-Americans at large that would warrant such drastic action, DeWitt 
consistently made the opposite case even when the facts were not on his side. He even 




Likewise, Truman deliberately exaggerated the communist threat and set a tone of 
fear through his international and domestic Truman doctrine. This was done precisely to 
create the hysteria he later decried in his memoirs. Truman’s loyalty commission, whose 
hurried report the loyalty order was based on, based their recommendations in part on 
information from a obdurate Attorney General that refuse to provide actual numbers on 
the suspected number of subversives but rather said “even one disloyal person” 
constitutes a “serious threat” to the “security of the United States.” 
When Hoover initiated the COINTELPRO program, he did so not because the 
communist party’s influence had grown, but rather because the party was weak. 
Nonetheless, the specter of the communist threat was used throughout COINTELPRO to 
open investigation after investigation and launch disruptive operations against dissenting 
groups. When Sullivan, who would go on to be the architect of the COINTELPRO 
programs targeting the New Left, told Hoover the facts didn’t show communists were 




What is suggested by the cases above is that the decisions that lead to repressive 
outcomes are complex and can involve a variety of factors. Some of the key factors that 
motivated decisions in the cases surveyed are stated above. In all of the cases, however, 
there is great doubt that the groups targeted with repression were targeted because they 
represented a serious threat to the state. Nor does the historical evidence suggest that the 
degree of repression or curtailment of civil liberties was a function of the extent of the 
threat presented.  
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In the WWI case, anti-war activists presented a threat to Wilson’s campaign for 
public opinion which was needed to maintain support for the war. But the activities of the 
anti-war activists themselves, negligible in number in comparison to the security 
apparatus and the size of the state, presented no credible threat to state security. When it 
came to Japanese internment, there were multiple intelligence agencies along with the 
Attorney General making the fact-based case to the President that no credible threat 
existed from the Japanese-American population. During the Second Red Scare, we know 
that Truman did not perceive a serious threat from communists in the United States which 
he referred to as a “bugaboo” and later reiterated the same sentiment in his memoirs. In 
the COINTELPRO case, perhaps the most counterintuitive of all, the FBI launched an 
intensified effort to debilitate the Communist Party, not because the Party was strong and 
presented a credible threat to the state but rather precisely because the Party was weak 
and in a state of disarray.  
All of this evidence suggests that the widely held assumptions about why states 
repress or why civil liberties are curtailed are flawed. This can only come to light, 
however, through a case-study approach which carefully traces causal mechanisms and 
seeks to understand what exactly weighed into the decision making processes which 







Chapter 3 - Nixon & the Middle East: Viewed through a Cold War Lens 
 
 
The Soviets are prepared to move forward on a whole range of topics: 
Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, Arms control (strategic arms 
talks), cultural exchange. In other words, we have the ‘linkage’. 




If I was to tell you that the following pages reveal how a Nixon White 
House conspiracy came to be and that a clandestine oval office tape recorder 
provided the smoking gun, you might think you have already heard this story. But 
this is not about the infamous Watergate scandal. Rather, this is the story about 
how in late September of 1972 the Nixon White House cut a secret deal with the 
Israeli Ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin, which very few people ever knew about. In 
return for Rabin’s help with quelling pro-Israel interest groups that were lobbying 
congress to challenge a US-Soviet Trade Bill which would hurt the White House 
just before the election, Nixon agreed to form a Cabinet level counter-terrorism 
committee and support an longstanding Israeli arms request. The formation of this 
committee resulted in the repression of Arab-Americans and others thought to be 
supportive of Palestinian aspirations. From what my research yields, it seems only 
three people knew about this undisclosed pact; Nixon, Rabin and Nixon’s top 
aide, Henry Kissinger. Two of the three have taken this secret with them to the 
grave and the third, Kissinger, has never acknowledged it.  
So how did this come about? What made conditions ripe for such a deal? 
Why were pro-Israel interest groups attacking a US trade deal with the Soviet 
Union? Why did Nixon have to go to the Israeli Ambassador for help with his 
own Congress? Why was Nixon desperate enough to cut such a deal? To answer 
these questions and understand how this deal was made in the fall of 1972, we 
must first go back a few years prior and trace the development of Nixonian 
foreign policy in the Middle East, with the Soviet Union and the White House’s 
relationship with Congress and interest groups throughout this period.  
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In the following five chapters, I engage in a deeper exploration of a case where 
the decision that led to a repressive outcome is traced using primary documents and 
recently declassified information.  On September 21
st
, 1972, President Richard Nixon 
decided to establish a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT). This committee, 
and most importantly its working group, engaged in a series of efforts that would have 
repressive effects on the Arab-American community. The factors that weighed into 
Nixon’s decision had been developing for years prior and finally came to a head on that 
late September day. These included foreign policy matters, domestic constraints, special 
interest groups and an impending election. As in the cases surveyed in the previous 
chapter, but in far greater detail, I will provide contextual background information around 
the decision in this main case, answer why it happened as well as what happened as a 
result. 
In the moment of history to where we now draw our focus, Nixon was engaged in 
a foreign policy of détente during the Cold War. America was stuck in Vietnam where 
the war had escalated in a very costly way under Nixon’s predecessor. The Middle East, a 
Cold War battle ground, had just seen a transformational war the year before Nixon was 
elected between American and Soviet client states and it remained turbulent throughout 
his Presidency. There was a variety of issues that connected the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Israel and the Arabs during this time including ongoing clashes in the Middle 
East, the activities of militant groups, détente related treaties and a sometimes 
uncooperative Congress that was needed to ratify them, multi-party talks for Middle East 
peace, a crisis in Jordan, violent attacks on Soviet diplomatic targets in America and 
concerns about Soviet Jewish émigrés.  
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The decision to establish the CCCT, as we will see in the following pages, was 
not the response to a terrorist attack but rather the outcome of a bargain with a foreign 
actor that very few people knew about at the time and, it is likely, very few people know 
about to this day before this writing. The conditions for a trade off became ripe when the 
key elements of the foreign policy agenda of a President facing election were challenged 
by domestic interests groups tied to a foreign actor. Nixon agreed to concede to requests 
made by the Israeli ambassador in return for his cooperation in corralling interest groups 
and their influence in Congress.  
I trace this decision making process using primary source evidence including 
verbatim conversations in the candid voices of the participants themselves captured on 
audio tape. What this evidence reveals is precisely why and how the decision to establish 
the CCCT was made and what factored into the trade off. The evidence about what 
motivated the decision in this case, not unlike the cases surveyed above, seems 
completely at odds with the assumptions prevalent in the literature about what leads to 
repressive outcomes. 
It is impossible, however, to understand how and why the bargain that resulted in 
the CCCT was made without understanding the foreign and domestic political contexts in 
which it took place. The bargain itself was the product of a nexus between American, 
Soviet and Israeli foreign policy, the interests and objectives of these actors, and how 
those interests and objectives interacted with each other within domestic American 
political institutions. Before we can effectively grasp how this nexus produced the CCCT, 
we must first understand what those policies and interests were.  
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The following chapters will explore these contexts to situate the immediate time 
around which the decision to establish the CCCT was made. This chapter, chapter three, 
begins this by exploring the foreign policy context relative to President Nixon’s decision; 
US interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, each Great Power’s objectives and positions in 
the Middle East, Israeli Foreign Policy objectives and a crisis in a Cold War flashpoint 




The US and the World in 1969 
 
As Richard Nixon came into the White House in January of 1969, over 36,000 US 
military personnel had already been killed in Vietnam, most during a period of escalation 
under his predecessor Lyndon Johnson. The US found itself mired deeply in a conflict 
that it had been engaged in for fifteen years with no end in sight. The War was draining 
resources and increasingly unpopular at home to the point of causing significant unrest. It 
became clear that the policy of large scale intervention to contain the spread of 
communism had failed and should not be repeated.  
Still, Nixon felt he had to find a way out of Vietnam with as much US military 
credibility in tact as possible and while military intervention in the cause of containment 
was to be avoided, containment by other means was vital. To achieve these ends the 
Nixon Administration set out on a course of détente and triangulation. Vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union, Nixon sought to improve relations and reach strategic weapons agreements 
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to limit the rapid growth of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal and maintain a balance of power. 
With China, Nixonian foreign policy exploited a growing split between Beijing and 
Moscow and opened the door to China in 1972, further incentivizing the USSR to 
cooperate. It was thought that improved relations with China and the USSR would better 
the chances of a respectable US withdrawal from Vietnam and pursue containment via 
diplomatic means.  
 
US, the USSR and the Middle East : Post-1967 Reevaluation 
 
Less than two years prior, before Nixon’s term in White House started, a major 
war in the Middle East fundamentally changed the region and many of the assumptions 
which underpinned policy. Israel managed, in six days, to exploit a divided, surprised and 
strategically inept Egyptian military and succeeded in conquering and occupying the 
Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights from Syria and the Palestinian territories of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The 1967 war would prove to be a pivotal moment in the US-Israel 
relationship and created a much clearer alignment of governments throughout the region 
with either the US or the USSR. Likewise, this was a moment during which Washington 
would pause to reevaluate its foreign policy in the region, what its interests were, and 
how this all related to the most important issue in global politics; the Cold War.  
Indeed, reevaluating American foreign policy in the Middle East was an 
immediate national security priority from the very first day of the Nixon Administration. 
On January 21
st
, 1969, President Nixon ordered the National Security Council to study 
“alternative US policy approaches aimed at securing a Middle East settlement” and 
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“alternative views of basic US interests in the area.” The study was supposed to address 
several specific questions
101
 about the Middle East. This order was given in the form of a 
Presidential Directive labeled “National Security Study Memorandum 2.
102
” The only 
Nixon administration national security memorandum which preceded this was on 
Vietnam
103
 where the US had half a million troops, perhaps indicative of the seriousness 
and immediacy with which the Administration viewed the Middle East. 
The NSC report
104
 in response characterized US involvement in the Middle East: 
 
We are deeply involved in the Middle East for two fundamental purposes: 
(1) because we wish to assure the survival of Israel and (2) because, in 
terms of our global strategic interests, we do not wish the land mass, 
population and resources of the eastern Arab world to fall under Soviet 
domination. We seek the achievement of both purposes. But, given the 
underlying forces of conflict in the area, pursuit of either purpose tends to 
militate against the achievement of the other. While neither purpose is 
“vital” in the strict sense that failure to achieve it would require us to go to 
war to safeguard our national security, both are of sufficient importance 
that we cannot disengage from the area without sustaining a serious blow 
to our Great Power position. 
 
Soviet Influence in the Region: Post-War Deepening of Ties  
 
While the United States was increasingly relying on foreign sources of oil, the 
Soviet Union was a net exporter. So even though both great powers had interests in the 
region the US viewed their interests there as more vital than the Soviets did. The Soviet 
strategy in the region, as seen by the US intelligence community
105
, was to exploit 
“postcolonial resentments and especially the Arab-Israel conflict…[they] seek to deny the 
area to Western interests an influence.” However, they “have not seen the area as one 
which engaged their most vital national interests; these remain focused on their relations 
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with the US in general, on Eastern and Central Europe, and on their conflict with 
Communist China.” 
The Soviets maintained four instruments of power in the region; military aid, 
economic assistance, economic interests, and a Soviet military presence. After the war in 
June of 1967, “the Soviet military presence has grown,” in the region “roughly 5,000 
Soviet military advisers [were] stationed in several area countries; the Soviet naval 
squadron in the Mediterranean has been strengthened, and is supported by air and port 
facilities in Egypt.
106
” The number of Soviet personnel in Arab countries “jumped rapidly 
to about four times its prewar level and continued to be maintained there.
107
” The charts 
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Clearly, Syria and Egypt, the two most significant strategic challenges to Israel, 
the American client state in the region, were the states with which the USSR had the most 
leverage. After the war, the Soviets had increased their military spending and ties with 
these two states in particular. In the 18 months after the war the USSR delivered an 
estimated $360 million in military aid to Cairo and $118 million to Damascus which 
amounted to 35% and 37% respectively of the aggregate aid given to those countries in 
the 13 year period preceding that.  
But Soviet influence also had its limitations among the Arab states. Most of the 
trade relations in the region, for example, were characterized by strong western leaning 
ties. Beyond Syria and Egypt, the Soviet leverage was greater in Iraq and South Yemen 
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Lebanon fell somewhere in between, they were “not anxious to cooperate with the 
Soviets but [tried] to maintain good relations.
108
” 
In regard to Israel, the US intelligence community believed the Soviets did “not 
have full master over [their] own policies.” Instead, “it is obliged by its relations with the 
radical Arabs…to maintain a hostile attitude. This is made easier by the USSR’s 
unremitting opposition to ‘Zionism’, which the Soviet leaders see as an internal security 
problem in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
109
”  
Zionism, the ideology of Jewish colonial nationalism, was seen also as an internal 
security problem because of the issue of Soviet Jewry. Israel encouraged Jewish 
immigration and the Soviet Union was home to millions of Jews who could be potential 
émigrés. As a matter of ideological principle, Communism was averse to ethnic 
nationalism in general but Zionism created other practical concerns for the Soviets. As 
Israel continued to shift more solidly into the American axis, and profoundly so after 
1967, Jews seeking to emigrate or promote emigration to Israel were viewed with 
suspicion, sometimes as foreign agents. Another challenge posed by mass emigration of 
Soviet Jews was “brain drain” or the flight of intellectual capacity which the state had 
invested in through socialized education programs. It is unclear what, if anything, 
domestic Soviet policies toward its Jewish citizens had anything to do with Soviet-Arab 
relations. 
In the Arab-Israel conflict, the patron-client relationship was complicated. The 
Soviets needed the Arabs to maintain a strategic foothold in a region where it sought to 
deter American hegemony and the Arabs needed the Soviets to balance Great Power 
American support for their regional adversary, Israel. In the view of US intelligence, this 
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often led to the Soviets being “a prisoner of Arab emotions rather than the architect of 
Arab policies” and made the Soviets recognize that in order to maintain their position 




Middle East Peace Making 
 
When it came to evaluating the US approach to Middle East peace, the NSC 
considered
111
 several options including 1) leaving the matter to the parties without 
diplomatic support, 2) vigorous diplomatic support, 3) a bi-lateral US-USSR led 
negotiation, and 4) a four-power approach that would include the US, USSR, UK and 
France. The authors viewed the latter approach, the four-power approach, as the most 
attractive. They identified doing “everything possible to establish the minimal military 
and political stability in the area” because if there was a new war “the consequences for 
the United States would be serious.” Renewed hostilities would “risk a Soviet-American 
confrontation.” “Unfortunately”, the authors noted, the prospects of managing the 
situation without renewed hostilities were slim without a new settlement.  
An alternative interest would be a piecemeal approach to a settlement and not a 
single grand design. This would “entail not recognizing the legitimacy of the present 
territorial situation, yet resisting any tendency to alter it by force or other improper 
pressure”.  
The authors would end with “a final word about US-Israeli relations.” To attain 
the minimum of stability and control over the situation “requires some pressure on 
Israel.” Thus, it was important to be clear where US and Israeli interests coincided and 
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where they did not. Americans would not tolerate the obliteration of Israel but they were 
not equally interested in the boundaries of Israel nor in its policies. Further, Americans 
want a settlement that will last and want to preserve some position of friendship with a 
hundred million Arabs. Finally, it was necessary to avoid a conventional or nuclear 
confrontation between the US and the USSR. Outlining these difference were vital 
because: 
The United States Government will undoubtedly face heavy pressures by 
groups which favor total support for Israel and its policies and to a much 
lesser extent pressures from certain pro-Arab interests, including the oil 
industry. We can expect that such pressures will continue. It will be 
important to develop maximum understanding of our policy at home so 
that the Administration will have maximum flexibility in pursuing our 
national interest in the area as we see it.  
 
Moving forward, Arab-Israeli peace making became a priority for the Nixon 
Administration. Nixon liked to keep significant foreign policy decision making as close 
to himself as possible but unlike other major issues like Vietnam and Soviet relations 
which were handled primarily through the White House and Kissinger, the Middle East 
Peacemaking portfolio would belong to the State Department and Secretary of State 
William Rogers – at least for now. 
Nixon saw some good things in Rogers but did not seem to trust him on the most 
important issues. Giving Rogers the Middle East portfolio instead of Kissinger is likely 
due to two things. First, Nixon feared that the prospects for success in the Middle East 
were slim and by identifying the issue as Rogers’ and not the White House’s, it would be 
easier to deflect blame incase of failure and also in the case the pressure from pro-Israel 
interest groups escalated. Second, Kissinger noted in his memoirs that Nixon hesitated to 
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give Kissinger this portfolio because of Kissinger’s Jewish background and the fear that 
this would make a perception of even-handedness impossible.  
The reevaluation of Middle East Peace Making policy which began as soon as the 
Nixon administration took office eventually became the basis for what would be known 
as the “Rogers Plan”. The State Department would take the lead. Joseph Sisco, the new 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, would soon conduct a 
flurry of meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the spring of 1969 to outline the 
plan.  
The Nixon Administration saw the Middle East as one of a number of issues of 
interest between them and the Soviets which would be addressed through “linkage”. This 
meant that issues of interest between the two nations would not be negotiated 
independently. Dobrynin’s first meeting with President Nixon set the tone of this and was 
interpreted as a positive start to relations.  
President Nixon asked Kissinger to provide an analysis of the substance of the 
February 17
th
 meeting with Dobrynin and his proposals. Kissinger
112
 would describe it 
was “extraordinarily forthcoming” and “totally non-ideological—even anti-ideological” 
grounded in “national interests and mutually perceived threats” without the usual “ritual 
obeisance to Marxist-Leninist jargon.” Dobrynin’s message advanced “the dialogue 
between the Soviet Union and the United States beyond mere détente and into the realm 
of overt Soviet-American cooperation in the solution of outstanding international 
problems and the maintenance of peace.” 
96 
 
“The Soviets,” Kissinger noted in his reaction, “are prepared to move forward on 
a whole range of topics: Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, Arms control (strategic 
arms talks), cultural exchange. In other words, we have the ‘linkage’.” 
US- Soviet discussions were met with great skepticism by the Israelis. By mid-
May
113
, Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin had requested a meeting with Kissinger to ask 
“What is the purpose of present US talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East?” 
Kissinger wanted to reassure Rabin, but also explained that both the US “and the USSR 
have an interest in avoiding confrontation with one another.” The purpose of the current 
conversations was to explore how hard the Soviets would be willing to push the 
Egyptians. Rabin believed that “there is a substantial difference between Israel’s 
definition of peace and the concept which underlay the proposals [Washington] had made 
to the Russians.”  
So even though Rogers would have the Middle East Peace portfolio, there is no 
doubt that Nixon and Kissinger understood the connection between moving forward on 
Soviet relations, Middle East issues and domestic politics as well. This disaggregation of 
related responsibilities would ultimately cause friction down the line and force a 
realignment of responsibilities as well as a realignment of personnel. In the short term, 
however, Rogers and the State Department would proceed with peacemaking efforts.  
High-ranking officials from Israel and Egypt would visit Washington throughout the year 
and it seemed as if progress was being made. The Israelis were hesitant and preferred to 
focus on securing weapons sales from Washington during this period. There was such 
suspicion on the part of the Israelis during the Rogers plan discussions that a backchannel 
hotline between Israel and Washington through its Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin and Henry 
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Kissinger was established after a visit by then Israeli PM Golda Meir to the White House 
in the fall of 1969. Rabin and Kissinger initiated what would become a long series of 
telephonic conversations on that line on October 10
th
, 1969.  
Before the United Nations General Assembly President Nixon lent support to the 
idea of a Middle East peace agreement. During this time, Sisco and Rogers also met with 
Dobrynin and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York. Yet while many public 
indications suggested Washington and Moscow would be moving closer to a unified 
approach, the secret backchannel Nixon and Kissinger established for the Israelis created 
a different perception in Tel Aviv.  
In November, Rabin met again with Kissinger to express the Israeli government’s 
position on the talks. The Israeli Prime Minister believed the US “had made a great 
mistake” and in fact had “undermined” Israel’s position. Rabin stressed the US approach 
with the Soviets was “basically wrong.” The Israelis felt that no concrete discussions 
about future borders should be taking place and they had no intention of withdrawing to 
pre-June 5
th
, 1967 boundaries. The US was giving too much away, in their view, to the 
Soviets during these discussions. Rabin closed by stressing the importance of continued 
weapons shipments to Israel, “especially planes” and Kissinger reiterated what President 
Nixon had told the Israeli Prime Minister a little over a month prior; “serious and 
sympathetic consideration was being given” to these requests
114
.   
In December of 1969, Rogers outlined his plan publicly. In a speech before the 
Galaxy Conference on Adult Education in Washington on December 9
th
, Secretary 
Rogers described the details of a plan that would seek an agreed interpretation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 242
115
.  “Our Policy is and will continue to be a 
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balanced one,” Rogers said in his lengthy speech. Later he would go on to say “The 
problem posed by refugees will become increasingly serious if their future is not 
resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown 
up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration toward 
hope and justice.” 
The Nixon Administration was quickly feeling pressure from pro-Israel interest 
groups in the United States. Attorney General John Mitchell and Special Assistant to the 
President Leonard Garment had been tasked by Nixon to, among other things, liaise with 
the Jewish community. Mitchell “warned Nixon of the domestic buzz saw”
116
 he was 
facing. Garment was in touch with the heads of Jewish organizations like Max Fisher, the 
very influential President of the Council of Jewish Federations. Fisher was irate that he 
hadn’t seen a copy of Roger’s speech before he delivered it. The “understanding was,” as 
Fisher put it in a phone conversation, “if there’s going to be a shift in policy toward the 
Middle East [he] was to be kept informed.”
117
 Kissinger brought this to the attention of 
President Nixon the same day
118
 stating that Fisher “called and said [the Administration] 
was undercutting the Jewish position.” Nixon directed Kissinger to have Sisco reach out 
to Fisher. Sisco did, admitting he had “goofed” by merely telling Fisher about the speech 
when instead he “should have sent him the draft speech ahead of time.” Sisco told Fisher 
he “would take full responsibility” for the error.
119
  
But while domestic pro-Israel interest groups were making their objections heard 
over what they believed to be a pro-Arab speech by Rogers, one of Nixon’s concerns was 
that the speech may not have been sympathetic enough to Arab audiences. In a National 
Security Council meeting the day after the speech, the President opened the discussion by 
99 
 
noting; “In the last two weeks the pressures to see me on the Mid-East have been 
mounting. Oil people were in yesterday; the Israeli group in Congress is ready to jump 
down our throats.”  Nixon said that during his recent meeting with business leaders 
representing oil interests, they expressed serious concerns about an upcoming Arab 
Summit where “pressures for a united Arab front” would “be too great for our moderate 
friends to resist.” Rogers “speech”, Nixon said, would “probably enrage the Israelis, but 





The quandary was the product of what Kissinger described a several “conflicting 
US interests” in the region at the outset of the meeting including an Arab-Israeli 
settlement, steadfast support for Israel and not worsening relations with the Arabs since 
U.S. “investment in oil is heavy and Western Europe and Japan depend on Mid-East oil 
supply”
122
.  It is those conflicting interests that lead the President to ask this open-ended 
question to his top national security advisors: “Assume for the sake of discussion that 
there is no domestic political pressure and that there is no moral question of continuing 
support involved, would the U.S. foreign policy interests be served by dumping Israel?” 
In the following days in a private conversation, President Nixon instructed Henry 
Kissinger to tell the Israelis that the “private reassurances” given to Meir “remained 
firm.” In fact, Nixon wanted Meir to know that the Rogers plan was “just a damn charade 
we are playing. We don’t want her to indicate everything is fine,” the President told 
Kissinger, “tell her I think it is helpful to indicate disappointment with Roger’s speech.” 
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Within days the Israeli cabinet seemed to comply. It issued a statement in reaction 
to the speech calling it an “attempt to appease [the Arabs] at the expense of Israel.” The 
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balancing act the United States was playing between oil interests and pro-Israel interests 
became increasingly tricky.  Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington had 
been summoned back to Israel for instructions. He returned to Washington in late 
December “with approval to launch a public campaign against the Rogers plan.”   
Upon returning Rabin met with Kissinger in the White House on December 26, 
1969. He made Israel’s objections clear and said “I personally shall do everything within 
the bounds of American law to arouse public opinion against the administration’s moves!
 
124
” Kissinger begged Rabin, “under no circumstances should you attack the president!” 
Kissinger explained that the President had not personally invested in Rogers’ approach 
and that an attack on the President would be “the last thing Israel can afford.” Rogers, 
Kissinger told him, had been given a free hand but “as long as [the President] is not 
publicly committed, you have a chance of taking action. How you act is your affair. What 
you say to Rogers, or against him, is for you to decide. But I advise you again; don’t 
attack the president!
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” Rabin was perplexed by this message. Here was Kissinger, an 
American official, offering him advice on how to attack plans emanating from Nixon 
administration. As Rabin was leaving, Kissinger’s phone rang at about 12:20pm
126
. It was 
the President: 
Nixon: Are you here? 
Kissinger: Yes. 
Nixon: Could you come over to talk to Mel [Defense Secretary Laird] and 
me? Are you with somebody? 
Kissinger: The Israeli ambassador is with me. Could I come over in 5 
minutes….Actually, it would only take me 3 minutes. 





After hanging up, Kissinger returned to Rabin. “The president would like to shake 
hands with you”. He said, “Shall we go in and see him for a few minutes?” 
“Here we were on the brink of a major political battle with the United States” 
Rabin wrote recalling the moment. “It was almost unheard of for an ambassador to see 
the president without prior notice or without even requesting a meeting!
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”  
During the 7 to 8 minute meeting, as Rabin recalls, the President reiterated his 
commitment to militarily and economically supporting Israel and urged Rabin to follow 
up on all these matters through Kissinger. While the records show that the meeting was in 
fact impromptu and unplanned, Rabin left under a different impression. “When we took 
leave of one another,” Rabin recalls, “I could only guess at the purpose of it all. Was 
Kissinger trying to prove to me – and by way of me, to the Israeli government – that the 
president’s attitude toward Israel differed from that of the State Department? Was he 
inviting me to drive a wedge between these two branches of the administration, or merely 
trying to ensure that we keep our fire far from the White House?
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” 
As Rabin worked out the answers to these questions, Soviet rejection of Rogers’ 
proposal followed. Nonetheless, Rabin began “full-scale activity” in the public campaign 
against the Rogers plan. Rabin “buttonholed senators, congressmen, and representatives 
of the media and addressed a meeting of three thousands Jewish leaders from all over the 
United States. [He] worked up enough momentum to subject Rogers and Sisco to a forty 
minute monologue on the damage they had wrought on Israel’s ability to negotiate with 
her neighbors
129
.” Rogers mentioned the discussion in a phone conversation the following 
day to Kissinger, describing it simply as “acrimonious”
130
.  The Rogers plan was 
essentially stopped dead in its tracks. 
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The Rogers plan was doomed from the outset because the President was never 
prepared to get behind the Secretary of State, as Kissinger put it, “he was not yet ready to 
press Israel, largely for domestic reasons.” Nonetheless, Nixon was not going to publicly 
contradict his Secretary of State. Rogers pressed forward with his plan while Nixon and 
Kissinger knew of, and precipitated, its impending derailment.  
Much of this was a product of an ongoing struggle within the policy making elite 
in Washington which pitted the White House against the State Department or, more 
directly, Secretary of State Rogers against National Security Aide Henry Kissinger. Many 
in the State department believed that a Middle East stalemate strengthened the Soviet 
presence in the region. Others, like Kissinger, disagreed and argued instead that the 
stalemate would do the opposite. Proponents of this view believed that so long as Soviet 
clients in the region failed to regain territory and so long as their Soviet patron continued 
to be unhelpful toward this end, the client regimes would reevaluate their relationship 
with the USSR. This was Kissinger’s strategy which “gradually became [US] policy from 
1969 onwards” over the “corpses of various State Department peace plans.”
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Kissinger’s role in foreign policy formulation, and the White House’s total domination 
over foreign policy making, would continue to grow in the coming years until Kissinger 
replaced Rogers as Secretary of State.  
What Israel Wanted from America: Military Aid and Know-how 
 
After Richard Nixon was elected to the Presidency of the United States in 
November of 1968 and before he was inaugurated in January of 1969 a series of events 
would take place that would significantly affect the US-Israel relationship in ways that 
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were not yet understood at the time. On December 26
th
, 1968, Mahmoud Mohamed and 
Naheb Suleinman, two operatives from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
mounted an attack on an El Al plane on route to New York City while stopped in Athens, 
Greece. The attack, which left one passenger dead, followed another hijacking of an El 
Al flight that was diverted to Algiers five months prior.  
The following day, December 27
th
, the United States announced the sale of 
advance fighter aircraft to Israel. The deal, which amounted to $285 million, would be 
the largest arms deal Israel had signed in its history. It called for the delivery of 16 F-4 
Phatoms to Israel in 1969 and 34 more in the following year. While this deal was 
announced by the Johnson administration, it would be fulfilled under Nixon. Despite the 
sequence of events, the arms sale was unrelated to the hijacking the day prior. In fact, the 
arms sale was the product of a long and drawn out effort on the part of pro-Israel interest 
groups and the US Congress to lobby the reluctant Johnson Administration to sell 
advanced planes to Israel. Johnson’s Administration had opposed the matter but 
ultimately relented. 
The next day, the 28
th
, would perhaps be the most consequential one. A cable
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from the US Embassy in Beirut to Washington captures the sentiment in Lebanon. Najib 
Sadaka, the Secretary General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry reached out to the 
Embassy to express that the Government of Lebanon was “deeply disturbed” by the 
attack in Athens two days prior and that it was “in no way responsible” and “equally 
disturbed by statements by Israeli officials putting blame on the incident on the 
Government of Lebanon.” The Fedayeen which carried out the operation were from 
separate refugee camps in Lebanon. Sadaka “expressed the Government of Lebanon’s 
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fears that Israelis intended to retaliate against Lebanon in one way or the other.” While 
Sadaka specifically warned of the possibility of an Israeli attack on “Lebanese airline 
planes in retaliation” the US Deputy Chief of Mission said such tactics on the part of the 
Israelis would be unlikely.  
In closing his cable memorandum, Ambassador Dwight Porter wrote: 
It is apparent that the Government of Lebanon is very worried indeed 
about possible Israeli retaliation against Lebanon for an act which they 
deplore and for which they feel they bear no responsibility. In all fairness 
to them, the government of Lebanon and Lebanese Army appear to be 
doing a good job in controlling Fedayeen activity in Lebanon. What they 
have not been able to control, however, is the growing admiration for 
those Palestinians who, after 20 years, are acting instead of merely taking 
about regaining their homeland.  
 
Despite the US Deputy Chief of Mission’s assessment to Sadaka, Israeli 
retaliation came that very evening. In a raid on Beirut’s Airport, Israeli operatives carried 
out an attack aimed at destroying civilian airplanes. After the raid was over, 
approximately 13 aircraft were destroyed. Most belonged to Middle East Airlines, 30% of 
which was owned by Air France which was in turn owned by the French Government.  
France had been the premier supplier of arms to Israel from 1948 through the 
1967 war. Significant coordination and ties grew between Israel and France after the 
1956 tripartite attack on Egypt leading to a golden age of Franco-Israeli ties in the mid-
1960s. This began to change with the 1967, after which France terminated sales of its 
Mirage fighter planes to Israel. The Mirage jets had been the backbone of the Israeli air 
force and key to the decisive preemptive attack on Egypt in 1967. With France no longer 
selling them to Israel, Israel would have to find a new seller. In the meantime, its air force 
still relied on the Mirage as a stop gap. But after the attack on the Beirut Airport and 
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civilian airliners, France issued a comprehensive embargo that included spare parts for 
Mirage and other French made jets. A spokesperson for the Israeli embassy in Paris at the 
time was quoted saying the embargo on parts “could ground the Israeli Air Force within 
‘a matter of months’.
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” The message was clear; the era of Israeli reliance on France for 
military aid was over and unlikely to begin again. Arms supply would now be an even 
more important agenda item in US-Israeli relations.  
The 50 F-4 Phantoms agreed to by the Johnson administration would begin 
making their way to Israel in 1969 but not without some hesitation. There were at least 
two instances during this period when key decision makers in the Nixon Administration 
discussed conditioning or delaying the delivery of some of these jets. One of these 
instances came in June of 1969 when a review group
134
 met to consider a response to 
National Security Study Memorandum 40 (NSSM 40) on Israel’s Nuclear Weapons 
Program. The Undersecretary of Defense David Packard noted that the US should 
“clearly give the signal that we are in dead earnest and prepared to re-examine such 
things as military supply arrangements” if the Israelis refused to give assurances about 
their nuclear weapons program. 
The second instance came in early September just days before a shipment of 
Phantoms was due to arrive in Israel. Another hijacking had taken place on August 29th 
and negotiations over hostages being held in Syria were on going. The Israelis wanted 
this shipment advanced to August but discussions
135
 over delaying it further into the fall 
were taking place in Washington because the optics of the delivery might complicate 
hostage negotiations.  
106 
 
The arms deal for the 50 F-4 Phantoms and the minor hiccups in delivery, 
including this incident in September, would pale in comparison to the aid request the 
Israelis would place with Washington later that month. The request, which amounted to 
$1.2 billion
136
 in aid during the years 1970-74 was massive. Hal Saunders, who led the 
National Security Council review group on this Israeli aid request, wrote that “the 
magnitude of Israel’s request surprised us.” In fact, Israel was asking the US “to provide 
during 1970-74 almost as much as we have during all the years since 1948.
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” 
This aid, in military terms “would provide $925 million for additional purchases 
of military goods” and most of the remainder “will go to finance major expansion of 
Israeli defense industries” wrote Saunders. Key parts of his analysis of the aid request, 
reproduced below, highlight potential implications and concern: 
The effect of such an expansion would be to free Israel from some 
of the worries associated with foreign sources of supply for military 
goods. As the United States has become, reluctantly, the principal military 
supplier of Israel, we are being asked to assist Israel in becoming 
independent of the United States as a source of military supply.  
In economic terms such an expansion of Israel’s military-industrial 
complex would be very costly, since Israel itself offers an insufficient 
market for the military goods to be produced. Short productions runs mean 
high costs. One way to lower costs would be to market arms abroad. We 
may reasonably expect as a by-product of a massive expansion in its 
military industries that Israeli will become an aggressive arms merchant. 
This, too, Israel might calculate, would enhance its image in Arab eyes…. 
We always question Israel closely on major military sales. Each 
major sale involves a major effort on Israel’s part to justify the need to the 
USG…..Israel asserts that if we meet its aid request, no aid will be 
required after 1974. While the assertion may be made in good faith, there 
are grounds for questioning it. Israel, in fact, has embarked on an arms 
race in a major way. Apparently any hope of a political solution vis-à-vis 
the Arabs has been discarded, and Israel plans to rely on force of arms for 
its security. Our own experience with the arms race has been that the 
weapons become increasingly complex and increasingly costly; and 
ultimately they do not bring security. The possibility must be faced that 
this will happen to Israel also. If military expenditures do not drop after 
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1974, additional aid requests might be forthcoming at that time. It could be 




When I spoke to Saunders recently asking about this period, he stated “there was 
always a sense of driving with the breaks on
139
” when it came to Israeli arms requests. 
The special relationship with Israel was recognized but the US “also had a relationship 
with the surrounding countries, the Arab countries, for obvious reasons particularly the 
oil producers. So and the Israelis usually probably asked for more than they needed”. 
In assessing the aid request, American officials knew that the “balance of military 
power in the Near East favors” Israel. Israel, “according to U.S. intelligence estimates” 
would be able to defeat “any combination of Arab attacks within three weeks.” Arab 
numerical superiority was based on the “premise that the Arab nations can, and are 
willing, to fight a coordinated modern war” against Israel. This, it was concluded, “has 
not occurred in the past and is unlikely” to happen in the future
140
.  
Based on Israel’s arms requests, existing military capabilities and future arms 
requests, the NSC came up with an assessment of the current Israeli strategy. They 
subsequently developed alternative strategies that the US could support to give policy 
makers options. There were of course numerous risks associated with giving the Israelis 
whatever they wanted including alienating and enraging moderate Arab allies, fueling a 
proxy arms race with the Soviet Union and emboldening the Israeli position against 
negotiation with the Arabs.  
Alternative strategies developed by the NSC analysts, which they believed “to be 
realistic alternatives”, included Israel maintaining “sufficient military capability to defeat, 
within three weeks” an attack by “Syria, Jordan, Iraq and the UAR”.  Two separate 
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strategies were developed based on this capability depending on whether the Arab attack 
was coordinated or uncoordinated. These differed from the current Israeli strategy which 
was to maintain the ability to defeat “any combination of Arab forces under any 
circumstances within three weeks.” 
Additionally, analysts prepared models of Arab responses to a given Israeli 
strategy. This allowed them to estimate, through 1974, the ebb and flow of force postures 
of both the Arabs and the Israelis depending on the strategy the Israelis were able to 
employ. They modeled two potential Arab responses. The first would involve an 
improvement of quality and capability without increasing current force levels while the 
second was a “maximum effort to increase force levels as rapidly as Arab manpower” 
would permit. The charts below depict the NSC estimates
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 for both aircraft and non-

























Helicopters 53 110 53 53 53 53 
Hawk Missiles 280 440 280 440 280 440 
Artillery 1016 1150 1000 1100 1000 1000 
APCs 2000 6000 2000 2000 2000 2000 












NSC Estimates of Military Equipment Needed 
for Various Israeli Strategies (Non-Aircraft) 








The immediate decision facing the US government was what to do regarding the 
specific Israeli request. This request included the sale for 25 F-4 Phantoms and 100  A-4 
Skyhawks to be delivered starting in 1970. NSC analysts saw various options. They could 
suspend military support for Israel all together, approve some degree of the Israeli 
request, or give the Israelis everything they asked for. Each option had its pros and cons. 
Cutting off the Israelis entirely would help bring the pressure needed to push Israel to 
make a deal but it would also lead to a crisis in US-Israel relations and might increase the 
likelihood of an Israeli attack. Partial approval would signal political disapproval but also 
prevent an open crisis in relations. Giving Israel all it asked for would “preserve the best 
relationship with Israel” and set “Israel up for some time to come” but to a degree of 
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NSC Estimates of Military Equipment Needed 
for Various Israeli Strategies (Aircraft) 





At this time, members of pro-Israel interest groups reached out to the White 
House through Leonard Garment with concerns over an “imminent statement” they 
believed the President was going to make on the Israeli request. While this was not the 
case, the concerns were enough to prepare a statement
143
 of reassurance from the White 
House stating that “The United States stands by its friends. Israel is one of its friends.” 
While no statement was about to be made, the Special NSC Review Group on 
Israeli Assistance Requests
144
 was about to meet. The NSC analytical papers would frame 
the discussion but Henry Kissinger opened the meeting by including two additional 
factors. He reminded the group that President Nixon made a commitment to Israeli PM 
Gold Meir when they met in September of 1969 that “while the US could not always be 
helpful on ‘software’, [it] would help on ‘hardware’.” Nixon had also told Ambassador 
Rabin in December “in the presence of Secretary Laird” that the US would “look at 
Israel’s assistance requests with a sympathetic attitude.
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” 
“While the President did not specify any particular aid levels with either Mrs. 
Meir or Ambassador Rabin and the group was not bound to any particular level” 
Kissinger told the group members, “it had to keep in mind this part of the picture.” 
During the meeting, two central issues of concern were raised repeatedly, mostly 
coming from representatives of the Defense Department and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs. One was the apprehension over Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Several 
interlocutors, specifically Richardson and Packard, urged tying assistance to Israel on 
their signing of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The other concern was 
whether assisting Israel with the “software” part of its request would turn it into an arms 





” The meeting concluded with the general consensus that the US would 
give Israel some aid but on the lower end of the spectrum and attempt to link this to 
progress on the political issue.  
Just days after this meeting concluded, the State Department, along with its 
counterparts in London and Paris, has received a letter from Soviet co-Premier Alexei 
Kosygin on the USSR’s position relating to Israeli raids in the Middle East and its 
preparedness to militarily support its clients to a greater degree in response. Early word 
about the letter leaked to the press, forcing the President to direct the State Department to 
cease comment about it
147
. With diplomatic talks underway, along with an ongoing 
review of Israelis arms requests, allowing this letter to get blown out of proportion and 
become the center of public conversation threatened to complicate the more delicate 
approach Washington was hoping to bring to settle the situation and draw the parties 
toward some sort of agreement.  
By February 10
th
, Henry Kissinger requested to meet with the Soviet Ambassador 
Anatoliy Dobrynin to “make a few points on behalf of the President”.  The meeting
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took place in the White House Library to “avoid newspaper speculation.” Kissinger made 
several points to Dobrynin around the subject of the Kosygin letter that had arrived days 
earlier. The letter, Kissinger said, “received the highest level of attention” but because it 
was sent through formal channels it left Washington no choice but to treat it formally. 
President Nixon, Kissinger told Dobryinin, “was prepared to have bi-lateral discussions 
on the Middle East through the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel with a view to finding a 
solution that is fair to everybody”. This method of communication was being chosen to 
avoid a formal demarche. Washington wanted Moscow to know, however, that “the 
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introduction of Soviet combat personnel in the Middle East would be viewed with the 
gravest concern” and that despite the informal channel of communications they sought to 
make sure that Soviet Leaders “are under no misapprehension about the possibility of 
grave consequences.” 
Dobrynin “understood perfectly” and sought to assure Kissinger that they had no 
intention of “exacerbating tensions” but rather sought to indicate “that the situation was 
getting serious” The main concern of Soviet leaders was “the arms race in the Middle 
East.” While Dobrynin understood Washington’s concern about a Soviet combat 
presence, he told Kissinger he hoped Washington would take “into account Soviet 
problems when [it] made any decisions about future weapons deliveries to Israel.
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” 
The meeting helped clarify the positions and intentions of both sides and establish 
a channel of communication that would attempt to prevent the complications that could 
arise from the more public communications like the Kosygin letter. The letter, which 
came in the midst of US consideration of an Israeli aid request, however, had already 
done its damage by creating a certain public interpretation of events and positions.  
About two weeks after Kissinger’s conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, 
Israel’s Ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin, was walking into Kissinger’s office in the White 
House. Rabin came to see Kissinger after receiving a call from Elliot Richardson. 
Richardson inquired with Rabin about something he had focused on in the meeting of the 
Special Review Group about a month earlier; whether Israel would join the NPT.  Rabin 
wanted to make clear to the White House that “Israel [had] no intention to sign the NPT” 
and he sought to make sure that the US would not link any decision on arms requests to 
Israel’s signing the NPT. “Such a linkage would be extremely unfortunate.” Rabin said. 
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Rabin went on to say that while Israel could live with a longer time period for a US 
decision on its aid request, the Kosygin letter complicated things. If they US appeared to 
delay after receiving the letter, it would be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a success 
and “would certainly be so represented to the Arabs.”  It would prove, Rabin argued, 
“that blackmail does succeed”. Kissinger inquired whether a decision was enough or if 
Israel sought a more public announcement and Rabin replied that given Kosygin’s letter 
“some sort of public announcement” would be necessary. While the main thrust of 
Rabin’s meeting with Kissinger revolved around the US answer to the Israeli aid request, 
in closing Rabin did note his growing concern over the situation in Jordan where he said 
Israel felt “the King was rapidly losing control”
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.  
The answer on the aid request came on March 12
th
 in another meeting
151
 at the 
White House between Kissinger and Rabin, this time along with Alexander Haig, 
Kissinger’s Military Assistant. Kissinger began by informing Rabin of his meeting with 
Dobyrnin and sharing with Rabin the points he made to Dobrynin. He also noted that he 
met with Dobrynin again just in the last few days and Dobrynin had returned with a 
statement from Moscow that “in effect proposed a de facto cease-fire between Israel and 
the UAR”. Kissinger also shared this statement with Rabin and stated that while the 
White House shared Israel’s understanding of recent events, they believed there was 
room for some progress to occur.  
On Economic assistance, Kissinger told Rabin that he foresaw no problems and 
shared with him a summary of proposed economic assistance. On Military hardware, 
however, the answer was different. The US “would replace actual Israeli aircraft losses 
during the period of 1969-71, up to 8 Phantoms and 20 Skyhawks.” However, on the 
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longer term, which Kissinger noted the President himself sought to separate out from the 
short term response, the US would “supply the major part of the Israeli hardware request 
if more significant USSR arms shipments into the UAR take place”. The question of aid 
for an independent Israeli arms industry was not addressed and would remain a matter of 
interest for Israel moving forward. 
Washington was well aware of what Israel needed and its analysis showed that 
Israel was already superior to most of its neighbors militarily. What the Israelis had 
requested would give the air superiority to such a degree that they would conclude 
security would be easier to achieve through means of military force than diplomatic 
agreement. Through this limited aid, Washington was committing to a status quo where 
Israel would have greater incentives to compromise than if they gave larger amounts of 
military aid. This approach would ultimately produce a cease-fire in August of 1970 
ending the “war of attrition.” This would be the only success of the far more ambitious 
Rogers plan but any hope for stability in the region would be quickly shatter as all eyes 
on the Middle East would shift from Sinai to Jordan where an emerging crisis would take 
center stage. 
 
From Black September to the Black September Organization 
 
The June 1967 war and its aftermath had significant territorial and political 
implications for the state actors immediately involved and it also has serious 
repercussions for the Great Power patrons and their foreign policy moving forward. But 
its effect on non-state actors like the Palestinians and Palestinian guerilla groups was 
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perhaps most profound. The battle of Karameh in 1968 was a significant moral victory 
for the Palestinian guerilla group Fatah which was able to inflict significant casualties 
against Israeli soldiers during the loss. This helped counter the demoralized consensus 
regarding Israeli invincibility following the 1967 war. Recruitment for the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and its largest faction, Fatah, began to grow steadily. 
Simultaneously, the defeat at the Karameh camp near the Jordan River forced the 
guerillas to recentralize their operations closer to the mountains of Amman, the 
Hashemite capital.  Karameh and its aftermath laid the foundation for the events of 1970 
that became known to many Palestinians as “Black September” and to others as the 
“Jordanian civil war”.  
Jordan, and its King Hussein, had been seen as a vital ally by Washington, a 
bulwark of moderation amidst a sea of growing radicalization. The US had “a clear 
interest in maintaining a collaborative relationship” with Hussien because the 
replacement of the existing regime “by elements oriented toward Moscow would create 
problems” for Washington
152
. So when several airplanes where hijacked by Palestinian 
guerillas in early September of 1970, the Nixon Administration would begin dealing with 
a nearly one month long crisis that was reminiscent of Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis.  
On September 6
th
, 1970 news began to break regarding the hijacking of several 
planes. The White House situation room was informed that four planes had been 
commandeered including TWA Flight 741 and Swiss Air Flight 100 which landed in 
Dawson’s field outside Amman, Jordan. PAN AM Flight 93 landed in Beirut to refuel but 
then continued to Cairo where it was blown up after the passengers were led to safety. 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) issued a 72-hour ultimatum to 
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Information on the crisis kept pouring into the situation room but by 6am the next 
morning, little more was clear. Some 145 passengers from the TWA flight would be 
released and transported to Amman by Jordanian Army units. It was also reported that 
PFLP spokesmen told the local TWA agent that American, British, Israeli, West German 
and Swiss nationals would be held. Some 90 Americans and 50 Israelis were thought to 
be aboard the Swiss Air flight.
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In Cairo, three of four hijackers had already been apprehended by the UAR 
authorities and all 170 passengers were safe an accounted for, although 5 or 6 had been 
admitted to the hospital for undetermined injuries
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. But while a sigh of relief could be 
breathed after news from the Egyptian capital, the situation in Amman was growing 
increasingly grim.  
By 6pm EST, Washington had been notified by its embassy of a “gloomy picture” 
of the security situation emerging in Amman. “Near-Anarchical” conditions existed in 
most areas of the city with “instances of shooting, auto theft, and some persons subjected 
to search at fedayeen roadblocks.” And, perhaps most troubling, some “clashes between 




Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger spoke on the phone at 9am the next 
morning and agreed to meet along with representatives from the CIA and the Defense 
Department
157
. President Nixon brought these individuals together for another meeting 
that afternoon and included the Director of the FBI and Assistant Secretary of State 
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Joseph Sisco to review the latest information on the situation. The PFLP deadline was 
approaching the following day at 10 pm. It was thought that 37 passengers from the TWA 
plane were released while 100 remained on board and 86 had been released from the 







 to call a meeting of the Washington Special 
Advisory Group (WSAG) which was a NSC led interagency “mechanism for crisis 
management.” Outside of the Jordan Crisis, this mechanism was used sparsely and only 
to deal with significant national security challenges during the Nixon Administration like 
the Cienfuegos crisis, the Indo-Pakistani War, and Vietnam.
160
 The morning WSAG 




But even before the meeting took place, certain actions by U.S. Military forces 
had already been arranged. Six C-130 aircraft were being moved to Incirlik, Turkey to be 
available for evacuation purposes. The USS Independence, an attack aircraft carrier was 
moved toward the Israel-Lebanon coast along with four destroyers and an oiler. US Strike 




At the WSAG meeting, contingency plans were reviewed to “(a) extricate the 
hostage personnel, (b) evacuate American citizens from Jordan if the situation 




Plans for evacuating both US official personnel were complete. US forces would 
have to be mobilized from Europe to achieve this objective given time constraints. The 
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same operational plans could be used to evacuate hostages but the consensus at the 
WSAG meeting was that such a step should only be undertaken if the lives of hostages 
were at risk and the Jordanian government was unable or unwilling to act
164
.  
The trickier question dealt with at the WSAG meeting was that of intervention to 
save Hussein. If the US was to execute the operation, it could mean a long term 
commitment of strategic reserves which might escalate into the involvement of Iraqi and 
Syrian forces making air supply increasingly difficult. The alternative was to have the 
Israelis do it. “King Hussein has already asked that the Israelis help him if he needs it” 
and it was thought that Israeli action would be better than US action. Israeli action, 
however would require US help to “keep the Russians out”.
165
 
Later, Kissinger also spoke with Defense Secretary Laird about operational 
options like putting planes on alert and moving the US 6
th
 Naval Fleet closer to Jordan
166
.  
In the hours that followed, Kissinger would speak with the Defense and Transportation 
secretaries to develop a Presidential initiative on air marshalls
167
.  
Contingency planning couldn’t be implemented soon enough however as another 
plane was hijacked and taken to Dawson’s field in Amman. President Nixon was 
informed of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) flight hijacking in a dim 
mid-day report. By this point the situation in Amman had “deteriorated seriously”. King 
Hussein ordered the army chief of staff “all authority of the armed forces” but the army 
had yet to enter Amman in an effort to drive out the fedayeen
168
.  
The evening report updating the President on the situation noted that this brought 
the total number of hostages at the airstrip to some 300. The deadline however had been 
postponed with no specific expiration. The situation in Amman seemed to have calmed at 
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the moment but it was unclear whether this was to be a long-lasting cessation or a lull. 
The US would continue to work with the various European governments involved to 
work “against the fedayeen demands and efforts to split” the parties
169
.  
The WSAG met again the following day to more thoroughly discuss operational 
plans. Members from the State and Defense Departments, as well as the CIA, the NSC 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in attendance. US involvement in Jordan was not 
preferred; it was the view of the group members that Israeli involvement would be best. 
However, plans for deterring Soviet involvement once Israel did get involved were 




On the domestic front, concerns were growing within the American Jewish 
community that the United States might pursue a separate deal and leave Israeli citizens 
hung out to dry. Len Garment spoke with Henry Kissinger about these concerns on the 
evening of September 10
th
. Garment heard from the Israeli Charge d’affairs Shlomo 
Argov that he wasn’t worried and wanted to know from Kissinger if the President was 
worried and if he should start making calls to Jewish Organizations to reassure them. 
Kissinger told him to hold off until the next day to see “if it gets hot”
171
. The following 
day, Kissinger would also speak with Nelson Rockefeller who was campaigning in New 
York about the White House’s messaging to the Jewish community during the crisis
172
.  
The next few days of the crisis featured a calming of the security situation in 
Amman, continued discussion with the government parties involved and the Red Cross 
negotiator about their position vis-à-vis the hostages
173
, and the formulation
174
 of US 
statements about the movement of military assets in the region.  
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All of this changed on September 15
th
, however, when a cable from Amman noted 
that King Hussein announced a new military government in an effort to root out the 
fedayeen. Kissinger called over to Joe Sisco’s office at the State Department but Sisco 
was already in the process of discussing the cable with the Secretary of State. Roger 
Davies took the call and expressed concern that Hussein’s move “may blow the 
hostages”. The King’s actions, he said “may threaten their lives.
175
” 
That evening, a memorandum
176
 would be sent to the President updating him 
about the urgent situation. King Hussien “had advised our embassy he is moving tonight 
to an all or nothing showdown with the fedayeen.” The King “urgently requested the US 
take steps to assure that the Israelis do nothing to prejudice or aggravate the situation. He 
also stressed that, depending on fedayeen reactions, he may need to call for U.S. and 
Israeli assistance.” The military government would be announced the following morning 
at 7am Amman time and it was thought that if “Hussien carries through with his plans 
tonight the 54 hostages in the hands of the PFLP will be in grave danger.” 
On September 16
th
, King Hussein indeed “appointed a new military government 
early [that] morning as planned.” Yasser Arafat was “reported to have ordered the 
immediate unification of all Palestinian forces” and “fadayeen units throughout Jordan 
are on high combat alert.
177
” It was thought
178
 that while the operation “will take longer 
than a day” Hussein “could defeat the Fedayeen by himself.” That evening another 
WSAG meeting was held and “there  [was] a unanimous opinion that [Hussein] should 






By the next day “the King seemed to be in pretty good shape.” Still, the President 
authorized the movement of another carrier. “When the Soviets see the [USS] Kennedy 
come through the Straights of Gibraltar…” Kissinger began a sentence that Nixon would 
finish, “they will know that we are ready to do something”. What seemed like an 
improved situation and an increased US show of force in the region did not prevent the 
President from being ready to authorize airstrikes if need be. “We also have airplanes to 
strike,” he told Kissinger, “I want Europe mobilized in readiness. If we do [strike] I want 
to hit massively. Not just little pinpricks. I want them to know we are hell bent for 
election.”  
It is unclear from the text whether Nixon merely used this expression, born out of 
the FDR era, literally or figuratively, however Kissinger would later close this 




But the positive feelings would soon give way to serious concern as Syrian troops 
crossed over the border and invaded Jordan. Syrian tanks entered Jordanian territory and 
some were destroyed by Jordanian tanks. “They were reluctant to use the air [power] 
because they haven’t got much air [power]. And they are also inferior in the air to the 
Syrians.”
 
 A “major drawback” for the US was intelligence. It was hard for Washington 
to independently ascertain what was transpiring on the ground. However, they “were 
getting lots of intelligence from the Israelis.”
181
  
Perhaps the most telling bit of information would come from King Hussien 
himself who delivered a frantic 3am message to the American Embassy: “Situation 
deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. 
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Irbid occupied. This having disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and 
surroundings. After continuous action and shortage of supplies.
182
”  From the earliest 
days of this crisis, decision makers in Washington had contemplated US or Israeli 
involvement to rescue Hussein. Now it seemed like those contingency plans might have 
to be put into action. The following days would be crucial. If Hussein fell, it could trigger 
a major regional war involving US and Soviet client states and even bring the two Great 
Powers to blows. The implications of this for the Middle East would be tremendous. For 
US-Soviet relations it would surely mean détente was over.  
But Kissinger also saw potential for achievements if things went well for US 
interests. If the King pulled through, “it gave [the US] an opportunity for a show of 
strength which was badly needed.” 
183
 Further, it would give the US a chance to re-launch 
peace efforts from a position of strength. The push for peace in a few months earlier was 
“the worst mistake [the US] made…[replying] to Soviet SA-3s by starting a peace 
offensive, directed at Israel, that was our disaster…that put the cat among the pigeons.
184
” 
By the evening of Sunday, September 20
th
, the President had come around to the 
view that any intervention should not be directly taken by the United States
185
. Initially 
the President took the opposite position but Kissinger was able to bring him around
186
. 
But the President knew that any action, American or Israeli, would certainly mean an 
escalation and very likely a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Kissinger, frantically 
working the phones from his office in the White House, left with Sisco on the evening of 
September 20
th
 to brief Nixon, who was in the White House bowling alley. It was there, 
bowling ball in hand, where Nixon gave the green light to pursue Israeli involvement. 
Kissinger then called Rabin who was in New York at a dinner honoring Golda Meir. He 
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informed Rabin of what the US was requesting but wanted more intelligence about the 
situation at the front first. It was resolved that Israel would fly reconnaissance missions in 
the morning
187
.  After consulting with Meir and other Israeli officials in Israel, Rabin 
parted ways with Meir who returned to Israel that evening. Rabin returned to Washington 
on an emergency flight, courtesy of a White House plane arranged by Kissinger which 
brought him into Andrews Air Force Base. Rabin believed those accommodations 




The next three days would be crucial. On the morning of the 21
st
, meetings were 
scheduled at the White House where the President wanted his team to assess the latest 
information because, as Kissinger noted in a call to the Defense Secretary, “it seems to 
me we can’t go to war on the telephone so we have scheduled a meeting.
189
” 
Complicating matters was a Presidential trip that was scheduled to take Nixon to 
the United Kingdom and also to the naval carrier the USS Saratoga. If the situation 
deteriorated the President would cancel his trip, Kissinger believed canceling early was 
best
190
 in part because it would send a message indicating how serious the US was about 
the issue.  By evening the Americans were formulating a Note Verbale to the Israelis to 
establish a working agreement on Israeli intervention in Jordan. Even then, the President 
was “leaning to keep the trip on” in “every possible way”. “Just because the Israelis are 
having a little battle with the Syrians” the President told Kissinger, “we are not going to 
be moding around.
191
” Shortly after hearing Nixon’s persistent stance on the trip, 
Kissinger told Nixon’s chief of staff Bob Haldeman that “it would be a disaster if we 
were all scattered all over Europe” when the crisis escalated and that “the Saratoga would 
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have to pull out of line if the crisis is still in full pitch.
192
” By the time the President went 
to bed that evening the message had been dispatched to the Israelis and it was not yet 
clear what the response would be. “I think by tomorrow morning,” Kissinger told Nixon, 
“we will have answers.
193
” He was right.  
September 22
nd
 would be a pivotal day with the potential to send the region into 
all out war. By late morning Kissinger and Sisco having yet to hear back from the Israelis 
were concerned the “Israelis might strike without coming back to us.” They determined 
to contact the Israelis to send the message that “before any buttons are pushed, you will 
be back in touch with us.
194
” Similar concern was noted in a conversation between 
Kissinger and Rogers. The coordination would be crucial because Israeli intervention was 
only desired if necessary. If the “situation stabilizes” Rogers urged Kissinger, they should 
“caution [the Israelis] to wait. If Hussein could pull it off it would be a hell of a thing.
195
” 
Haig took a call from Rabin around lunch time, Kissinger was out, and Haig 
received updated information from Rabin about events transpiring in Jordan. The Syrians, 
Rabin said, launched attacks in the morning only to be repelled by Jordanian fire after 
taking heavy casualties. There were no signs of new attacks at this point. Heavy fire was 
still going on in Amman however. Several C-130 and Antonov-12 flights from Libya to 
Syria and from Egypt to Syria were spotted by the Israelis. It was their estimation that a 
battalion size Libyan force was being introduced to Syria. Rabin also said they were 
watching Iraqi troops in Jordan and that there were also some indicators of an imminent 
Iraqi attack. He closed by saying he expected a cable resulting from the day’s Cabinet 





Sure enough, around 4pm Rabin rang Kissinger, “I got a response from the 
government and would like to come as soon as possible, ” Rabin said. “How long would 
it take you to get here?” Kissinger asked. “15 Minutes” Rabin said. They agreed to meet 




Rabin, Kissinger, Haig and Argov met at 4:50 in the Map Room. Rabin began by 
reading a message noting that after discussions in the “Israeli Cabinet and a subsequent 
more restricted high-level consultation” the Israeli government decided that the Note 
Verbal from the United States constituted “an official U. S. request to Israel” and that 
Israel was “prepared, in principle, to carry out the military operations against Syrian 
forces in Jordan.” Israeli operations would consist of airstrikes but ground operations will 
also be conducted if the situation required it. Rabin also noted that the Israelis required 
clarification on two points. First, they sought to ensure that US support against Soviet 
intervention included support for any activity that may emerge on the Sinai front with 
Egypt as well as in Syria. Second, Israel sought to ensure that it would have streamlined 
access to US military equipment as the conflict grew
198
.  
Kissinger told Rabin that his understanding of the Israeli position was that Israel 
would first conduct air strikes and then assess the situation before conducting ground 
operations. Kissinger noted that Jordan objected to ground operations and read Rabin a 
note from the US Embassy in Amman relaying the Jordanian Prime Minister’s message 
from the King that Hussein wanted air support but not a ground attack. Rabin stated that 
the Jordanians might be able to turn the tide after an airstrike alone but that Israel would 
not go forward without the option of a ground attack. Kissinger told him that Israel could 
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get immediate and full approval for an air attack but approval for air and ground 
operations would “generate heated discussions.” The two agreed that an affirmative US 




Kissinger recapped the discussion. The US would respond to Israel’s points of 
clarification regarding fronts and military equipment. Israel would then coordinate with 
Jordan through the US Government. Israel would then launch air attacks. Kissinger asked 
“whether this could be done as early as Friday morning.” Rabin replied “it could be done 
sooner and that timing was up to the United States.
200
” 
The plans were essentially set and whether the Israelis moved forward depended 
on the constantly evolving situation at the front. Kissinger would shift his focus to 
ensuring a military aid package could get through Congress in an expedited fashion. The 
Israelis met with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Pranger that afternoon only 
to learn that “their only authorization was additional ammunition if they had any 
shortages” but Haig would assure Rabin that they had a Presidential directive to 
“untangle the problems at Defense.
201
” Kissinger reached Deputy Secretary of Defense 
David Packard
202
 shortly thereafter. “We have been trying to get an assistance package 
together for Israel in case it has to move.” Kissinger told him, “We are going through the 
same song and dance that always happens.” He then relayed Rabin’s complaint that the 
Israelis were told the authorization was limited when they spoke with Pranger. Kissinger 




While the bureaucracy was moving to extend further military aid, news from the 
front reached the White House from Rabin: the Syrians tried to “attack south again this 
afternoon and were badly mauled and lost 20 tanks.
203
” Still, how the situation would 
evolve was not yet entirely clear and Kissinger spent much of first half of the next day 
working to expedite a defense authorization bill in the House and Senate. Several 
conversations took place between him, Senators
204
, the Secretary of Defense
205
 and the 
White House aide for Congressional Affairs
206
 to ensure that the bill would go through 
without any limitations specified on aid. Kissinger wanted to ensure that the aid was seen 
as open ended to send a strong message to regional adversaries.  
Just as the Administration was working with Congress to get a bill passed more 
news came in from the front. A State Department telegram time stamped at 3:00pm notes 
that Rabin called Sisco with new information. The situation in northern Jordan was 
optimistic and the “Syrian tanks had been withdrawn from Jordan.
207
” 
A mood that had been tense for weeks turned celebratory. “I just wanted to tell 
you what I told the President 5 minutes ago,” Kissinger said to Laird on the phone, “We 
think we have broken the back of this crisis. I told him that you [and your staff] really 
pulled their weight. You are really great patriots.
208
” Gratitude was also extended to the 
Israelis. Kissinger told Argov that the President wanted Rabin to know that “the Prime 
Minister will hear that we will not forget your behavior this week and we feel very lucky 
that Israel was there.
209
”  
Within one week’s time, the situation continued to stabilize and Hussien took a 
stronger stance against the fedayeen after the passing of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser on September 28
th
.  By the end of the month, the remaining hostages had been 
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released. The month known among Palestinians as “Black September” had come to an 
end but its implications were just beginning.  
Just as the crisis in Jordan was deescalating, another was on the rise, threatening 
conflagration closer to home when it became clear the Soviets intended to set up a naval 
base in Cienfuegos, Cuba – a city whose name literally means: one hundred fires. As 
tense as some moments had been in recent weeks, with talk of war and collision with the 
Soviet Union, the resolutions to both matters in Jordan and Cuba sent messages to 
Moscow and Washington about the other allowing them to see each other as measured, 
realistic actors interested in mitigating conflict and possibly improving relations.  
It was at these moments that U.S. Soviet relations began to take significant steps 





 and October 9
th
. In a memo to President Nixon, Kissinger noted that the 
meetings were “clearly very significant in the short term and potentially very important 
for our overall relations with the Soviet Union.” The results of the meetings included: 1) 
A resolution, without a public confrontation, to the “potentially explosive issue of a 
Soviet base in Cuba,” 2) a clear “demonstration of Soviet interest in pursuing a Middle 
East settlement,” 3) an agreement in principle to a Summit meeting in Moscow in 1971 




During these meetings Dobrynin told Kissinger that “all senior officials” in the 
Soviet Union consider this the lowest point in US-Soviet relations since the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. They agreed it was in their mutual interest not to miss the opportunity to 
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better relations at this critical juncture and Kissinger scheduled a meeting between 
President Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a month’s time.  
At that meeting, on October 22
nd
, 1970 President Nixon and Gromyko had a frank 
exchange of views and discussed a range of topics including the Middle East, Berlin, 
SALT, Cuba and Vietnam. It became clear that the opportunity existed for bettering 




For the United States, the Middle East was the second most important piece of 
strategic real east other than Vietnam where it was mired in a costly and devastating war. 
The war in 1967 and the Soviet Union’s increased support for Arab states in its aftermath 
meant that the United States would also get further involved in the Middle East and that 
stability and peace region would be a mutual interest between Washington and Moscow. 
The region was not only a historical crossroads where Europe met Asia and Africa, but it 
was also becoming a crossroads for a variety of issues of interest to the United States and 
the Soviet Union including Israel and the Jewish question, oil and now terrorism as well. 
While the Middle East provided for many opportunities for the US and the USSR to 











I just don’t want those damn doves to figure they won something. 
--President Richard Nixon 
 
 
One of the key factors that weighed into Nixon’s decision calculus on the 
establishment of the CCCT was the role of Congress. The détente approach involved 
negotiations over various issues of mutual concern between the US and the USSR and 
treaties would have to be ratified by Congress to take effect. Kissinger had to play the 
delicate game of balancing Congress and the Kremlin, both of whom were suspicious of 
the other. Particular members of Congress, like Henry “Scoop” Jackson, were significant 
obstacles and handling the challenges they presented was not easy. In this chapter, I 
review a major challenge Congress created for the White House around the arms 
limitation treaty. This episode occurred in the months before the September decision and 
was not entirely resolved until after the decision to establish the CCCT was made. 
Kissinger’s exhaustive efforts to avert a crisis between Congress and the Kremlin over 
this deal helped move it toward eventual ratification, but it also became very clear to the 
White House that if Congress was to get stuck a deal, especially closer to the election, it 






Half way through the first term: Improving U.S. - Soviet Relations 
 
US-Soviet relations during this period mostly revolved around the negotiation of 
various bilateral agreements. The Nixon Administration, in efforts lead primarily by 
Kissinger with the assistance of different administration principals, worked to secure 
several agreements with the Soviet Union. Several types of agreements were being 











. The pinnacle of this 
rapprochement would be in late May in 1972 when President Nixon and Soviet Premier 
Leonid Brezhnev would meet in Moscow at a summit where several of these agreements 
would be signed or noted
217
.  
Negotiations on these agreements were top secret and treated with utmost care. 
The summit which took place in May would be seen as a great success by both sides. It 
would also be seen as a tremendous victory for Kissinger himself who the Soviets saw as 
instrumental to the success of negotiations. Brezhnev believed the greatest success was 
the personal relationship established between Nixon and the Soviet leadership
218
.  
Both parties had a vested interest in the success of the talks but they were not 
without complications. While two significant Arms control agreements were signed by 
Nixon and Brezhnev at this time, the Anti-ballistic Missile Agreement (ABM) and the 
“Interim Agreement
219
,” they still had to pass through a ratification process where 
obstacles in the form of anti-Communist Congressman stood in the way. Senator Henry 
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“Scoop” Jackson, a staunch anti-Communist Democrat, would soon be become one of 
these obstacles.  
 
The Jackson Amendment to the Interim Agreement and Kissinger’s Damage 
Control 
 
In the late summer of 1972 the Nixon Administration was fresh off major foreign 
policy successes after the Moscow Summit and planning the return of Kissinger to 
Moscow in September to continue negotiations on behalf of the United States. The 
Presidential Election was a mere 3 months away and its proximity was brought into sharp 
focus by upcoming Democratic and Republican National Conventions. It was during this 
time that the Nixon Administration sought speedy ratification of the agreements signed 
with the Soviets.  
In a conversation he might have soon regretted, Henry Kissinger spoke with 
Senator Jackson on July 27
th
.  Kissinger sought to assure Jackson that the agreements did 
not mean the United States was adopting a posture of minimum deterrence and that the 
US had no intention of doing that “under any circumstances.” Jackson hoped to get some 
assurances written into the agreement in the form of an amendment to the text of the 
resolution before the Senate.  Jackson persuaded Kissinger that his amendment would 
send a “signal from Congress” that would help the Administration on SALT-II. Kissinger 
told Jackson that the Administration could not “only live with that, [they] sort of 
welcome that.” The only problem would be that the Administration could not take a 
public stance in support of it because it could complicate relations with the Soviets. 
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Jackson agreed that as long as the Administration’s support for the amendment was 
understood on Capitol Hill it did not need to come out publicly
220
.  
Within days of this conversation, the text of Senator Jackson’s amendment to the 
interim agreement alarmed Ambassador Gerard Smith, the Director of the Arms Control 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the chief delegate to the SALT talks.  Smith told 
Kissinger on August 2
nd
 that the language of the amendment, specifically the statement 
that “the Congress would consider action of deployment by the Soviet Union have the 
effect of endangering the survivability of the strategic deterrent forces of the US,” to be 
“dangerous.” It would open the Administration up to “congressional yelps every time 
they saw a new intelligence report on Soviet modernization”, Smith argued, and was 
“very abrasive” to the Soviets. Kissinger agreed that the language was a problem and 
“too sweeping” but realized their approach to resolving this issue would have to be 
calculated since the optics of a battle between the Administration and Jackson over this 
amendment would make it difficult for Jackson to back down
221
.  
Kissinger might have wanted the Jackson amendment to go forward but it was 
clear that even if it did, he did not want a perception that it had administration support to 
be public. The New York Times, on August 3
rd
, ran a front page story
222
 on the 
amendment citing sources in the Senate and the Administration that Jackson was leading 
an effort to add reservations to the Interim Agreement with the “Administration’s 
support” and that the Administration had “agreed to lobby for the reservations.” Smith 
was quickly on the phone again citing the Times article to Kissinger
223
. Both Kissinger 
and Smith were surprised that “the article makes it look as if it’s all a carefully 
coordinated joint venture between the Administration and the Congress” and the negative 
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implications that such an impression would have on the good faith they have developed 
in negotiations with the Soviets was obvious.  
Now that this perception was public, Kissinger would have to engage in damage 
control with the Soviets and spoke that afternoon with Soviet Ambassador in Washington 
Anytoli Dobrynin
224
.  Dobrynin expressed concern over the amendment and the 
perception that the Nixon Administration, who had been so warmly welcomed in 
Moscow when these agreements were signed, were involved in legislative efforts that 
would complicate them. Kissinger assured Dobrynin that the Administration “had 
nothing to do with this amendment.”  
“We should not spoil a good beginning and a good resolution”, Dobrynin told 
Kissinger adding “You look at this and tomorrow, when I see you, you will tell me. OK?”  
“I’ll see what can be done.” Kissinger replied.  
The following day, Kissinger contacted Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations, David Abshire
225
. “Dave, I wanted to find out from you where 
that goddamn Jackson amendment stands” an obviously irritated Kissinger opened the 
conversation. Abshire would tell Kissinger that the Foreign Relations committee was 
hung up on the amendment. The Committee was controlled by Democrats and long-time 
chair Senator William Fulbright who Abshire was afraid would “embarrass” the 
Administration. Kissinger and Abshire agreed on the need to get the language of the 
Jackson Amendment changed and hoped that Jackson would concede to doing it himself 
but were also concerned that support from committee partisans would make it difficult 
for Jackson to back down at this point. Kissinger would begin directing his attention to 




A liberal Republican Senator from New York, Jacob Javits, who also served on 
the Foreign Relations committee, spoke with Kissinger the next day and attempted to 
devise a plan to get Jackson to back away from the inflammatory language in his 
amendment. Javits suggested that the President should write a letter to Jackson, “which 
[would] be flattering to him” explaining that the amendment was not necessary because a 
strong approach was already US policy. That, in Javits’ view, was the “optimum way” to 






, Kissinger was speaking to Jackson
227
 about his amendment again, 
attempting to resolve an issue that had evolved into a mini-crisis at this point. “I want you 
to know” Kissinger told Jackson “we are behind you 1000 percent.” An aide for Jackson, 
one Richard Perle, was working with Kissinger’s assistant, John Lehman, to “adjust this 
amendment so that [the Administration] could actually support it.” 
Kissinger told his staunch anti-Communist interlocutor that “Our problem is that 
we want to keep the Soviets quiet while we are squeezing the Vietnamese.” Jackson 
understood and agreed to alter the language. Kissinger told Jackson that he had spoken to 
the President and “he’s behind this approach.” Lehmen and Perle would finalize new text 
by the end of the day. Kissinger said he would speak with Senator George Aiken the next 
day while Jackson would speak with Senator Hugh Scott who was with him “100 
percent.” 
But before Kissinger spoke with Senator Aiken about the new text he briefed 





Kissinger told Dobrynin that they have tried to get Jackson’s “agreement to a formulation 
which is essentially meaningless” as this “has now become a matter of prestige.” Then, 
the administration would support that text with a statement “that it is not a reservation” 
but merely expresses “senatorial support” for previously stated US policy. 
Dobrynin wanted clarification as to how the amendment would not have 
consequences. Kissinger explained that “it will be a Jackson amendment which we will 
then say publicly has no legal force.” “What we are saying” Kissinger stated, is that “the 
Jackson amendment does not constitute a reservation or interpretation to the agreement in 
any legal sense.” Kissinger told Dobrynin that he was about to get Jackson to change the 
text that Dobrynin had seen earlier, “It has been totally emasculated now.” Dobrynin 
needed to see the new text so he could relay the understanding of the conversation to 
Moscow. Kissinger sent it right over. Shortly thereafter the two spoke again
229
 and 
Dobrynin agreed to the approach, “Well, I think it is now clarified and I will send to 
Moscow what you just explained. I think it will be very helpful.” 
Kissinger then turned to Aiken
230
 to explain where the Administration stands on 
the Jackson amendment. He told him that the original text submitted was “a little 
exuberant” and that everybody got a little bit carried away.” So Kissinger worked with 
Jackson “to get a new text which takes out the invidious cracks at the Soviet Union”. 
“Jackson is willing” Kissinger told Aiken, “It is a face-saving way frankly 
between you and me for Jackson to get out of it.” Aiken believed some version of the old 
amendment had the votes to pass, especially if the President was behind it, but Kissinger 
made it clear that the Administration would not get behind the old text and he was 
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counting on Aiken supporting the new version. “Well, all right.” Aiken said, “Let’s see 
and hope”. 
During this same conversation Kissinger told Aiken “between you and me, I sent 
a copy of [the text] over to Dobrynin of both the White House statement and of the 
amendment. Of course, he can’t get involved in our legislative process.” 
However, knowledge of that communication did not stay between Aiken and Kissinger. 
The New York Times
231
 reported that Kissinger “explained the revised resolution to 
Soviet diplomats and won their acquiescence on the ground that agreement itself would 
not be affected.” Kissinger would later tell Jackson
232
 that this was a result of “somebody 
running off at the mouth” and that they would “shut everybody up now.” 
More damage control with the Soviets would be necessary. Neither the Soviets 
nor the Nixon administration wanted to create the perception that the Soviets were in 
anyway affecting the US legislative process. The morning after the story ran in the New 
York Times, then Kissinger aide General Alexander Haig spoke with Ambassador 
Dobrynin to communicate how disturbed Kissinger was that news of this consultation 
was out
233
. Dobrynin noted his and Moscow’s surprise at the leak. Gerry Warren, Deputy 
Press Secretary at the time, inadvertently added fuel to the fire by seemingly confirming 
the New York Times’ reporting with comments at a press conference. To get out ahead of 
this, Haig told Dobrynin that the White House would put out a statement that the 
consultations that took place were in the context of discussions held at the SALT I 




Kissinger and Jackson spoke again that afternoon
234
. At this point, both men had 
climbed up trees they were finding it difficult to get down from. Jackson told Kissinger 
that the Foreign Relations committee might not back down, and that it would bring the 
amendment to a vote and there would be enough votes to get it passed. Domestic politics 
was also a consideration. Jackson believed that the committee felt the Administration 
would back down since they needed to get the interim agreement passed before the 
election. Kissinger replied that he would hold firm and inform the committee that the 
resolution had to come to a vote and if they wanted to vote it down “that’s their 
business.” Jackson concurred and encouraged this approach.  
The press continued to complicate the matter and Nixon’s Press Secretary, Robert 
Ziegler, was not helping. The New York Times ran a story
235
 stating “The White House 
began backing away today from Senator Henry M. Jackson's public elaborations on the 
meaning of the resolution he has been trying to attach to the offensive-weapons 
agreement with the Soviet Union.” Jackson had told Kissinger
236
 that Ziegler could not 
handle substantive questions on the amendment or the negotiations and “[Journalist John 
W.] Finney from the [New York] Times is trying –and others—trying to get him screwed 
up on substance” 




Kissinger: What happened there, Mr. President, was the Jackson was 
making statements interpreting his own amendment. 
Nixon: Yes, I understand that. 
Kissinger: In a way that we couldn’t really live with in the negotiations. 
Nixon: I see 
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Kissinger: So what we did was to support his amendment but all of that 
was arranged with Jackson. 
Nixon: Not his interpretation. 
Kissinger: Not his interpretation. 
Nixon: Yeah, yeah. I suppose it’s just the press that wants to make it 
appear that we are backing off. 
Kissinger: Exactly. 
Nixon: But Jackson understands it. I don’t care that we do it, I just want to 
be sure Jackson understands we’re not backing off. 
Kissinger: No, no, no; I talked to him. 
Nixon: I just don’t want those damn doves to figure they won something. 
Kissinger: No, no; I talked to Jackson and he is delighted. 
Nixon: Good, good, good.  
 
Kissinger indicated he owed Jackson a phone call and Nixon told him to tell 
Jackson he was outraged by the way the press was reporting the situation. Nixon was 
concerned that Jackson would be unhappy because of the headlines and did not want him 
to think the Administration was trying to embarrass him.  Kissinger reassured the 
President that Jackson “thinks we’re supporting him outstandingly.” 
Jackson and Kissinger spoke
238
 after Kissinger hung up with the President. 
“Listen,” Jackson jokingly told Kissinger, “if you don’t shutup Ziegler pretty soon, 
you’re going to have all our friends in Europe on your back,” referring to the Press 
Secretary’s misinterpretation of the implications of the amendment. Kissinger assured 
Jackson that “[Ziegler] is shutup as of today.” But Jackson was, as the President thought, 
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concerned about the news coverage. Kissinger admitted being distressed over it as well. 
They discussed how to handle it, including a possible public clarification by Jackson, but 
agreed the best thing to do was to keep all parties silent on the matter moving forward 
and get the committee to vote. 
Within a few hours Chairman Fulbright was asking
239
 Kissinger for his thoughts 
about sending a letter to the President asking for a statement clarifying the 
Administration’s position. Kissinger opposed the idea. He told Fulbright he was against 
the idea because the Administration had already made its position clear and that if a letter 
was written to the President, Nixon would not be inclined to respond to it. It would then 
put Fulbright in a position of being rejected by the President which Kissinger believed 
would be unhelpful for working relations between the two when they needed to get most 
done after the election. By this point, Kissinger just wanted the entire issue to go away 
and get the resolution passed. Kissinger said the administration “had no interest in driving 
a line between the hawks and the doves on this issue” and that it “was something on 
which we want the broadest possible support.” 
By the evening Senator Javits notified
240
 Kissinger of the most recent proceedings 
of the Foreign Relations Committee where it “took a position against all amendments and 
reiterated the position of the President as expressed” by Kissinger in an August 15
th
 
statement. Kissinger hoped to get to a vote immediately “the major thing now is to get the 
agreement behind us.” Javits was hopeful that this would be the end of the matter.  
Within the hour Kissinger communicated
241
 with Fulbright again expressing his 
hope that the matter will be put to a vote soon. Fulbright agreed and told Kissinger that 
SALT I and the Interim Agreement were “the most significant things you have 
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accomplished.” The reason this became such a difficult problem was that Jackson is “not 
only what his words are” as Fulbright put it “but what he stands for.” Jackson’s staunch 
anti-communist reputation made it politically difficult to oppose some of his stated 
positions, even if, as in this case, he was backing away from them himself.  
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, two days later, expressed
242
 dismay over the hold 
up. The “treaty that was supposed to create a better atmosphere is now completely 
different.” Kissinger seemed to think the storm had passed and the matter would be 
resolved soon. “By Monday it will be over”, Kissinger said, “and by Wednesday it will 
be forgotten.”  
*** 
This would prove to be wishful thinking as the interim agreement would not be 
signed into law by President Nixon until October 3
rd
. This episode showed the Nixon 
Administration, and Kissinger in particular, just how difficult it could be trying to get 
treaties negotiated with the Soviets through Congress. If the anti-Communist hawks in 
Congress wanted to slow down or event stop the process, they could likely do it. Several 
sensitivities came to light in this chapter including the role and prestige of certain 
members of congress, the media driven perception of the White House-Congress 
relationship and how that was interpreted by the Soviet Union, and the importance of 
Henry Kissinger’s relationships with key figures. 
By the time the interim agreement was ratified, the Nixon Administration would 
be dealing with yet another crisis created by a different Jackson amendment. Before then, 
however, the issue of terrorism would come to the forefront of international affairs. 
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Chapter 5 - Terrorism Pre and Post Munich 
 
 
If we [go to the Security Council], Mr. Ambassador, we ought to do it by 
tomorrow before people start thinking about the problem. 
--Henry Kissinger to Yitzhak Rabin 
 
 
When we think about terrorism today, it is almost impossible to do so without 
thinking about major terrorism related events that have characterize armed conflicts of 
the last two decades as well as a spate of spectacular, high-casualty attacks like the 
attacks on 9/11 which were aimed not only at inflicting damage but also creating 
headlines. In many was 9/11 served as a clean breaking point in the general 
understanding of terrorism. This transformational moment changed many things in the 
security, political, civil liberties and geostrategic realms. In short, there was a pre-9/11 
era and a post 9/11 era.  
 To best understand the decision making around the Cabinet Committee to Combat 
Terrorism we must first ask and answer how terrorism was thought of at the time. It 
differs greatly from how the phenomenon is understood today. To a much lesser extent 
than 9/11, the events in Munich in 1972 did serve as another transformational moment. 
The following chapter discusses what was thought of and meant by “terrorism” in the 
time when Nixon and his aides were dealing with the fall out of the 1972 hostage taking 
of Israeli athletes. I discuss not only usage of the term “terrorism” but also how and in 
what ways it mattered at the highest ranking decision makers in the nation. What I show 
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is that the usage of the term “terrorism” as sparse and often used to characterize proxies 
on the side of US clients in the cold war. Also, I show how a number of terrorist incidents 
and groups did exist in the United States but they were not Arab groups. The case of one 
of the more active groups in the United States, the Jewish Defense League, is examined 
in this chapter as well and how the Nixon administration dealt with this particular 
challenge sheds light on some of the complexities at play between terrorism, domestic 




Terrorism Prior To September 1972 
 
To better understand the decision calculus behind counter-terrorism measures in 
September of 1972, it is important to understand how terrorism was understood at the 
time, how the government perceived the threat, and what measures were taken to deal 
with it. 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) at the University of Maryland maintains a database of terror related incidents 
starting in 1970. The data
243
 provides insight into the specific terror threats present both 
internationally and domestically in the first few years of the decade. The chart below 
depicts the number of terror related incidents each year from 1970 to 1973 in the United 






Two things become immediately clear from the chart above. First, according to 
the START data, the incidents in the United States in 1970 and 1971 made up a 
significant amount of terror incidents globally. This is likely to be a product of a US-
centric data collection effort and not necessarily the most accurate reflection of the 
empirical reality. Second, immediately prior to 1972, the number of terror incidents in the 
United States dropped significantly and to a greater degree than incidents around the 
globe. 
During this timeframe, according to the data, the countries which saw the most 
incidents were the United States, Northern Ireland, Argentina, West Germany and Spain. 
The following table enumerates the most common known perpetrators in each of these 
countries. 
 














1970 1971 1972 1973 
Terror Incidents US & International 
US 
International 




United States Left-wing militants, Black Nationalists, 
Chicano Liberation Front, Armed 
Revolutionary Independence Movement 
(MIRA), White Extremists, Jewish Defense 
League 
Northern Ireland Irish Republican Army (IRA), Protestant 
Extremists, Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster 
Freedom Fighters 
Argentina People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), 
Montoneros 
West Germany Baader-Meinhof Group (Red Army) 
Spain Catalan Liberation Front (FAC) Basque 
Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 
 
 
At first glance, particularly through the prism that is the post-9/11 mindset, it may 
seem strange that Arab perpetrators are not among the most active. In fact, during this 
period Arab perpetrators made up a very small fraction of global terror incidents. Those 
that were active coalesced around the Palestinian issue and included groups such as the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, the Black September Organization, Al-Fatah, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. From 1970 to 1973, Palestinian perpetrators 
of terror incidents globally accounted for 0.04% of all incidents and prior to September 
5
th
, 1972 when the attacks in Munich were perpetrated Palestinian groups accounted for 




an even more insignificant 0.026% of total global incidents. Perhaps even more 
importantly, their activity in the United States was even less remarkable and in fact, non-
existent. Prior to September 5
th
, 1972 no incidents of terror in the United States were 
attributed to Palestinian groups or Arab groups in the name of the Palestinian cause. An 
FBI report on Fedayeen from June of 1970 notes “no information has been developed that 




What was meant by “Terrorism”? 
 
The concept of terrorism that we are accustomed to today differs from that which 
was understood in the public discourse during this time period, as well as the way the 
term was operationalized by the US government. Indeed, this period and particularly the 
period immediately following the events in Munich in September of 1972 were critical 
moments in the effort to define how “terrorism” was understood. Early September 1972 
serves are a clean break point in time for the way the term was used.  
The origins of this term in modern history can be traced back to the French 
revolution during which time “the Terror” was used to describe a period of purges 
through executions of the revolutionary state’s political rivals. This differs of course from 
the conventional understanding of the term today which sees terror and terrorism as 
something that states generally reject and non-state actors often embrace.  
Remi Brulin
245
 conducted textual analysis to understand the evolution of the term 
in American political discourse: 
The only Western power not to have colonies and therefore not to 
be faced with decolonization movements, the United States, was also the 
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only Western power that did not have, before 1972, a discourse on 
“terrorism.” Analysis of the speeches of Presidents Franklyn [sic] D.  
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon shows that 
during the four Defining “Terrorism”  15 decades prior to the debates, the 
term “terrorism”  was virtually absent from the political lexicon of the 
American presidency, and was used to  refer to a very broad range of both 
state and non-state actors and acts.   
A search of the digital archives of the Public Papers of the 
Presidents  (American Presidency Project) finds the terms “terrorism” or 
“terrorist” in only 6 speeches by President Roosevelt, 4 by Truman, 4 by 
Eisenhower, 1 by Kennedy, 44 by Johnson and 25 by Nixon, 11 of which 
were given before the Munich incident. In the overwhelming majority of 
these speeches, the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist” appears only once, 
sometimes twice.  
Further proof that the term “terrorism” was, in 1972, a rarity in 
American political discourse, is the fact that until March 6, 1972 no 
American president had used the term “terrorism” or “terrorist” to refer to 
hijackings or bombings of commercial aircraft, using instead terms like 
“air pirates,” “sky pirates” or “hijackers.” 
A search of National Security Archives during this time period offers further 
insight. In almost all available documents prior to 1972 “terrorism” was generally used to 
refer to Marxist or leftist militants. Some documents use the term to label US adversaries 






, and Vietnam. Much of 
the references to the term in this period deal with Guatemala, which was undergoing a 
bloody civil war between the government and leftists.  
In January 1968, two U.S. military officers were assassinated in Guatemala and as 
a State Department air gram
249
 noted it “shocked U.S. public opinion and focused 
attention on the continuing high-level of violence in Guatemala”. American Ambassador 
in Managua, John Gordon Mein, was writing to the State Department concerned about 
the inaccurate US coverage of the violence and the “inherent danger” that such 





 wrote that a “redefinition of terms is needed to permit 
a clearer view of the hard realities”: 
It is particularly important to recognize that the “situation” in Guatemala 
is highly complex and does not lend itself to easy classification under 
loose generic terms. Even the term “terrorism” requires some agreed 
definition for it is composed of such disparate elements as insurgent 
action, counter-insurgent measures, political violence and common 
criminality. For the purpose of this analysis, the most frequently-used 
terms are defined as follows: 
a) Terrorism: violence perpetrated by members of far-left extremist groups 
such as PGT, FAR, MR-13; synonym: insurgency, insurgent action 
 
b) Counter-terrorism: violence perpetrated against members of the above-
named groups or others by GOG [Government of Guatemala] security 
forces whether overt, covert, or para-military (civilian); synonym: counter-
insurgency (COIN)… 
 
It is equally misleading to use “Left” as a synonym for insurgent terrorists- 
for there is also a large sector of non-communist “left” in the Guatemalan 
body politic who have taken no part whatsoever in political violence. Yet, 
the use of the generic term “left” would imply that all of this large sector 
is involved in terrorism and subversion, which is manifestly untrue and 
gives a highly distorted picture of the extent of “leftist” subversion. 
What emerges from this picture in Mein’s analysis is that terrorism was not to be 
defined by the nature of the act but by the political orientation of perpetrator committing 
it. He took issue with characterizing the entire Guatemalan left as terrorists but made 
clear that those engaged in terror are leftist rebels, while those acting against them are 
engaged in “counter-terror”, regardless to the nature of the acts the perpetrated. Mein was 
also very much aware of the Guatemalan government’s tactics: 
Their ultimate objective is the elimination of the subversive threat. This is 
done primarily by the physical elimination of the subversives themselves. 
There is a related propaganda objective; however, the GOG wants to 
appear to be operating within a legal framework as behooves a democracy 
and to be operating with the support of the people. …The main limitation 
is that whenever either the police or the military arrest a suspect, by law, 
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he must be turned over to the courts. This has proven to be a most 
unsatisfactory procedure…The government has reacted by establishing 
clandestine unites of the security forces which operate under government 
control but outside of the judicial process.  
 
By the end of the war, the death toll stood at approximately 200,000 dead or 
“disappeared”. A UN sponsored commission in 1999 assigned responsibility for 93% of 
human rights violations during the war to the Government, which Mein described as 
engaging in “counter-terrorism”.  
Of incidents perpetrated in the United States, most motivations were domestic. 
Racial and economic issues accounted for the motives of many including left-wing 
extremists, black nationalists and white extremists. Some groups had foreign policy 
motivations, these included Puerto Rican nationalists and independistas, Armenian 
groups, Chicano groups, Cuban exiles and leftist groups like the Weather Underground 
which opposed imperialist foreign policies.  
One group, however, the Jewish Defense League, posed a particular challenge to 
the Nixon Administration during this time by complicating Nixon Administration foreign 
policy objectives. A closer examination of this group helps shed light on the decision 
making of the Nixon Administration at the time. 
 





The Jewish Defense League (JDL) was initially formed in June of 1968 and in 
September of 1969 a Certificate of Incorporation was filed for the JDL listing their 
officers as Meir Kahane, Morton Dolinsky and Bertram Zweibon. It’s organizational 
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structure consisted of a National Executive Board which set national policy and executed 
decisions through chapters that are formed across the country. The chapters where 
coordinated and liaising with the national leadership regularly.  
Within the JDL, there existed an activist group known as “Oz”. This group was 
totally dedicated to the JDL ideology and is composed of its most active and ardent 
members. This group is further broken down between Oz-A, which is made up of “shock 
troops” who are expected to put their training into practice at any moment. Oz-B is the 
back-up force for Oz-A and is composed of members who are not physically fit for Oz-A 
level activity.   
The JDL was headquartered in New York but active chapters existed in 
Philadelphia, Boston, Washington, Los Angeles, Montreal and the greater NY area. In its 
early days the JDL confined its activities to the New York area and primarily in Brooklyn 
and it attempted to confront what it believed to be anti-Semitic actions of the 
revolutionary left like the Black Panthers and the right like Neo-Nazis. What 
distinguished the JDL from other Jewish rights organizations was the willingness of its 
members to actively engage in confrontations and violent actions.  
While the JDL had thousands of members nationwide in 1971 and 3,000 in the 
New York area it was estimated that only 150 hard-core members who were willing to 
become involved in militant activities.  
The JDL gained national prominence when it focused its attention on the plight of 
Soviet Jewry through a systematic campaign of harassment of Soviet Diplomats and 
attacks on Soviet facilities in New York and Washington, D.C.  They sought to put 
pressure on the Soviets to permit Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel. Similar acts have 
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been perpetrated against Arab official establishments to dramatize what the JDL 
considered to be injustice by Arabs against Jews. 
Although there are many JDL chapters, the only cities where serious terrorist 
activities took place attributed to the JDL are New York, Philadelphia, Washington DC 
and Los Angeles. 
The New York City branch lists Herman Beiber, as well as Kahane, as one of its 
leaders. Beiber is head of the hard-core inner circle of “shock troops” know as Oz. This 
elite core is specifically trained in self-defense and weaponry and is structured in 
accordance with Israeli military guidelines.  
In the past, terrorist activities by the JDL have ranged from the ineffective use of 
a Molotov cocktail to the implementation of sophisticated destructive devices resulting in 
extensive property damage and loss of life.  
The JDL and US Foreign Policy 
 
As the JDL continued to target foreign embassies, buildings and diplomats, their 
actions began to complicate US foreign policy as states on the receiving end of these 
attacks regularly raised concerns with their US interlocutors. Regarding the dimensions 
of the JDL problem in New York one US government document
252
 notes: “The impact of 
the security problem has been greatest in our relationship with the USSR and the Arab 
countries. We have been bombarded in recent years by protest notes from the Soviet 
Union and have barely avoided counteraction against either our mission in Moscow or 
involving cultural exchanges with the United States”.  The US government counted 
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Chart 8. NY Incidents Targeting Missions by Type 
 
 






The charts above indicate that a significant upsurge in incidents began in 1970 
and this was particularly noticeable as it relates to the most severe types of incidents 
noted; bombings. Zero bombings occurred in 1969 but six bombs targeted missions or 
related facilities in New York the following year. By 1971, that number increased to 
eight. In a meeting between President Nixon and numerous top administration officials in 
the Cabinet Room on April, 27
th
, 1971 US Ambassador to the United Nations George 
H.W. Bush brings the most recent JDL bombing attempt to the President’s attention: 
Bush: Mr. President, this week in New York, we had a tough one. A 
policeman defused a bomb at the Amtorg [Soviet Trade Representative] 
Building, fifty-nine minutes before a sixty-second, a sixty-minute clock 
had run out.  
Nixon: Gee. 
Bush: And, uh, they’ve escalated this –  
Nixon: Yeah.  
Bush: It was un-un-unrelated from this thing here.  
Nixon: That the Jewish Defense League thing?  
Bush: Yes, sir, and it’s getting worse. 
While missions from around the world are present in NY, the focus of the activity 
was on the USSR, Eastern European states, Arab states and Cuba. The trouble caused by 
terror incidents in NY related to foreign missions had become such a headache for the 






This was occurring as the United States and the Soviet Union were each 
attempting to improve relations with the other. Détente, as this rapprochement came to be 
known, was a central element to Nixon administration’s foreign policy.  Attacks by the 
JDL on Soviet interests in the United States and the perception that the US was not doing 
enough to stop it threatened to derail the easing of tensions. A memorandum written by 
National Security aide Henry Kissinger of a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy 
Dobrynin in early 1971 sheds light on these complications. The meeting
254
 took place at 
Dobrynin’s request, Kissinger notes: 
Dobrynin began the conversation by expressing his outrage over 
the behavior of the Jewish Defense League. I told him that the President 
was unhappy about these actions; that we were seeking indictments where 
that was possible; and that we would use whatever Federal resources were 
available to increase the protection of Soviet installations.  
 
Dobrynin said that what rankled most in the Soviet Union was the 
absence of any court action. It was inconceivable in the Soviet Union that 
such actions could take place without connivance by the authorities. While 
he was taking a slightly more tolerant view of that aspect of it, he was at 
one with his colleagues in his inability to understand why there had been 
no court action of any kind…. 
 
I repeated that we were taking the measures that were possible and 
expressed the personal regret of the President. I said there was no official 
connivance, but the overlapping of authority between Federal and State 
government presented particular complications for us; however, we would 
seek court action wherever was appropriate.  
 
The US-USSR relationship was paramount to most other issues for the Nixon 
Administration and moving in on the JDL quickly became an administration priority. 
Immediately after his meeting with Kissinger, Dobryinin’s concerns about the JDL were 
translating into action at the highest levels of the Nixon Administration. Three days after 
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the conversation at the Soviet Embassy, the Justice Department and the White House’s 
National Security Advisor were engaged in a coordinated effort to act against the JDL.  
Attorney General John D. Mitchell and Henry Kissinger discussed the best 
approach toward prosecution in an early morning phone call. Mitchell believed that the 
President might not have considered some of the negative implications of injunctions 
against the JDL. Mitchell’s concerns included the possibility that it might be a public 
relations disaster and “come back to haunt us like the Scranton Commission
255
”. Second 
he noted that this might “affect the Israelis materially” and that the Israelis would “look 
with disfavor on the publicity that will [come] from it as we being anti-Jewish.” This 
would, in Mitchell’s view, have “and averse political impact.” Third, he argued that 
“liberal groups” who would fight in court on the grounds that “we are trying to infringe 
on free speech” could result in a prolonged court battle that would grab media headlines. 
Finally, he was concerned about the possibility that even if they got such a court order, 
they would not have the resources to enforce it since federal marshals were spread thin 
and if federal troops couldn’t properly resolve the problem it would just create “more 
difficulty with our Soviet friends.”
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Kissinger agreed with Mitchell’s reasoning and argued that they just need to show 
the Soviets that they were doing something. Both Kissinger and Mitchell agreed a grand 
jury approach would be a sufficient first step and the Mitchell would bring this idea up 
immediately with the State Department.
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After meeting with the State Department, the Attorney General called
258
 Kissinger 




Mitchell: Henry. We had a meeting with Irwin and the State Department 
and in accord with the suggestion that I made to you earlier decided to 
proceed immediately, probably on Thursday, with the Grand Jury 
approach…judicial processes in New York has picked up Cahain [sic] 
(Kahane) and a couple more of his people. They brought an indictment 
against him today and other indictments which are going to be brought 
down and I have talked to [US District Attorney in NY] Frank 
Hogan….and expecting all of their activities. I think this will satisfy the 
State Department and the Russians. 
Kissinger: Excellent. 
Several notable terrorist incidents where attributed to the JDL
259
 prior to 
Dobrinyn’s meeting with Kissinger. Among these attacks were: 
June 23
rd
, 1970, the Soviet Trade mission to the United States was raided 




 1970, a pipe bomb exploded at the door of the Palestine 




, 1970, a large JDL arms and explosives cache was uncovered 
by the NYPD in Brooklyn among JDL literature, and Oz-B membership 
list, diagrams of the Algerian and Syrian Missions and detailed drawings 




, 1970, a pipe bomb exploded outside the offices of a 
Soviet airline. 
 
January 8, 1971 a pipe bomb exploded outside the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington, D.C.  
 
However, the targeted prosecutions became most prevalent immediately after 
Dobrynin expressed his outrage to Kissinger and Mitchell’s statement about “satisfying 
the Russians” leaves little doubt that the increased focus is due in large part to foreign 
policy concerns. It was after the meeting that indictments against JDL members began in 
earnest. The aforementioned ATF report
260
 on the JDL states: 
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From January 1971, to the present (November 1972), over fifty (50) JDL 
members have been named defendants in Federal fire-arms and explosives 
cases presented to the appropriate U.S. Attorney for prosecution. Thus far, 
there have been thirty-three (33) indictments and eight (8) convictions. 
Among those convicted was Meir Kahane, who was given a five year 
sentence and placed on probation. Included in the list of those indicted 




, all members of the JDL, were prosecuted after this point 
for a variety of offenses such as giving false statements in the purchase of firearms, 
unlawful making and possessing of explosives and destructive devises, the bombing and 
attempted bombing of foreign missions and residences, and passport violations.  
The law enforcement apparatus and legal system of the United States went after 
the Jewish Defense League not simply because of the illegal activities of the organization 
but rather, primarily, because it was creating problems in their foreign policy vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union. This is not to say that the JDL and its operatives involved in criminal 
activity should not have been prosecuted but rather that the prosecution of the JDL was 
not a priority of law enforcement prior to Soviet objections and it certainly was not a 
concern for high-ranking administration officials before then either. The real crackdown 
on the JDL began after Soviet objections and, as the documentation shows, high-ranking 
administration officials granted it immediate attention.  
The discussion between Mitchell and Kissinger about how to approach coercing 
the JDL offers interesting insight into the decision making process behind coercive 
measures. The potential costs weighed by Mitchell and Kissinger included the negative 
perception of the effort by the Israelis as “anti-Jewish” which could translate into 
unacceptable domestic political costs, the negative public perception of a heavy handed 
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approach akin to the fall out of the “Scranton Commission” and the negative publicity a 
long, drawn out court battle would inevitably create. The Soviet perception, of course, 
was also important. 
This suggests that costs and benefits, outside of those generally understood in the 
political repression literature for motivating coercive state behavior, played a critical role 
in the decision making process on precisely how to mitigate the JDL threat. Further, it is 
also clear that the impetus for this aggressive law enforcement campaign against the JDL, 
directed from the upper echelons of the state, was in fact a foreign actor, the Soviet 
Union, and not the direct threat the JDL posed to the state, its assets or its reputation for 
providing security for its citizens.  
The primary example of this dynamic discussed in this study took place after a 
terror incident, not in the United States, but in Munich, Germany. How the Nixon 
Administration responded to the events in Munich as they evolved and what weighed into 
the decision making of initiating an interagency crackdown on Arabs and Arab-
Americans following it is discussed below. 
 
Munich- The Hostage Crisis and the Nixon Administration 
 
As events unfolded on the morning of September 5
th
, 1972, President Richard 
Nixon was in San Clemente, California at “the Western White House”. The first item on 
his daily dairy that morning was an 8am phone call from Sidney Sexner, President of the 
Community Council of Jewish organizations in Chicago taken by the President’s aide on 
Jewish affairs, Leonard Garment. Within a few short hours the President was on the 
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phone with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. By noon, the President met with members 
of the press to express “his concern for the Israeli athletes”. Later in the afternoon, the 
President would head back to Washington, DC and speak to Yitzhak Rabin, who was in 
Vancouver, before the evening was through
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Kissinger was back in Washington receiving updates about the fluid situation in 
Germany. “The latest unconfirmed news report is that the terrorists and the hostages have 
been taken to the Munich airport” one afternoon memo began, “State [Department] is at a 
loss over how to apply effective leverage on the terrorists.
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Despite the gloomy reports Kissinger sought to assure others that the White 
House was doing all they could. One such interlocutor was important Senator Jacob 
Javits, with whom Kissinger spoke to early that evening. “We made a statement at 7:30 
this morning California time expressing the President’s outrage,” Kissinger told Javits. 
“He has done great since. [He] talked to Golda Meir and so forth,” Javits replied. “That’s 
right”, Kissinger said. “And we are also in diplomatic contact with a number of 
governments that we believe have influence with Arabs and I will be talking to Dobryin 
in a little while.
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Of course the State Department memo was not optimistic about their leverage, 
calling the diplomatic contact with Arab governments “the best they could come up with” 
but Kissinger certainly wasn’t going to tell Javitz that. Also, while Kissinger did speak to 
Dobrynin later, the situation in Munich was barely mentioned and most of their 






Cables from the US consulate in Munich were briefing Washington on the 
situation as it unfolded. The attack began at about 4am and the hostage takers had 
“demanded safe passage by plane for themselves and the hostages to any Arab capital 
other than Beirut or Amman”. The Israeli government “sent an urgent request [that] 
morning to the Olympic organizing committee requesting that the Olympic games be 
suspended pending resolution of crisis”
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The attack in Munich “has stunned the Israeli public” another cable on the Israeli 
reaction to events from the US embassy in Tel Aviv stated. The government was “in 
emergency session all morning discussing the tragedy.
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Ambassador George H.W. Bush relayed the US actions at the United Nations in a 
cable from New York to Washington. Ambassador Bush, “issued a press release 
expressing strong indignation towards terrorist action”, “telephoned the Israeli charge” to 
express “sympathy and concern” and phoned the Secretary General as well. The US 
mission would await instruction to ask for a Security Council meeting
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The President began the next day, September 6
th
, in Washington and met in the 
Oval Office at 8:13am with various foreign policy staff including Rogers, Kissinger, and 
Haig to discuss the US response to the events in Munich. By this time the smoke had 
cleared on the runway and it was clear that all the hostages were dead.  
Nixon began by telling the group that he had spoken to Rabin the night before and 
“found him to be completely rational”. He also stated that the US “must pursue a delicate 
line which demonstrated justified sympathy for Israel but which did not serve to 






The discussion shifted toward what the US should do at the moment to show 
sympathy. Rogers raised the notion that the Israelis might ask the US to pull out of the 
games and the President made clear that the US will not do that. Nor, the President 
argued, should the US lower flags for the Israeli victims because “we had not done 
similar things when deaths occurred in Ireland or during the earthquake in Peru
270
 and we 
must be careful not to demonstrate a double standard”
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Geostrategic considerations were also discussed. What would the events in 
Munich lead to in the region? If Israel lashed out it could destabilize the region and 
possibly lead to a larger conflict. Rogers argued that the events in Munich underscore the 
need for an overall settlement. Terrorism in this instance, Rogers and others at the State 
Department felt, had underlying causes that needed to be addressed. The President, 
however, believed that the events in Munich would only strengthen the hawks in Israel 
and not the peace camp. If the US led an effort at the UN Security Council in reaction to 
the events and in response to terrorism in general, it may calm some of the tensions in 
Israel. Kissinger believed that any action at the United Nations had to happen right away.  
A memo by NSC staffer Sam Hoskinson summed up US objectives at the United 
Nations regarding terrorism: “We would be seeking to (1) focus world public pressure on 
those governments which tacitly or directly support groups which engage in acts of 
international terrorism (2) bleed Israeli reaction away from acts of military retaliation into 
more constructive channels, and (3) project our determination to stamp out international 
terrorism.
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” He noted that “the hard reality, however, is that there is really very little 
we, or any major power, can do to rectify this situation or make sure that it will not 
happen again. We can attempt to focus world moral indignation and press for tighter 
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As was the case so many times before, Kissinger found himself disagreeing with 
Rogers and others at State who believed that the root causes of terrorism needed to be 
addressed. On the morning of September 6
th
, and in the course of his conversations with 
various advisers on the matter, Nixon spoke with Rogers about the broader impact of the 
events in Munich on the region and the prospects for peace. Records indicate that 
Kissinger was in the room during this conversation however he seems to have sat silently, 
listening, but not contributing to the Rogers-Nixon exchange as was often the case. The 
following is an excerpt from that verbal Oval Office conversation
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 between Nixon and 
Rogers: 
Nixon: The Israelis don't think the UN is worth a damn, but they do think 
the publicity is worth a damn. Rabin said a very interesting thing last 
night, and it shows you what a cool customer he is, he said 'well, this is a 
terrible tragedy for these men and their families' but he said, you know, he 
said 'these men, in a way they will help their country', he said because 'it 
will bring the attention of the world to this terrible problem that is 
plaguing us. You see what I am getting at is that it may be that they would 
be great to appeal to. You see they seem to be making a lot of the fact that 
you called them, I called them. 
Rogers: Mr. President another thing we have to do I think, more than that, 
is that if we can get a few days of calm and nothing happens for the next 
few days and we can keep everybody calmed down then there is going to 
be a realization that what is important is not punishing guerillas, but that 
what is important is to try to settle the problem. Now the Israelis are 
thinking along these lines. I had a discussion with Moshe Dayan recently 
where he said he thinks it’s time for them, for them, not for us, to be more 
forthcoming. Egypt is certainly going to make some sort of proposal at the 
General Assembly this fall, I’m not too sure of what form, but there will 
be renewed interest in trying to bring about some kind of solution to the 
basic problem. Because as long as the basic problem exists everything else 




Rogers: and you can shoot at guerillas and they can blow up aircraft… 
Nixon: Right. 
Rogers: but the problem is what exacerbates the whole area.  
Nixon: Well in that connection, just to be the devil’s advocate, the UN 
action might be helpful because of the idea that the United States put this 
on the world stage.  
Rogers: Well, I think the UN action, there will be UN action, but it will 
deal with the problem, not with punishing guerillas and I think that when 
the General Assembly starts this will revive a lot of interest in trying to 
make progress to a peaceful settlement. And I think that we ought to start, 
and I realize that you are sensitive about taking any action between now 
and the election, on the other hand if we could get, if talks could start or if 
we could be helpful in getting talks started, even if nothing else happens, I 
think it could be an asset as far as the campaign is concerned. And as I 
said the young leaders in Israel are thinking more on these lines. I think 
we ought to let, if not now and if Dayan is speaking for the government I 
think we should not indicate any…  
Nixon: Do you think that's the consensus? This will strengthen the hawks, 
don't you think? 
Rogers: Well, it could for the short run. Everyone realizes...say Israel 
retaliates and blows up something in Lebanon, that doesn't help anyone. I 
mean a thoughtful Israeli has to say to themselves 'Christ, we've only got 
two and a half, three million people' and there's gonna be a whole lotta…  
Nixon: Well, that was Rabin's message. 
Rogers: and we can't, I've talked a lot about this in the last 3 and half 
years, they can't handle it over a long period of time, there just too many 
God damn Arabs and there are too many crazy ones. And uh, it’s a hell of 
a shock when you kill 11 Israelis…. 
Nixon: On television… 
Rogers: On television. And you know I heard the Egyptian representative 
at the UN last night he said 'it’s tough you know, we don't condone it but 
we've had a hell of a lot of Palestinians killed over the years and we've got 
all these people homeless. What this does indicate to the world is that 
164 
 
we've got to solve the problem. It’s a hell of a thing to have 11 Israelis 
killed and it’s a hell of a thing to have millions of people homeless all 
these years. So the problem has to be solved. So I think there will be an 
effort made to bring this thing to a head this fall and if there was some 
way to get negotiations started I think it would be the best thing that can 
happen in the area. Because if the Israelis retaliate, which they may do, 
that will quiet the guerillas down for a while until they think of some other 
dastardly god damned thing to do and they will do it, and there is not a 
thing you can do to prevent it.  
 
Immediately after the meeting in the oval office, Kissinger phoned Rabin. “Their 
conviction” Kissinger told Rabin speaking of his colleagues with whom he disagreed, “is 
that you are now convinced that there must be a settlement.” Rabin replied, “I just told 
Haig that it seems that those who carried out the action in Munich succeeded beyond 
their expectations.”  
Kissinger explained to Rabin why going to the Security Council was important. “I 
recognize it will not lead to any practical results but it will focus the problem on an issue 
on which we can talk jointly while the great danger that I see is that in a few days people 
will say – as was said at the meeting this morning – we must remove the cause of this.” 
Moments later he would tell Rabin “If we [go to the Security Council], Mr. Ambassador, 
we ought to do it by tomorrow before people start thinking about the problem.
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Kissinger wanted to ensure that the conversation quickly moved toward the 
condemnation of terrorism before anyone could really question what had caused it. The 
strategy was to demonize the perpetrators lest anyone think they could have legitimate 
grievances. The President would even take this a step further later in the afternoon when 
he called Kissinger to ask if the North Vietnamese ever supported the guerillas in their 
statements. “It would be very useful if we could know whether that’s the case. You see 
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what I mean?,” The President asked, “It’s just a little research thing….It’s just something 
that we can do for a columnist to pick up and write.
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Kissinger and Nixon didn’t want people “thinking about the problem” of 
terrorism, at least, not until they can shape their thinking about the issue. As Kissinger 
noted to Rabin, this approach would not lead to any “practical results” but would be 
aimed instead on creating and dominating a global narrative on terrorism. The initial 
practical response to the events in Munich would be tasked by President Nixon to 
Secretary Rogers. 




, President Nixon tasked Secretary Rogers with implementing 
“contingency plans” and practical steps to deal with the risk of terrorism
277
. Rogers met 




The next day, Secretary Rogers “established two departmental committees to 
coordinate” the Administration’s “activities against terrorism.” The first committee, 
chaired by the NEA, would study recommendations for international action against 
terrorism and the second committee would be chaired by Joseph Sisco to make 
recommendations to prevent terrorist actions against foreigners and property in the 
United States
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.  Since these initial steps were under the direction of the Secretary of 
State, they focused on matters under the purview of the Department of State. Embassy 





 of September, a memorandum from the NEA Committee chair Rodger 
Davies to the Secretary of State outlined the initial steps taken in the days after the 
Munich incident. US security services were asked to provide protection for “Arab, Israeli, 
German and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments against attacks by the JDL or 
other groups”. Ambassadors from 44 different countries were called in to be informed of 
“United States concern over continued acts of political terrorism and of our desire to 
consult on means to improve international cooperation and capabilities for countering 
terrorism.” Elements of the American intelligence community were called together and 
consulted about improving intelligence collection on terrorist activities. “A survey of 
present intergovernmental cooperative arrangements and a proposal for specific bilateral 
initiatives with selected governments [was] under preparation.” Finally, the memorandum 
noted that “preliminary thoughts” on further actions to be considered included tightening 
“controls over foreign groups and organizations in the United States which have ties to 
movements advocating or practicing political terrorism” and specifically identified 




Despite various attacks and hijackings happening before, the hostage taking in 
Munich during the 1972 Olympics served as a game changer. The drawn out drama took 
place in a spot where the international media were already assembled and they were able 
to broadcast the events as they were happening to people around the globe. The United 
States did not have a history with Arab terrorism at this point, but it did have a strong 
relationship with Israel which American intelligence analysts believed might eventually 
put the US onto the fedayeen target list. Overall, however, terrorism was still not a high 
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priority for decision makers in the White House who were more concerned with 
reelection and the various negotiated deals with the Soviets. While an Administration 
response to the events in Munich was being formulated under the auspices of the State 
Department and Secretary Rogers however, another issue was starting to demand Henry 
Kissinger’s attention; Soviet Jewish emigration.  
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Chapter 6 – Congress vs Détente: Round II – The movement for Soviet Jewry  
 
 
Once [Nixon] gets on the phone there’s no telling what he will say. 
-Kissinger to Bill Timmons, President Nixon’s Assistant for Legislative 
Affairs 
 
Just as the Nixon Administration was entering the final months before the 
election, which were scheduled with various high profile events to highlight the fruits of 
their negotiating strategy with the Soviet Union, the movement for Soviet Jewry in the 
United States had reached critical mass and threatened the Administration’s attempt at 
rapprochement with the Soviets. By the time September of 1972 had arrived, this 
movement had gained enough clout to push its concerns to the fore of media coverage 
and forced its way into the Presidential campaign. Most importantly, the movement had 
generated enough influence and support in Congress to pose a significant legislative 
threat to a multi-billion dollar trade deal that was the centerpiece of the Nixon 
administration’s detente strategy. Kissinger, who was still attempting to manage the last 
roadblock thrown up by Scoop Jackson’s amendment to the arms limitation treaty, would 
now be faced with an even bigger congressional challenge over the issue of Soviet Jews. 
In this chapter, I discuss the role Israel played in stirring the American movement for 
Soviet Jewry through its embassy in Washington and its Consulate in New York, how the 
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issue entered into the political campaign for President and how the Nixon administration 
suddenly found themselves in a bind. 
*** 
Israel’s Role in the American Jewish Movement for Soviet Jewry 
 
The Zionist movement, which began in the late 1800s, sought to establish a 
Jewish state in Palestine. Palestine, like much of the region around it, was home to native 
Arabs. Jews made up a tiny portion of the population at the turn of the century. Thus, 
realizing the Zionist movement’s goals necessitated changing the demographics. Jewish 
immigration into Palestine, over the objections of the native population, allowed for the 
growth and development of a significant Jewish minority in Palestine until the late 1940s. 
It was not until 1948 however, that the demographics inverted. During the war in 
Palestine from 1947-1949, some two-thirds of Palestine’s native Arab inhabitants were 
depopulated and launched into a life as refugees. If the establishment of a Jewish state 
among a mass of Arabs required massive demographic engineering, so too did the 


























The chart above depicts Jewish immigration into Israel and country of origin of 
immigrants from 1948 to 2012 based on data drawn from Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics. Despite significant immigration from 1948-1951 there is an immediate and 
sharp drop off after that. The Israeli government sought to increase these numbers and 
knew also that a population of 3 million Jews resided in the Soviet Union. It was then, 
and with this in mind, that in 1952 the Israeli government established a secret program 
code-named “Nativ.” The program, also known as the “liaison office”, was charged with 
the goal of establishing and renewing ties with Soviet Jewry and encouraging Soviet 
Jewish immigration to Israel. Nativ placed operatives in Israeli embassies around the 
world to countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Latin American states, Canada , the 
United States and of course the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, diplomatic immunity 
allowed the Nativ operatives the protection to do some of the work that would otherwise 
be treacherous for Jewish activists and organizers.  The operatives in each country would 
work with Jewish communities to encourage Soviet Jewish immigration. In the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, they would “work through the Israel embassies behind the 
Iron Curtain in Moscow, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. Its task was to 
maintain contact with Jews in those countries; help them in every possible way; provide 
them with information; smuggle in Jewish cultural and religious material; explore the 
possibilities for aliyah; and in some cases, help Jews escape across borders.
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By the mid-1950s, it became clear to Nativ leaders in Tel Aviv that a growing 
relationship between the Soviets and the Arab states would complicate their mission. A 
growing divide was also evident between the United States and Western Europe on one 
side and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other. In 1955, they decided to 
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launch a campaign called “Bar” in the West, which was aimed at sensitizing public 
opinion to the plight of Soviet Jews in an effort to get outside help to accomplish their 
aim.  
In the United States, Nativ operatives were based out of the Israeli consulate in 
New York and also the Embassy in Washington D.C. They worked directly with the 
media in an effort to highlight the plight of Soviet Jews and work with members of 
Congress to insert similar information into the Congressional record. Perhaps the most 
central figure in Nativ’s operations preceding and during Nixon’s time in Washington 
was Nehemia Levanon.  
Levanon was a Latvian-born lifelong Zionist and selected for this very important 
post by Nativ headquarters in Tel Aviv for both his zeal and his intimate knowledge of 
the Soviet Union. In Nativ’s earliest days he worked in the Soviet Union before later 
being moved to the United States where the propaganda battle was most important. It was 
during his time in the Soviet Union that he developed the idea for the Bar campaign. His 
superiors in Tel Aviv put him in charge of the project and asked him to develop the 
concept for implementation. 
Prior to Levanon’s arrival in Washington, Nativ’s work and the work of the Bar 
campaign was limited to the efforts of operatives functioning out of the Israeli consulate 
in New York. Uri Ra’anan was a young student and the first Nativ operative in the United 
States in 1958. He’d soon be succeeded in New York by Benyamin Eliav who was far 
more seasoned as a diplomat. By 1961, Meir Rosenne, a future Israeli Ambassador to the 
United States, would take over the role of managing Bar operations out of the consulate 
in New York.  
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“In 1965”, Nehemia Levanon writes. “Ambassador Harman and Consul General 
Eliav came to the conclusion that Nativ had to have its own man at the embassy in 
Washington. I was asked to take up the post of minister consul in Israel's Embassy in 
Washington. In addition to serving as an expert on Soviet policy, my main task was to 
keep the State Department, Congress, and influential news media informed on the fate of 
the Jews in the Soviet Union, and to seek sympathetic and active support from them for 
our cause. I soon learned that the plight of Soviet Jewry had drawn little attention in 
Washington. American Jewish organizations had involved the two Jewish senators, 
Abraham Ribicoff and Jacob Javits, to a certain extent, but that was about all”
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It is probably no coincidence that the impact of Nativ and its Bar program to this 
point had been mostly limited to the New York area. Ribicoff and Javits were both 
Senators in from the Greater New York City area. But it wasn’t until Nativ had a 
presence in Washington that its efforts began to gain more traction.  
“I realized I had to do a lot of basic groundwork” recalls Levanon, “among 
officials of the State Department, on the Hill, and with the top journalists who 
represented important segments of the American press. I also tried to enlighten some of 
the better-known Sovietologists, who appeared to know very little about Jews in the 
Soviet Union. To a certain extent, I ignored the protocol. I regularly met with senior 
officials of the Soviet section of the State Department, as well as with desk men and 
those in the back rooms. I kept them informed, and gradually won their support for our 
view that public and political pressure by the West could produce positive results in 
Moscow. I believed that the State Department and the White House could be pulled into 





A key example of his efforts was the Yesha Kazakov affair. Kazakov was a 
Soviet-born 19-year old engineering student at university in Moscow in 1967. In January 
of that year, he became among the first and most well known Soviet Jews to reject Soviet 
citizenship and demand the right to immigrate to Israel. It is unclear what contact Nativ 
had with Kazakov prior to this. However, Nativ played a direct role in publicizing his 
personal plight. Kazakov wrote a letter to the Supreme Soviet demanding the right to 
leave the Soviet Union and go to Israel, which he wrote was his right as a Jew. The letter 
became popular in underground circles in the movement for Soviet Jewry and in late 
1968 it was published in the Washington Post on December 19
th
. “A young Jew in 
Moscow”, began the lead paragraph
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, ‘has written a remarkable letter to the Supreme 
Soviet denouncing anti-Semitic policies, renouncing his citizenship and proclaiming 
himself an Israeli, according to verified information received by Jewish sources here.” 
The Jewish source cited in the story was none other than Nehemiah Levanon
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, who 
through his post at the Israeli Embassy in Washington passed on the story to contacts at 
the Post.   
Kazakov’s story became widely known and soon became a public relations 
headache for the Soviet Union, within a matter of weeks after the publication of the letter 
in the Post and the subsequent media attention to his plight in the West, the Soviet Union 
permitted Kazakov to leave.  
Kazakov arrived in the United States and began a provocative speaking tour and 
hunger strike to raise awareness about the cause of Soviet Jewry. Nativ was concerned 
that these actions would draw focus on Israel’s role and also Israel’s influence with 
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American Jewish groups, thus it encouraged American Jewish groups not to get too 
involved in Kazakov’s efforts.  
This period highlighted some of the disarray in the Jewish community around the 
issue of soviet Jewish and also some of the divisions. Israel had helped found the 
American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ) in 1964 which was to act as a 
umbrella organization coordinating the efforts of various Jewish organizations in the 
United States on this issue. While most sympathized with the plight, not all agreed that 
Zionism was the best answer. Some believed a Jewish presence in the Soviet Union was 
important and that the struggle should be for equal rights there. The skepticism of 
Zionism largely dissipated among the American Jewish community after 1967 and the 
outcome of the June War. Still, Kazakov’s episode underscored the delicate tightrope 
Nativ was walking. Israel wanted to push the United States toward confronting the 
Soviets on this issue but at the same time did not want to be seen as the instigator or a 
liability for the United States. They also did not want to appear to be directing the 
American Jewish community. The range of opinion in the Jewish community on the 
Soviet Jewish question led Nativ to believe that the AJCSJ was no longer effective and 
that some of the infighting among the various Jewish organizations might endanger the 
cause. They sought to establish a new organization that would succeed AJCSJ and would 
have a much larger budget but Israel’s fingerprints could not be apparent. Nativ sought 
out the support of the Jewish Agency, a non-governmental organization which worked to 
encourage Jews to immigrate to Israel. Through their involvement the National 
Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) was born to replace the AJCSJ in 1971.  
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Nativ played an important role in every critical juncture of the US movement for 
Soviet Jewry though it always worked to stay in the background. Nativ’s role from the 
beginning was to organize, mobilize and support the American Jewish community to 
work on the Soviet Jewish issue and did so primarily through the Israeli embassy in 
Washington and to a lesser degree through the consulate in New York. 
A Campaign Issue 
 
The mobilization Nativ had helped create was climaxing at the worst possible 
moment for the Nixon Administration. Just a few months before the election and after 
several years of working on détente to improve US-Soviet relations, the President and his 
key advisor Henry Kissinger, found themselves forced to confront the question of Soviet 
Jewish emigration. 
An irate and cynical Kissinger took a call
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 from Leonard Garment the day after 
the Munich events: 
Garment: I don’t know when you’re getting away but the Russian issue is 
flooding my desk and phone at this point and I need some guidance both 
with the Fischers and Schreibers and countless other groups that have 
streamed in. 
Kissinger: Is there a more self-serving group of people than the Jewish 
community? 
Garment: None in the world. 
Kissinger: I have not seen it. What the hell do they think they are 
accomplishing? 




Kissinger: You can’t even tell the bastards anything in confidence 
because they will leak it to all their… 
Garment: Right. Very briefly what seems to be coming through just 
dozens of conversations is basically this and there are political as well as 
some other dangers involved – that the intellectual and Jewish community 
in the Soviet Union are just saying that in a sense they will have their 
position compromised by the Soviets through a trick of timing and that the 
Russians feel secure until November in going ahead with the attacks 
because of the concern on our part of… 
Kissinger: They are dead wrong. After November they are even safer. 
Garment: That may well be. I think then in any event… 
Kissinger: You can say – well, what we are doing, we’ve talked in a low 
key way to Dobrynin. Next week we’ll call him into the State Department. 
If the Jewish community doesn’t mind after I’ve been in the Soviet Union 
and done some national business, so we’ll do it on Wednesday or 
Thursday next week. Don’t tell them that. 
Garment: No, I won’t tell them anything. 
Kissinger: But next Thursday we’ll call them in.  
Garment: And defer any meetings between any of our people and the 
Jewish groups until after Wednesday. 
Kissinger: That’s right. After Wednesday you’ll be able to say that the 
issue has been raised both with Dobrynin and the Minister.  
Garment: I think between now and November a certain amount of theater 
is needed to keep the lid on. That’s basically what seems to come through 
to me. After that I just don’t know; there are various people that are 
talking about forming committees, to raise money and doing a variety of 
things. 
Kissinger: They ought to remember what this Administration has done… 
Garment: Yes, all of that can be pointed out but nevertheless here they 




Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson, who was intimately involved in bilateral 
negotiations on the US-Soviet trade bill, phoned
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 Kissinger to notify him of the 
movement in Congress which could jeopardize the bill. Peterson told Kissinger he had 
heard “from three different sources that there is a strong movement on the Hill to tie the 
Soviet Jewry issue with anything that has anything to do with the Soviet Union….there is 
strong pressure in this one group that I met with that’s been confirmed since then to 
submit MNF legislation, but to tie the issue to that and then to use the submission of the 
bill to get extremely vocal about it.” Kissinger believed that these maneuvers would 
either “subside” or “not be effective” until after the election. Peterson wanted Kissinger 
to know that, in fact, that was not the case. “I don’t know how much it hurts you, 
however, to do it prior to the election because that’s what they are going to do,” Peterson 
said, “I just wanted you to know about it.” “No,” Kissinger replied, “I didn’t know about 
it; it will hurt me but…it will hurt but what can we do.” It would take several more days 
for the Administration to determine what they could do. It was becoming clear, however, 
that the Soviet Jewish issue, if tied to the Trade Bill, could have disastrous consequences 
not only for the bill and détente, but also for the President on the eve of a national 
election.  
Calls from Jewish interest groups decrying Soviet treatment of Jews grew just at 
the very moment the Nixon administration was seeking ratification of several bilateral 
agreements on the eve of the election. In September of 1972, the Washington Post 
reported on the first public acknowledgement of new Soviet emigration restrictions which 
would “probably affect more Jews than others under present conditions, because Jews are 





Soviet magazine, the New Times, made the first public reference to new fees up to 
$30,000 that all “emigrants to the West will have to pay to cover the cost of their higher 
education”. 
It was just at this moment that Henry Kissinger was departing to Moscow to meet 
with Leonid Brezhnev on behalf of President Nixon to discuss a wide range of bilateral 
issues including Economic Relations
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Kissinger notes that from 1969 the Administration had “begun to make overtures 
to Moscow to ease Jewish emigration” because such a policy would improve the 
atmosphere in US-Soviet relations. This was done, according to Kissinger, privately, and 
they “had no great hopes of success”. However, they were surprised when Jewish 
emigration “increased from 400 a year in 1968 to 35,000 in 1973, parallel to the 
improvement in US-Soviet relations.” This is why Kissinger and Nixon were 




One American columnist described how this issue might be playing out during 
Kissinger’s trip: 
At some point in his Moscow visit this week, Henry Kissinger is presumed 
to have cleared his throat in the manner of one approaching a delicate 
subject and remarked: ‘Now in connection with the emigration of Soviet 
Jews--” Presumably, at that moment, President Nixon’s foreign policy 
advisor was interrupted by a gruff reminder from his Russian counterpart 
that he was raising an issue regarded by the Soviet Union as an ‘internal’ 
matter not subject to discussion with outsiders. But Kissinger probably 
persisted. He knew before he left Washington that the right of Soviet Jews 
to emigrate became a political issue in the Presidential campaign. He was 







Indeed, as Kissinger’s pre-trip conversations with both Garment and Peterson 
show, he was aware of the potential that this issue might blow up prior to his departure. 
The issue did enter the Presidential campaign as well. At one rally, for example, 
representatives of both campaigns, Ambassador George H.W. Bush and Eunice Shriver, 
appeared with Jewish leaders to stand in opposition to Soviet emigration restrictions. 
Bush was interrupted by “frequent shouts of ‘Stop Soviet Trade!’ from the audience 
during his 30-minute speech
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Transcripts of the meetings Kissinger had with Brezhnev and various other top 
Soviet officials show that the issue of Soviet Jewry was never raised. Meetings took place 
in Moscow on September 11, 12 and 13 of 1972 with Kissinger and Brezhnev as the main 
interlocutors. They were joined by assistants as well and the conversations where 
conducted through a translator.  
Domestic politics were only twice substantively raised on either side during the 
marathon meetings. First, in negotiations over a trade agreement, Kissinger wanted 
Breznev to understand that they “needed a climate where Congressional opinion” was 
receptive and showed him a recent editorial from the Washington Post critical of the 
Administration’s stance. Kissinger hoped to gain negotiating leverage by arguing the 
administration’s hands were tied by Congress on the specifics of the trade negotiations. 
The following exchange
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 then ensued:  
Brezhnev: That is just a newspaper, not the government policy. 
 
Kissinger: Yes, but it is significant because it came from a liberal 
newspaper. It is the liberal groups who normally favor expanding trade 
and we will need the support of these groups to get passage of MFN. They 
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influence our Senators whose support we need for our trade relationships. 
So it is not an insignificant newspaper in this respect as your Ambassador 
[Dobrynin, who was also in the room] will no doubt confirm. 
 
Brezhnev: Tomorrow I can instruct Pravda to criticize the Ministry of 
Trade for paying too high an interest rate on grain. It is not a side issue, 
but let’s talk about the terms of lend lease, when we will sign lend lease 
and when we will sign MFN. We are people of business and if you have a 
like attitude we can make policy. (Brezhnev pounded his book 
emphatically while making this point) 
 
Kissinger: If you have read editorials in the Washington Post over the 
weeks you must get the idea that we can’t instruct them. 
 
Brezhnev: Have another sweet. Let’s not get away from the spirit. 
 
Kissinger: I agree. Let’s forget about it. 
 
That terse exchange seemed to set a certain understanding between the two men. 
Brezhnev did not want to be bothered by the Nixon administration’s domestic problems. 
He considered those internal matters and expected the same in return. Brezhnev wanted 
to know he was dealing directly with Washington’s unified positions on issues and 
expected his American interlocutor to be a man of his word. Things worked a bit 
differently in the United States than they did in the Soviet Union.  
There was only one other time domestic political issues were raised at these high 
level meetings. Later, toward the end of their meetings on the 13th, Brezhnev raised 
concern
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 about the Jackson Amendment that threatened the arms control bill which 
Kissinger had spent the early part of August trying to make disappear.  
“I was very sensitive to the facts that relate to the Jackson Amendment regarding 




Kissinger, however, was prepared for this and had spoken to Chairman Fulbright 
on September 7
th
 prior to his departure telling him “what I want at this point is to get the 
bloody thing ratified”. “Gromyko”, Kissinger told Fulbright, “is coming over by the end 
of the month and we would really like it if we could go and have some ratification by 
then.” Fulbright and Kissinger agreed to “have a vote first of the week” and should it 
pass, “have [the amendment] taken out in the conference.
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the issue during those last moments of their final meeting, Kissinger responded “If it 
passes the Senate it will not pass the House. If the Senate passes it, arrangements have 
been made for the conference report to drop it…special arrangements have been made to 
seek passage this week. I haven’t mentioned this to the Foreign Minister yet, but I hope 
he will be able to participate in the ceremony solemnly depositing the instrument of 
ratification.
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debacle that had threatened to complicate the arms limitation bill and Brezhnev’s 
concerns were suitably answered. The agreement was ratified and entered into force on 
October 3
rd
, 1972. Neither Brezhnev nor Kissinger, however, could expect the impending 
challenge Jackson and other members of Congress would pose to jeopardize yet another 
bilateral agreement, this time even closer to Election Day.  
September Surprise 
 
Kissinger returned to Washington from the Moscow trip aimed at improving 
relations and coordinating plans moving forward only to find several issues taking place 
in his absence threatened to complicate his mission.  
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The Israelis were carrying out cross border attacks in Syria and Lebanon targeting 
fedayeen camps. Kissinger’s trip was bookended with Israeli strikes. When in Moscow, 
Kissinger had to explain to Gromyko, in a September 11
th
 meeting, that the US was 
blindsided by the Israeli strikes taking place a couple days earlier and “had done our best 




Kissinger found himself on the phone with Avner Idan, a minister at the Israeli 
Embassy, shortly after returning to the United States. “[I]n Moscow, we acted in a sense 
that I know you will highly approve of,” however, Kissinger added “if you do not stop 
these actions – I must tell you are running an enormous risk in your relations with the 
President. You launched an action the day before I go to Moscow and you launch an 
action the day I come back at a time when we are taking an all-out diplomatic position in 
your defense and are preventing – going into actions. We cannot take this. Now there is 
no President who has done more for you.
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But Israeli military actions in Arab territory were only one of the issues that 
would likely draw Soviet ire immediately after Kissinger’s trip. Kissinger had 
specifically told Brezhnev that they’d work to remove the Jackson amendment on the 
interim agreement. Yet at 1p.m. on September 18
th
, President Nixon called Senator 
Jackson to discuss the passage of the bill and if Jackson let any word of this become 
public it could confirm suspicions in the Soviet Union that the Administration was 
actually behind the Jackson Amendment all along. As soon as Kissinger found out about 
the call, he demanded to know “who programmed the President to call Jackson” from the 
President’s assistant on Legislative affairs Bill Timmons. “I hope you realize,” Kissinger 
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told Timmons, “this breaks a direct promise I made to Brezhnev…That we were not 
going to get ourselves officially behind the Jackson Amendment.” Timmons couldn’t 
quite grasp the magnitude of the problem presented by the call but Kissinger explained 
that this could “jeopardize things on which everything depends” since they had “all of 
October programmed with Soviet co-operative efforts with [the US].
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Kissinger had, “within 3 days of leaving Moscow violated a promise [he] made to 
Brezhnev on behalf of the President and it’s going to make [the Administration] look like 
the worse triple-crossers ever.” “If Jackson can say he had a call from the President 
congratulating him,” Kissinger told Timmons, “we are in deep trouble.” The US had 
“something precariously worked out with the Soviets which is not in their interest but in 
ours and if there’s one thing we don’t need it’s a double-cross.” 
Timmons said he would call Jackson and ask him to “shut up about it so we can 
get the damn thing through” and that that should “keep him quiet for the next few 
days.
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legislation that “touches foreign policy, [Timmons should] check with Haig and 
[Kissinger]. The President just doesn’t know all the details.” “Once [Nixon] gets on the 
phone,” Kissinger told Timmons, “there’s no telling what he will say.
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While Timmons was off to call Jackson in the hopes of keeping him quiet, 
Kissinger would have to do some damage control of his own with Dobrynin. Minutes 
after speaking with Timmons, Kissinger was on the phone with the Soviet Ambassador to 
explain the President’s call to Jackson which Kissinger admitted was “embarrassing to 
[him] in light of [his] discussions in Moscow.” Kissinger explained that the President’s 
liaison people type up a note for the President to call bill sponsors to thank them for their 
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efforts and he “found out to [his] horror that the people did that with the Jackson 
Amendment and so [Nixon] called Jackson today.” Dobrynin’s responded with surprise, 
“Uh-ooh!” Kissinger wanted Dobrynin to know he was “mortified” and that he was 
“raising unshirted hell” and wanted to inform him in the event Jackson made news of the 
call public. Dobrynin assured Kissinger he’d explain it to Gromyko.  
*** 
The movement for Soviet Jewry in the United States, in many ways instigated and 
certainly supported by Israel, interjected the Middle East into the US-USSR 
rapprochement in a dangerous way. The Soviets did not want what they say as their 
internal issues being dragged into international negotiations.  Along with Israeli strikes in 
Syria and Lebanon and the mix up that led to the President congratulating Senator 
Jackson, a third issue rapidly developing in the weeks before the election would put 
Kissinger in a very difficult position vis-à-vis the Soviets; a congressional movement to 
condition the US-Soviet trade bill on Soviet emigration restrictions. How this issue 
evolved, why it presented significant challenge to the Administration and how Nixon and 








Chapter 7 - The Trade Deal and The Trade Off 
 
 
It’s very good we’re getting some Jewish votes now but Henry, if the 
American people get the idea that their gonna jeopardize a 5 billion dollar 
trade deal because of the Jewish community in this country or some Jews 
in the Soviet Union, they will never do it! 
-President Richard Nixon 
 
Kissinger returns from Moscow where he had concluded negotiations with the 
Soviets on a variety of issues and is confronted at a press conference with “nasty” 
questions, not about the negotiations but about the Soviet Jewish issue. Something had to 
be done about a problem that was getting out of hand. In this chapter, I show how Nixon 
and Kissinger discussed the issue and how they agreed to handle it. Fresh off a battle with 
Scoop Jackson and Congress on the last amendment, Kissinger felt it was best to go 
outside of Congress, to the Israeli Ambassador, in an effort to quell Congressional 
opposition driven by the Soviet Jewish movement. It was during this effort that Nixon, 
through Kissinger, agrees to create the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism in 
exchange for Rabin’s help in Congress. I also show why the Israeli Foreign Minister 
wanted the CCCT and how it fit his agenda of changing the international conversation 
from a land-for-peace discussion that Israel was resisting for several years to one about 




Every. Deal. Is. Made. 
 
Henry Kissinger walked into the Oval Office at 9:46am on the morning of 
September 16
th
 after arriving from meetings in Europe and Moscow
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.  His trip was 
successful and the principles of a variety of bilateral treaties were agreed upon with his 
Soviet counterparts in the preceding days. “Every. Deal. Is. Made. It is just the 
formalities,
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” he would tell President Nixon.  
The President assigned the deal making to his National Security aide Kissinger. 
This was the hard part and of course with a month to go before elections, ensuring 
success was critical. The formalities, which would be conducted through normal 
diplomatic channels, would largely be overseen by Secretary of State Rogers. Rogers, 
despite being relegated to a lesser role in the process, was “delighted” when Kissinger 
informed him of the outcome of the negotiations
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.  
The discussion then shifted to the planning and timing for signing the agreements 
in the coming weeks. A different agreement was to be signed each week leading up to the 
election. This would culminate the Nixonian foreign policy of détente on the eve of the 
election allowing voters to see the fruits of the policy in a condensed and impactful 
period of time. The maritime agreement would be concluded in late September, then 
SALT in the first week of October, the trade deal in the second week, an announcement 
about SALT II talks the week after that and the European Security Conference in the last 
week of the month.  
The schedule was designed for maximum public impact immediately prior to the 
election and thus the optics would be critical. How important were the details of the 
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timing and the media impact? So important that Nixon and Kissinger worked out each 
date for maximum effect. Nixon insisted that SALT be signed on October 3
rd
 instead of 
the 2
nd
 when Gromyko would be arriving for a working dinner. An earlier event on the 
third would allow for much better placement of a photograph of the signing ceremony, 
Nixon believed. He also insisted that the trade deal be signed on the 10
th
 which would 
allow it to “dominate the headlines
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.” After outlining the schedule with the President, 
Kissinger remarked that “literally we will have solved every issue between us and them. 




”  The 
election would be held for four days later. 
After reviewing the scheduling of signings with President Nixon in the Oval 
Office, Kissinger was off to a press conference on his trip. After he was finished he 
would return to the Oval Office to once again speak with the President. The President 
wanted to know how the press conference went and Kissinger noted that it was packed 
but that most of the questions, which he described as “nasty”, were about the Soviet 
Jewish issue and an amendment that Senator Abraham Ribicoff was proposing that would 
condition trade with the USSR based on their treatment of Jews. Kissinger tried to answer 
the questions succinctly in an effort to mitigate discussion on the issue but it became 
clear that the issue was beginning to snowball in the media and in Congress.  
It was at this point that Nixon and Kissinger first discussed the serious problem 
presented by the amendment and what it could mean for the trade deal. Nixon believed 
the entire initiative was “idiocy.” That “some senators and congressmen,” Nixon told 
Kissinger, “are going to try to block the trade agreements for the persecution or denial of 
exit visas for Israelis or Jewish people, Jesus Christ, that’s ridiculous.” Kissinger agreed 
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and immediately responded by explaining the Soviet perspective, that the Soviet Jewish 
issue was an internal affair not for other governments to involve themselves in: “If a 
foreign country starting bringing pressure on us with respect to Angela Davis we’d be 
climbing walls!” “Of course,” Nixon responded, “well I think you gotta tell them that.
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Nixon was referring to the members of Congress putting a rider on the agreement.  
Kissinger, however, didn’t think direct engagement with the members would be very 
helpful and instead sought “to get it quieted down by [Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak] 
Rabin” in the coming days
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Three days after the press conference momentum had continued to build in the 
media and in Congress on the Soviet Jewish issue. Nixon simply could not accept a 
public embarrassment with the Soviets just weeks before the election in the middle of a 
month entirely programmed to show cooperation.  
In an afternoon meeting
313
 that day in the Oval Office Nixon told Kissinger “its 
very good we’re getting some Jewish votes now but Henry, if the American people get 
the idea that their gonna jeopardize a 5 billion dollar trade deal because of the Jewish 
community in this country or some Jews in the Soviet Union, they will never do it!” 
Kissinger agreed of course and both he and Nixon cited other examples where treatment 
of minority groups in other countries did not play into their bilateral relations like 
Bangladesh and Burundi. It simply “cannot be the key aspect of US Foreign policy,” 
Kissinger said.  
It was at this point that Nixon interrupted Kissinger and directed him to send a 
clear message to the Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin whom he had a meeting with the 
next morning. “You go see Rabin and say ‘Look, you know who’s your friend and you 
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know who is going to be in this office so for Christ’s sake don’t embarrass him at this 
point’ and don’t shake our whole Soviet deal because anything we do in the Mid East is 
gonna depend on us getting some help from the damn Russians”
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The trade deal was the central component in détente and Kissinger told Nixon that 
Breznev was planning on highlighting it in a major speech on the upcoming 50
th
 
anniversary of the Soviet Union so, Kissinger remarked, “we gotta have it”. 
Later in the conversation
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, President Nixon asks Kissinger, “Do you think Rabin 
can influence [Senator Jacob] Javitz and [Senator Abraham] Ribicoff?” “Of course,” 
Kissinger replied “We’ll put the heat on him..I’m going to tell him that ‘the President is 
getting very disturbed, I go to Russia and I’m faced with their attack on Syria, when I 
come back, Lebanon. We’re holding down the fort for you with the Russians, and you 
give us no help?’ So, I’m going to be very tough.” 
Rabin “knows damn well,” Kissinger said, “that you and my office are the ones 
that kept them safe from being stampeded,” likely referring to Nixon and Kissinger’s co-
effort to marginalize the State Department in years prior.  
“What [Rabin] also knows,” Nixon retorted, “is that he is gonna deal with us later, 
he knows there is no way -- if they want to play it – if they make this issue a difficult one, 
sure they may hurt us some politically but they are not going to defeat us and I will not 
forget it. Believe me, and you know what I mean.”  
Kissinger did not believe the Israelis were behind this initiative in Congress, 
however, instead, he believed it was the American Jewish community who he called “a 
bunch of self-serving bastards.” Nixon wondered if elements within Jewish community 
with ties to McGovern might be trying to embarrass Nixon prior to the election. Neither 
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could identify precisely where the problem was coming from, though they had their 
theories, but both agreed there was one good way to try to stop it. 
 
“I’m going to see Rabin in the morning,” Kissinger said.  
 
When Kissinger Met Rabin 
 
Just as the interagency group was meeting at the State Department in Foggy 
Bottom, Kissinger walked back into Nixon’s office on Pennsylvania Avenue, “I had a 
talk yesterday with Rabin about the Jewish stuff,” he said. “He said he would help us on 
it. It will take him about a week to quiet them down because it is a tough problem for 
them too but he’ll do it. He agrees. He says it is hard for us to imagine the emotion in 
Israel about Munich. They are under tremendous pressure domestically but he said he 
would do his share.
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But help is rarely offered in Washington for free. When Nixon dispatched 
Kissinger, he told him to tell Rabin that the President would not forget the difficult 
position he was being put in by the Soviet Jewish amendment. Is that what convinced 
Rabin to help? Kissinger told the President that the Israelis wanted two things in return 
for assistance with their Congressional problem. 
“There are two things that might help,” Kissinger said, “one is…I thought it might 
be useful if you created an anti-terrorist committee, a government like committee.
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Nixon was immediately responsive. “We could do it for another reason; 
[Secretary of State] Bill [Rogers] is the one I’ll ask to do it. First, it gives him something 
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to do”. Nixon then explains a second reason, “when you were gone I got a hold of Haig 
and I told him I want contingency plans because I get concerned. Rose
318
 talks to this 
soothsayer and she says they are so desperate that they could kidnap somebody, they 
could shoot somebody and they create this…We have got to have a plan Henry. Suppose 
they kidnap Rabin and then ask us to release all blacks in prison throughout the United 
States and we didn’t, naturally, what the Christ do we do? We won’t get into…but you 
see what our problem is? We’ve got to have contingency plans for hijacks, kidnapping, 
for all sorts of things that happen around here.” 
The other item Rabin wanted? Kissinger told the President “the Israelis have 
made a request to us for some industrial help in producing their own tanks and producing 
a modified version of a French airplane. Now the bureaucracy is opposed in part because 
they think it will create an airplane manufacturer that is a competitor to us which I think 
is nonsense that a country of 2 million and secondly because they think they will lose 
leverage. The counter argument that I feel very much is if we could get them off our 
backs with periodic airplane deliveries it would be a cheap price and if you do it in 
October it could do you some political good.
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“Sure”, Nixon said “I’d love to do it.” 
“If I could tell Rabin,” Kissinger said, “‘Now you call off your Jewish senators 
and we’ll help you with this arms package’ that’s a message he’ll understand
320
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As soon as Kissinger had secured the agreement of the President on these two 
items he left the Oval Office and immediately spoke with Rabin on the phone
321
. “One 
point that I would like to check with you.” Rabin said, “Since we talked yesterday about 
the idea of a special agency-- ” 
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“It’s all entrain” Kissinger told Rabin. “Raise the idea and Rogers will be 
delighted to tell you that he has just been put in charge of the big machinery.” 
Shortly after speaking to Rabin and assuring him the President had agreed to the 
creation of a “special agency” whose “big machinery” Rogers’ would be in charge of, 
Kissinger returned to the Oval Office to speak with the President. 
“I talked to Rabin,” Kissinger said, “and he said he has already started moving on 
the 4 major Jewish organizations. He says the problem is a bunch of people got involved 
while he was away in Israel. He promises us he will cut off legislative pressures. He says 




The relief could not come soon enough. That afternoon, Congressional Majority 
Whip Leslie Arends put in a frenetic phone call to Henry Kissinger. Congressman 
Charles Vanik was now proposing an amendment similar to the rider in the Senate. 
Initially, Kissinger and the Administration’s Republican allies in the House were hoping 
to have the amendment removed from consideration for being irrelevant but “the 
unfortunate part about it though” as Arends told Kissinger, “is that the Parliamentarian is 
apparently going to say that this is germane. That’s hard for me to believe but this is the 
last word.
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” Arends then read Kissinger the proposed text: 
None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act for 
carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be used 
to provide loans, credits, financial and investment assistance or issue 
guarantees on sales to or investments in any nation which requires 
payment above the nominal and customary costs for exit visas, permits or 




“You know our view on this”, Kissinger said. “I know the view on the thing.” 
Responded Arends, “Now the question is in my mind and that [Speaker] Gerry [Ford] 
and I discussed is did you get a hold of Rabin yesterday?” 
“One thing I cannot afford is to have spread all over Capitol Hill whatever I may 
discuss with Rabin” Kissinger quipped.  
“That’s right”, Arends replied, “And we don’t want you to tell us what Rabin said 
or anything but I mean you were going to…” 
“I’ve talked to him and I’ll work on him.” Kissinger said interrupting Arends. 
“But for Christ’s sakes don’t mention it.
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They would have liked for this to be nixed by the Parliamentarian but it had now 
become out of the question. “If we get stuck on this thing,” Arends told Kissinger, “why 
its going to be terrible. I just don’t know what we are going to do.” 
After hanging up with Arends, Kissinger was immediately on the phone with 
Rabin. “Mr. Ambassador,” Kissinger said “I’ve just been told that Congressman Vanik is 
putting forward a Resolution cutting off all assistance, guarantees and so forth to any 
country that has emigration fees. And I’m getting desperate from Gerry Ford and others 
saying they’re all being put into a horrible fix. I really believe this is going to backfire 
against the Jewish Community as soon as people get their breath.
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Rabin explained to Kissinger that he was doing what he could without overtly 
getting publicly involved in domestic American politics. He did, however, offer Kissinger 
campaign advice for the Republican Presidential ticket, suggesting the campaign should 
have slammed the Democratic vice-presidential nominee, Sargent Shriver, for not 





The Vanik amendment was approved by voice vote that evening as part of the 
House vote on the trade bill
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. The next morning Kissinger would be trying to explain 
this to the Soviet Embassy as he told Secretary Yuri Babenko, “That vote yesterday on 
the Vanik amendment, I told [Dobrynin] that we had it beaten and we had it beaten; we 
had it ruled out of order. Then he changed the amendment by saying it wasn’t relevant, 
and he made it relevant and it passed. And we are now going to try to kill it in the Senate, 




Why did Rabin Want the CCCT? 
 
In return for working to cut off pressure in Congress against the trade bill, the 
Nixon Administration would acquiesce on two items Rabin wanted. One was related to 
arms development assistance that had been held up by the “bureaucracy.”  As was 
demonstrated earlier, the Israelis were increasingly relying on the U.S. for military aid 
and one of the contentious items they requested was assistance for their domestic arms 
industry. So it is easy to understand why Rabin would use the leverage he had at this 
moment to ask for this longstanding Israeli request. But why the CCCT, especially at the 
price of the pressure around the Soviet Jewry issue which was itself something the Israeli 
Embassy had been actively working to foment for years through Nativ? 
It is likely that seeing the extent of influence interest groups had already 
generated and the willingness of members of congress, especially a prominent anti-
Communist hawk like Scoop Jackson, to champion the issue, Rabin calculated that a 
critical mass had already been achieved and it was only a matter of time before such 
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legislation would pass. So, if he could reap the rewards of the leverage he had at this 
unique moment of vulnerability before the election, he could do so knowing the long 
term prospects a trade bill rider would not be in jeopardy. Of course, history would prove 
this to be an accurate calculation as the Jackson-Vanik amendment became law as part of 
the 1974 Trade Act months later.  
Still, why request a cabinet level anti-terror committee? There are a few ways 
which the State of Israel could have benefitted from its establishment. First, it would 
allow for a degree of monitoring of anti-Israel political activity in the United States by 
turning the attention of the federal government toward this issue. Second, the committee 
would create new mechanisms for deeper information and intelligence sharing between 
Israel and the United States. This would not only allow Israel to pass on information 
about political opponents but it would also deepen the ties between Israel and the United 
States government. We know that as the CCCT was being established, officials from the 
Israeli embassy in Washington were in communication with the U.S. State department 
and presented “seven Government of Israel proposals” to strengthen “the campaign 
against terrorism.” These proposals included urging airlines and pilots unions to boycott 
countries from which hijacked flights emanated, impose tighter travel restrictions on 
Arab nationals and encourage other governments to do so as well, seek the assistance of 
international groups, use US influence with Arab governments, close the PLO office in 
New York and engage INTERPOL in counter-terror initiatives. The proposals made by 
the Government of Israel were taken into continued consideration by the CCCT. At the 
end the conversation between Avner Idan of the Israeli embassy and Alfred Atherton, the 
Deputy Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Idan “expressed Israeli concern” of the 
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employment of Arabs in the United States in certain locations and that Arabs should not 
be employed at ports, airfields or in the postal service. “The Government of Israel would 
like the United States Government to use the appropriate opportunities to enforce this 
view,” the memo noted of Idan’s remarks. Atheron, in response, “saw a difficult moral 
dilemma here” and that “all must not be assumed responsible for the acts of a few” even 
drawing “a parallel with the much regretted WWII US government policy toward 
Japanese-Americans.” This exchange demonstrates an official Israeli attempt to shape 
U.S. counter-terror policies in a way that would target Israel’s political opponents in the 




Of course, Israel did ultimately reap these benefits from the establishment of the 
CCCT, but is that why Rabin asked for it? While we have oval office tapes documenting 
the verbatim conversations between Kissinger and Nixon on this bargain, and while we 
have phone transcripts of conversations between Rabin and Kissinger mentioning it as 
well, records of the in-person conversation between Rabin and Kissinger where the 
outline of the deal was struck are not available. Kissinger “went to see Rabin” which 
suggests that unlike many meetings he had with Rabin in the White House’s map room, 
this meeting likely took place elsewhere. Insight however might be gleaned from the 
September 21
st
 phone conversation between the two where Kissinger confirmed to Rabin 
that the wheels begun to move on putting the committee together. Kissinger told Rabin 
that Rogers will soon be in charge of the CCCT and that this would be “a great victory 






We know from the records that Kissinger and Nixon thought of the CCCT as 
giving “Rogers something to do” and that Rogers would do it for the prestige, but why 
would the establishment of the CCCT be a victory for Rabin’s Foreign Minister, Abba 
Eban?  
Not long after the hostage crisis in Munich, Eban’s priorities began to shift in a 
way that reflected the trade off made with Rabin. In August of 1972, just as the Soviet 
Jewish issue had become hot, Eban had planned to focus his UNGA General Debate 
speech on the Soviet restrictions on Jewish émigrés
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. After Munich, however, the 
narrative and the talking points shifted. Terrorism and the need for a global, united battle 
against it became Eban’s main focus. He planned to come to the United States and make 
these talking points known and his UNGA speech focused on Terrorism. A State 
Department Cable
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 reports comments Eban made just before departing to the United 
States: 
Foreign Minister Eban, in remarks to reporters at Lod Airport, 
stated that because of terrorist attacks against Israel, solution to political 
problems had been pushed aside. He said that “terrorism must be rooted 
out and this war is now our principal concern.” According to press reports, 
Eban was critical of freedom with which terrorists operate within West 
Germany and UK and said that he hoped leaders of those countries “open 
their eyes and change their liberal policies towards the terrorists.” 
 
  Israel, which had been intransigent when it came to peace talks pushed by the 
United States, would now use the issue of terrorism to argue against returning to talks in 
any way. This became the theme of Eban’s trip to the United States. Shortly after arriving 
he met with Secretary Rogers on September 22
nd
.  Rogers had just the day before been 
informed of the President’s intention to form the CCCT and have him chair it. Eban met 
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with Rogers for 75 minutes. The New York Times reported
333
 that the outcome of the 
meeting was that “United States and Israeli officials agreed” that “priority should be 
given to combating international terrorism although ‘options should be kept open’ for 
peace negotiations in the Middle East.” It continued: 
Mr. Eban, the State Department said, outlined for Mr. Rogers the 
measures that Israel thought other governments should undertake against 
terrorism. The measures were not publicly spelled out.  
A State Department official said that the reference to keeping 
negotiating options open in the Middle East despite the importance of 
combating terrorism was “theoretical” because of the present situation.  
Speaking to newsmen after conferring with Secretary Rogers, the 
Israeli Foreign Minister referring to terrorism said that Middle East peace 
negotiations could not proceed until “this obstacle is out of the way.” 
 
Since the first days of the Nixon Administration in 1969 when they made the 
Middle East peace effort through four party talks and Gunner Jarring a priority, the 
Israelis saw the State Department and Rogers in particular as a problem in Washington. 
While they were often comforted and reassured by Nixon and Kissinger in the White 
House, they believed, and in part due to Kissinger’s efforts, that Rogers and the State 
Department’s approach was naïve and even dangerous. This crystallized after Rogers 
outlined his plan in December of 1969 and Rabin began “full-scale public activity” 
against it. Now Rogers, who had become synonymous with the Nixon Administration’s 
peace efforts, was publicly agreeing with the Israeli Foreign Minister that peace talks 
were not a priority and should be put on the backburner. The CCCT, which was publicly 
announced on the 25
th
, just days after Eban’s meeting with Rogers and just before Eban 
spoke at the UNGA with the same talking points, served to create the perception that 
Eban persuasions resulted not only in a post-meeting joint statement on terrorism taking 
200 
 
priority over peace talks, but that it also translated into United States policy. While this 
was no triumph for peace, it was certainly a “victory” for Eban’s foreign policy agenda.  
Putting Together the CCCT’s Big Machinery 
 
While Kissinger and Nixon were hoping Rabin’s leverage could cut off legislative 
pressure as he promised, they went to work to assemble one of the requests Rabin had 
made; a cabinet level anti-terrorism committee. Nixon, Rabin and Kissinger knew about 
the bargain that resulted in the decision to establish the CCCT but Nixon could not 
formally establish one based on that pretext. An official process was undertaken through 
the National Security Council - under Kissinger’s direction - to draft a memorandum for 
the President recommending the establishment of the committee. Richard Kennedy, who 
worked under Kissinger, drafted an initial memorandum for Kissinger presenting two 
options including the CCCT and the option of simply putting Rogers in charge of a 
working group, and excluding cabinet level officials. Kennedy wrote that while the work 
of the two State Department-chaired working committees “were doing useful work”: 
We need to harness the bureaucracy and assure its full participation 
and support in the development of a comprehensive effort to deal with 
both aspects of the problem – prevention of and response to acts of 





While this memo, drafted on September 23
rd
, seemingly presented a choice of 
actions to Kissinger to recommend to the President, the choice had already been made by 
Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office two days earlier. Nonetheless, the formalities of 
the action drafting process continued. Kissinger approved the CCCT option in Kennedy’s 
memo and it was then sent to the President.  
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In a subsequent memo to Al Haig, another of Kissinger’s aides, Richard Kennedy 
wrote that the “talked with Krogh.” Egil Krogh was an attorney and advisor to the 
President at the time; he would later be the Undersecretary for Transportation before 
being sentenced to prison time during the Watergate scandal. At this point in 1972, 
however, Krogh was the head of the “Cabinet Committee on Drugs”
335
, which the CCCT 
was modeled after. Krogh “emphasized again the need for strong White House push and 






, the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State 
noting that “the two committees you have set up to cope with this major problem are 
making commendable progress” but, he continued, “because of the great importance and 
urgency I attach to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism, which encompasses 
diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions, I am hereby establishing a 
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
337
”.  The President followed the memorandum 
to Rogers with another to all heads of departments and agencies wherein he wrote that he 
considered “it to be of the utmost importance that we move urgently and efficiently to 
attack this worldwide problem” and that the committee must work to “prevent terrorism 
here and abroad.” He expected department and agency heads “to be fully responsive” in 
the “efforts to coordinate government-wide actions against terrorism.
338
” 
As White House staff members were working on making this announcement 




. “We will 
announce that committee today – the Anti-Terror Committee.” And what of Rabin’s other 
request for the arms package?  
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“I’m pushing the other matter too.” Kissinger said, “Just let me do it in my 
crooked way.” 
“Fine,” said Rabin, “And in the meantime I will leave you the pressure [about the 
limitations at least in the Senate that] didn’t go bad for your point of view.” 
“Right,” Kissinger replied, “And if you can keep in so far as you can control it 
attacks from being made on the President.
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” 
Rabin’s Campaign Advice 
 
Nixon was increasingly concerned about political attacks from the Jewish 
community. The Democrats and his challenger McGovern had made it a point of 
contention in the campaign. Earlier in the year Kissinger had brought this to the attention 
of the President and asked him if he had read the “foreign policy platform of the 
Democrats?” Nixon “didn’t want to lose [his] breakfast” but Kissinger told him it was 
“not to be believed.” 
Aside from weakness on Vietnam and defense spending, the rest of the foreign 
policy section of the platform, Kissinger said, was “all-out on Israel” and “in a really 
nauseating way.” 
The platform had called for Jerusalem to be recognized as Israel’s capital. “Isn’t 
that something” the President remarked on the “all-out on Israel” nature of the platform. 
“That is so dishonest,” he said, “I hope Rabin and that bunch aren’t taken in by all that 
crap.” He told Kissinger, “you can be for Jerusalem being the capital and if you’ve got a 
$35 billion defense cut, there isn’t going to be anything to be capital of.” 
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Kissinger objected all together. “But, Mr. President, to make Jerusalem the capital 
of Israel is not the platform of a major American national party for Christ sakes. That is 
what I find so revolting. These people who have nothing, they don’t mention NATO, they 




Revolting or not, Israel, Soviet Jewry and relations with the American Jewish 
community was becoming a major issue in the Presidential campaign. That is why after 
Kissinger told Rabin fulfilling his request in return for taking legislative pressure off the 
President he’d ask Rabin for a bit more help. The President was scheduled to meet the 
following day with several leaders of the American Jewish community in New York and 
he was “very nervous about” it.  
“I don’t know whether you have any influence on them to keep them from 
harassing him too much” Kissinger told Rabin. 
Rabin advised that the President should “start with a few words rather than to let 
them set a tone”. He told Kissinger that the President should tell the Jewish leaders what 
they want to hear which is “as much as possible the same line, the same, let’s say, basic 




After the Israeli Ambassador advised the White House on what to say to their 
domestic Jewish constituents, he again offered some campaign advice to Kissinger. When 
they had recently spoken, Rabin suggested Nixon’s campaign should slam Sargent 
Shriver for not showing up to a rally on Soviet Jewry, this time the target was Gary Hart. 
Hart, who was McGovern’s campaign manager, “appeared here in George Washington 
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University,” Rabin told Kissinger and “he said Israel should be condemned for each 
action against Lebanon. No one has used it.” 
Rabin told Kissinger that it even appeared in the student paper. Kissinger said that 
was “very helpful” and that he’d “pass it on.
343
” 
Kissinger hung up with Rabin and went immediately to the Oval Office. “Mr. 
President,” Kissinger began, “We are going to announce today the formation of an anti-
Terrorism cabinet level committee.” Nixon asked Kissinger if Rogers agreed and 
Kissinger told him “He did when you said you wanted it.” Rogers would chair the 
committee and that prestige should be reason enough for Rogers to be for it, Nixon 
thought. However, Kissinger took this opportunity to clarify to the President precisely 
why the committee was being formed
344
.  
“Well the reason we do it, Mr. President,” Kissinger said, “it’s good for your 
meeting with the Jewish leaders tomorrow. The Israelis want it. It doesn’t cost us a god 
damned thing.” 
Kissinger quickly transitioned to telling Nixon what he had learned from Rabin 
regarding the upcoming meeting with Jewish leaders. Rabin “thinks it would be good if 
you made a brief opening statement and he said the way to handle it is don’t let them ask 
you too many questions,” said Kissinger. “I’m writing it out and you will get it,” he 
continued “but you should say ‘Look our policy has been consistent, every Phantom that 
goes to Israel was put in by my administration, two-thirds of the Skyhawks, we have 
supported Israel, we’ve done it not for the election but we’ve done it for four years’ and I 




Then, Kissinger passed on Rabin’s campaign advice. “Rabin told me that 
McGovern, when he talked to this group, talked a lot about the UN, he said it turned them 
all off. And so if you can get a crack in at the UN, ‘we’re not counting on the UN we are 
doing it ourselves’. Secondly, Rabin told me, and I am going to mention this to [Robert] 
Haldeman, that Gary Hart gave a speech at George Washington University and said that 
every time Israel makes a move against Lebanon and Syria the United States should 
publicly condemn it and [Rabin] said we ought to get that out and he said he’d get it out 
for us”. 
Nixon was surprised at Hart’s remarks, “Good God! Really?” 
Kissinger told him that Rabin said “if anyone here takes Gary Hart on, he will see 
to it that it goes all over the Jewish community. He just has to have a peg to hang it on. 
Rabin is all-out on our side.
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The meeting with Jewish leaders took place the following day at the Waldorf-
Astoria hotel in New York City. Nixon remained well within the framework suggested by 
Rabin to him through Kissinger. The Jewish newspaper, “The Forward”, covered the 
event at the time.  
Nixon reportedly “assured the Jewish leaders that the US would ‘under no 
circumstances impose a settlement in the Middle East’; that the administration was 
‘committed to the survival of the State of Israel (and) the strength of Israel’; that the US 
would continue to ‘make available the assistance to Israel (necessary to) maintain her 
strength and that the ‘strong US presence in the Mediterranean’ would be maintained.
346
” 
Rabin’s advice was followed on more than just the framing of the President’s 
remarks. The Forward also reported: 
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 Prior to the press conference, a representative from the New York 
Committee to Re-Elect the President, distributed a copy of an article that 
appeared in a newspaper: ‘The Hatchet,’ a publication of a student society 
at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., which carried a 
headline, ‘Gary Hart: Israeli Raids Wrong.’ The article, signed by Mark 
Nadler, editor-in-chief, stated that Hart, Sen. George McGovern's 
campaign manager, in response to a question, told a crowd of 500 students 
at the university on Sept. 19 that McGovern should condemn Israel for its 




Several factors motivated Nixon to make this deal with Rabin. The short time 
before the election made the President particularly vulnerable. Kissinger had also known 
exactly how hard it was to attempt to resolve this with congress because of this recent 
experience with Scoop Jackson over the amendment on the interim agreement. The 
personal relationship between Kissinger and Rabin, one that developed through a secret 
backchannel line and was solidified during the high-drama moments in Jordan when the 
Israelis were prepared to launch strikes to save the King, allowed the White House to 
have an opportunity to cut this deal.  
 For Rabin and the Israelis, the establishment of the CCCT by Nixon was a 
boon. It would help advance the agenda of Rabin’s direct boss, the Israeli Foreign 
Minister Abba Eban, who wanted to elevate the international conversation around 
terrorism and deflect any calls on Israel to withdraw from territory it occupied in 1967 
until the problem of terrorism was resolved. It also provided the Israelis with an 
opportunity to strengthen their relationship with the US through intelligence sharing.  
 As the CCCT was being assembled, Nixon and Kissinger would pay little 
attention to the question of terrorism from that point forward. However the CCCT would 
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have a significant impact on one community in particular, the Arab American 




Chapter 8 – Something’s Happening Here 
 
Yesterday it was the Japanese, today the Arabs, tomorrow who? 
-Dr. Muhsin Biali 
 
 
This chapter traces the initial interagency efforts led by Secretary Rogers on 
terrorism and how they were given a significant boost through the creation of the CCCT 
and its working group. I show how Arabs in particular were put under the microscope and 
singled-out for this degree of scrutiny despite having no history of carrying out any 
terrorist acts in the United States to that point. As the program targeting Arabs begins to 
come under scrutiny, I follow an interagency discussion over it and show how the FBI 
was the only agency that sought to keep it while all others had agreed it was inefficient.  
Further, I show how data collection done by the FBI conditioned their perception 
of the “threat” posed by Arab student groups and how organizations sympathetic to Israel 
and with suspected ties to the Israeli government were also spying on these Arab student 
groups and passing information on to the FBI. The chapter concludes with a discussion 









, Secretary Rogers, who had been charged by the President 
with initiating international and domestic actions to combat terrorism, submitted an 
“initial report
347
” to the President on what had been accomplished thus far. He noted 
three different domestic efforts. First, the Executive Protective Service was asked, 
immediately following the Munich killings, to increase protection for Israeli, Arab, 
German and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments against attacks by the JDL 
and other groups. Second, steps were taken to “screen more closely visa applications of 
potential terrorists.” Third, they were looking “into ways to tighten controls over foreign 
groups and organizations in the United States which have ties to movements advocating 
or practicing political terrorism; e.g. the Palestine Liberation Office in New York, and 
groups of Arab and Iranian students in this country.” 
The “Interagency Group on Protection against Terrorism in the U.S.”, which was 
pulled together by Rogers’ initiative, met at 11am on September 18
th
. Representatives 
from intelligence agencies, the FBI, the INS, the Bureau of Customs and the ATF were in 
attendance. At this meeting, the representative from the FBI, Mr. A.J. Decker, stressed 
that experience had shown them that terrorists utilize “persons of student age to carry out 
their terrorist plans”
348
. The INS representative noted that “persons transiting the U.S. to 
a third country need no U.S. visa to enter this country and are permitted 10 days in the 
U.S. to complete the transit.” The government has “no knowledge whatsoever” that they 
are in the country. This loophole would be closed. 
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Mr. Decker also informed the committee of the “immediate rewards” the FBI’s 
“interview program with Fatah cadre members has produced.” He told them “that 




Rogers updated the President again on the 21
st
 following up on his initial report 
from a few days earlier. “High level consultations were undertaken with government 
representatives here and abroad,
350
” Rogers wrote. US posts “abroad have been instructed 
to intensify the examination of all Arab visa applicants, and a system has been initiated in 
which the names of all such applicants will be screened against the records of the CIA, 
FBI, INS and the U.S. Secret Service prior to the issuance of the visa. The INS is 
furnishing the FBI with the names and location of all Arab students currently in the 
United States
351
”.  It should be noted here that while groups like the Jewish Defense 
League and the Irish Republican Army had all been identified by name as potential 
threats in the interagency group meetings, only Arabs became the targets of this blanket 
screening action.  
At the September 21
st
 meeting, the chair of the interagency working group, Mr. 
Donelan, requested the INS ask airlines not to grant Transit Without Visa privileges “to 
Arab nationals traveling to the U.S.”. Currently, Soviet Bloc and Cuban nationals were 
excluded from such privileges and Donelan would check to see they could “have the 
same exclusion applied to nationals of Arab countries.” The representative from the 
Treasury Department was checking into the possibility of “a 100 percent customs check 





For their part, the INS advised that “all Arab overstays in the U.S. are being 
thoroughly checked by that service looking toward their possible deportation. INS 
advised there are presently 9,000 Arab students in this country, 15,000 other Arab non-
immigrants and 56,000 permanent resident Arab aliens. The Arab residents and non 




Donelan noted that “all State Department’s posts throughout the world are 
forwarding to U.S. names of individuals of Arab birth who applied for U.S. visas. These 
names are in turn being forward to CIA and FBI for indices check. This procedure is 
being handled under the code name Operation Boulder.
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”  
The coordinated U.S. counterterrorism response was just in its embryonic form 
and was already focused primarily on the “Arab threat” but it was about to get a 
significant boost after the deal cut between Kissinger, Rabin and Nixon over lobbying on 
the Soviet Jewish issue.   
 




, 1972, less than 3 weeks since the killings in Munich, a 
memorandum
355
 to Secretary Rogers was signed by President with the subject “Action to 
Combat Terrorism” which established the CCCT “because of the great importance and 
urgency [The President] attached to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism.” 
When discussing the composition of the committee after making the deal with 





The committee was ultimately “chaired by the Secretary of State and will comprise, the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, The Secretary of 
Transportation, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, the Director of 
Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the 
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the acting Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.”  
The Committee would be “supported by a Working Group comprised of 
personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee, chaired 
by the designee of the Secretary of State” and “will consider the most effective means by 
which to prevent terrorism here and abroad.  
The Cabinet Committee was largely symbolic in the sense that it reflected the 
primacy of the matter as a priority to President Nixon but Cabinet Members were not 
directly involved in most of the work conducted by the Committee apparatus. A working 
group, comprised of designees from each of the involved agencies, would meet on a 
regular basis to conduct the work of the committee. Armin Meyer, who had served as a 
US Ambassador to Lebanon, Iran and Japan, was Secretary Rogers’ designee and 
Chairman of the working group.  
Meyer, who would retire one year later, called his appointment to the 
chairmanship of the CCCT working group the “final challenge in a thirty-year career 
dealing with international affairs.” Yet even he, who would be leading this effort, had 
little or no idea about the trade off that help create it. He writes in his memoirs
357
 that 
President Nixon was “prompted by the new wave of lawlessness reflected in the bloody 
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Munich affair” and he had decided “the time had come for the American government to 
strengthen its defenses against the terrorist scourge.” 
At the start, the working group designees
358
 were Eugene Rossides (Treasury), 
Warren Nutter (Defense), William Olson (DOJ), Benjamin Davis (Transportation), 
Herbert Reis (USUN), Richard Ober
359
 (CIA), Richard Kennedy (NSC), David Young, 
(Domestic Council), Edward Miller
360
 (FBI).  
Meyer sent a memorandum
361
 to this group on October 5
th
, 1972 announcing the 
first meeting of the working group on October 9
th
. The work of the group “in seeking to 
thwart acts of terrorism appears to have four components: (a) effective intelligence, (b) 
precautionary measures, (c) contingency planning; and (d) international actions.” Efforts 
toward the first two areas were already being taken by the interagency committees 
directed by Sisco and Donelan. The role of Meyer’s working group would be “largely 
one of coordination” and tasked with asking, among other questions “are all government 




 for the October 9
th
 meeting included a checklist
363
 of actions “taken 
to combat terrorism”. These were divided into both foreign and domestic steps. On the 
domestic side the list was also bifurcated into “effective intelligence” and “precautionary 
measures”. Steps being taken under “effective intelligence” included “Cooperation with 
Kilowatt” and “Liaison with Israeli Sources”.  Under “precautionary measures” the items 
listed included “Operation boulder”, “Screening of Arab visa extensions”, “Special 
checks of Arab baggage, “Check on Fatah members overstaying visas”, “Check on all 
Arab students”, and “Check on status of other Arabs.” 
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Arabs Under the Microscope 
 
In the fall of 1972, it became very clear to the Arab-American community that 
they were the subjects of enhanced scrutiny. Operation Boulder and the Nixon 
Administration’s newly inaugurated Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism were the 
main reasons why. Unlike any other ethnic group in the United States, Arab-Americans 
were singled out en masse precisely because they were of Arab background. For the 
purposes of the covert program, an “Arab” was defined as “any ethnic Arab who was 
born or whose parents were born in one of the following countries
364
, regardless of 
present nationality or country of residence
365
”.  
Operation Boulder, housed and directed from the State Department, focused 
primarily on visa applications. According to the FBI
366
, it was ostensibly the “systematic 
screening of names of Arabs throughout the world who apply for visas to the U.S. record 
of CIA, FBI, INS and Secret Services are checked to determine whether any information 
is available concerning the names.” 
If any “derogatory” information came up in the indices check, the visa application 
was denied. A letter
367
 from the FBI director Clarence Kelly to the Secretary of State 
notes that in addition to “derogatory” information, a visa could be denied if an 
“individual’s bone fides cannot be completely ascertained.” Also, if “derogatory” 
information came to light after the issuance of a visa, “the fact that the individual has a 
visa along with the derogatory data is immediately available, allowing the FBI and other 
agencies to institute appropriate investigation including surveillances of the individual to 
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. There are few official 
numbers on the scope of the program during the 3+ year span it was in effect. Some 
figures, however, do appear in official documentation. As the program was nearing 
termination due to increasing public controversy and congressional inquiry, letters and 
memos exchanged between the FBI, the Attorney General, Members of Congress, and the 
Secretary of State bring to light information on the ineffective nature of the program but 
also provide insight into the internal dispute between agencies over the need for the 
program. In addition, internal documents versus those that were made publicly available 
feature differing narratives, suggesting something about the desire of the government to 
create a different public perception about the program than that which was arrived at 
internally. 




, 1973, Congressman Joshua Filberg, a Democrat from 
Pennsylvania and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality at the 
time, wrote to Lewis Hoffacker, a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State who had 
overtaken Armin Meyer at the Committee to Combat Terrorism, inquiring about 
Operation Boulder. The informative letter sent in reply
370
 to the Congressman was “not 
classified” but, Hoffacker noted, that he expected Filberg understand “it not be given 
general distribution.” In 1975, at the termination of the program, the informative letter 
was released to a journalist in response to a Freedom of Information Act request on 
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secondary appeal. It then served as the basis of public knowledge of the Boulder program 





, a total of 65,478 name checks were conducted under the 
program. Additionally, security agents had reviewed the INS files on 1,819 individuals 
who had previously entered the United States. Of these 65,478 visa applications screened, 
17, or roughly .0003% of all applications, were denied based on derogatory information. 
An additional 294 applications were abandoned after initiation
372
. While Hoffacker’s 
letter to Filberg says that derogatory information had been developed in these instances 
as well, an FBI memo notes that these instances included applicants who abandoned their 
application “after learning of the 5-day waiting period.
373
” 
From the earliest days of Operation Boulder its bulky nature was noted internally. 
The FBI complained in a secret memorandum in late September 1972 that “it was 
estimated by State that there would be no more than 40 to 50 names submitted on a daily 
basis” and yet “since the initiation of the program on 9/22/1972 [FBI] has received and 
handled over 3,300 requests from State.
374
” The process was becoming problematic as 
early as two weeks in and thus it was suggested that a facility be created to handle State 
department requests via Teletype rather than a courier service.  
The working group of the CCCT chaired by Armin Meyer considered the 
effectiveness of Operation Boulder at their twenty-second meeting. Boulder, the 
representative of the Bureau of Security and Consular affairs at the State Department 
said, was “cumbersome but useful”. Richard Ober, the CIA’s representative at the CCCT 
working group noted “even if there were statistically only a few stops, the regular 
application of Operation Boulder standards tends to build up a good body of evidence.” 
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The broad dragnet-type policies affecting the Arab-American community during 
this time was at least in part a product of the failure of entities like the CCCT and 
Meyer’s working group to come to a definite understanding of the phenomenon they 
sought to combat. Terrorism and the effort to define it was a matter of great discussion 
and little consensus. In fact, due to the “increasing concern of the U.S. government with 
the problem of terrorism and how to deal with it,” the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research held a conference on the topic of terrorism for this very 
purpose. Academic experts on political violence were invited and Meyer was in 
attendance along with representatives from the Defense Department, the CIA, the FBI 
and others. The conference “arrived at no agreed definition of terrorism or of the point at 
which it shades into other forms of violence.”  
Meyer would have the opportunity to attend other conferences around this issue, 
including a symposium to be held in June of 1973 in Sicily. Meyer told the CCCT 
working group that he had been invited to attend by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of 
Depaul University. Meyer “did not feel this was appropriate but welcomed Prof. 




This interaction is worth noting and ironic because just as Bassiouni, an Arab-
American legal scholar in Illinois, was attempting to provide Meyer and the CCCT 
working group with information to help them better understand the legal issues around 
terrorism, the FBI was closely watching Bassiouni. By 1974 Bassiouni, along with 
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Abdeen Jabara, an attorney from Michigan whom the FBI was also monitoring, met with 
the Attorney General at the request of Arab-American United States Senator James 
Abourezk from South Dakota to express the concerns of the Arab-American community 
around Operation Boulder and the blanket screening of Arabs and undue scrutiny this 
placed on Arab-Americans. In this meeting, Bassiouni and Jabara highlighted the 
“wholesale screening process of Arabs and Arab-Americans”, the “use of selective 
enforcement of US laws” against “ethnic Arabs” and the collection of data on Arabs 
based on their political beliefs and legally protected activity. “All of the above mentioned 
practices,” they wrote, “have had and continue to have a chilling effect on the exercise of 
First Amendment rights of Arab residents in the U.S. and Arab-Americans.
377
”  
J.D. Sawyer, the Associate Attorney General, sent a memorandum of the meeting 
including the positions of the Arab-American advocates to Edward S. Miller at the FBI 
who was involved both in the initial interagency working group set up by Rogers and the 
CCCT working group as well. “The Attorney General agreed to follow up on the matter,” 
Sawyer noted, “and would appreciate your comments.
378
” The memo was sent to the FBI 
for comment the same day the advocates met with the Attorney General. The quick 
turnaround time, rare in bureaucracy in general and in the plethora of documents in this 
file in specific, perhaps signals the import with which this matter was viewed by the 
Attorney General.  
The FBI response came in the form of a letter from the Director to the Attorney 
General two weeks later. Its content was mostly defensive and dismissive of the claims 
made by the Arab-American advocates arguing that the steps taken were necessary to 
combat terrorism. One section of the FBI’s response which deals specifically with the 
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allegation made by the advocates that information on Arabs and the legally protected 
activity and political views was being kept by U.S. intelligence agencies and shared with 
foreign intelligence agencies remains redacted today for purposes of “foreign policy and 
national defense” interests. The FBI acknowledges that on several terror incidents in the 
US and abroad, “all field offices were instructed to interview all known or suspected 
members of Al Fatah.
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”  
A closing note in the response reminds the Attorney General to consider the 
source of the allegations he has received. The advocates “are subjects of Bureau cases” 
and “are known to be interested in causes of Arabs in the United States”. They “have 
communicated with the United States Government and the FBI in an effort to put a stop 
to investigations of all Arabs in the United States.
380
”  
Despite the FBI’s efforts to justify the program, the heightened attention the 
Nixon Administration’s post-Munich response continued to grow. Members of Congress 
where starting to ask questions, which meant the Attorney General could not ignore the 
matter. Unsurprisingly, inefficiency ultimately became the main reason the Boulder 





, 1975, warns its impending termination. “It was the consensus of those 
gathered,” at a CCCT meeting, “except for the FBI representatives, that the Boulder 
Program was not producing sufficient results compared to the cost of administering it to 
warrant its continuance in its present form.” The memo was sent from one of the FBI’s 
representatives to the CCCT working group, F.S. Putnam to William Wannall, the head 
of the FBI’s counterintelligence position in an effort to clarify the agencies position 
moving forward.  
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Putnam, speaking for the FBI’s counterterrorism division, writes they “continued 
to follow the view that Boulder is one of the primary means of keeping terrorists out of 
the United States and that keeping terrorists out of the United States is the primary means 
of stopping Arab terrorism in the United States.” 
Putnam continues with a line of argumentation that is likely familiar and greeted 
with skepticism to most civil libertarians in the post-9/11 era. “We have continued to 
point out that the fact that there has been no successful terrorist act committed in the 
United States could possibly be due to the excellent cooperation among the intelligence 
community and the efforts made to keep Arabs with derogatory information from 
entering the United States.” 
“It would appear,” Putnam laments, “that we are now the lone voice in the 
wilderness and that no matter what we say, the Boulder Program will be discontinued.” 
Putnam’s memo was written to Wannall but also copied to then Deputy Associate 
Director (Investigations) for the FBI James Adams. “If you agree,” Putnam wrote about 
the argument to keep Boulder, “Mr. Gatch [CCCT] will be advised that the Director feels 
as noted above.” 
Handwritten notes on the memo reveal more about the interagency dynamics. One 
note on the memo in response from James Adams. “We should also seek Ambassador 
Hoffacker’s support to our position.” Hoffacker, who had previously chaired the CCCT 
working group and sent and informative letter to Congressman Filberg explaining the 
rationale behind and justifying the Boulder Program, was seen as an ally for the FBI’s 
position. But, unfortunately for them, and as  Putnam noted in his handwritten response 
“Hoffacker now retired & living in Houston, Texas – Unable to be of assistance.” The 
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FBI’s position was relayed to Gatch on March 21
st
, 1975 but to no avail, Boulder was 





The Arab-American community knew it was being unfairly singled out. Charlotte 
Saikowski, reporting on the issue for the Christian Science monitor in early 1973 writes 
“a mood of bitterness and frustration has built up among Arab students and Arab-
American communities as a result of a sweeping government operation
383
”.  Saikowski 
spoke with Dr. Muhsin el-Biali, the director of the Islamic Foundation of Southern 
California. He noted 31 Arab students, mostly from Syria and Lebanon, were awaiting 
deportation hearings. Biali stated his foundation and others in the community contributed 
money toward the bail of the some of the students.  
 “There is no stop in sight,” he said, “I have no doubt whatsoever this harassment 
is the outgrowth of the Munich incidents and that it is a repetition of what happened to 
the Japanese here during World War II. Yesterday it was the Japanese, today the Arabs, 
tomorrow who?” 
David Al-Damani’s case, an article published on this issue noted, was more 
typical than the exceptional. Al-Damani, and Iraqi studying in Long Beach,California 
said “two agents came to his house early one morning, identified themselves, and walked 
in without invitation.” Damani is quoted: 
They walked around the house looking at papers and asking questions. 
They saw some pro-Palestine posters, which I have and told me that they 
would have to take me with them. I asked for permission to call a lawyer 





Rhandi Shaker El-Natha’s case was another instance documented in this report. 
He was “told that his extension to study had been cancelled, his American-born wife’s 
petition for him to become a permanent resident had been denied and that he would have 
to leave the country immediately if he did not cooperate”. He was “kept in solitary 
confinement for six days and only got to make phone calls when he slipped out a message 
to friends via a priest. He has since been deported.
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The focus on students was intentional. From the earliest stages of conceiving the 
post-Munich operations, the FBI’s focus was on Arab students. A.J. Decker, one of the 




“I stressed that past experience has shown Arab terrorists utilize these persons of 
student age to carry out their terrorist plans, citing the example of Samir Siksek, who was 
a reported triggerman in the aborted assassination plot on the life of REDACTED
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when he visited this country in February of 1972.
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  Decker’s memo continued to describe the need to come up with a coherent policy 
about jurisdiction in the event of an attack on an embassy. “The terrorist activities of 
Arab groups and the Jewish Defense League, in particular, dictate that we have 
established policy in this field.” He recommended that this be raised with the Attorney 
General in an effort to clarify the Department’s policy in this regard. The following day, 
a memo from the acting director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray
387
, was sent to the Attorney 
General John Mitchell. Mitchell was of course already very familiar with the Jewish 
Defense League and their threats against Soviet Embassies because of the objections 
raised by Dobrynin through Kissinger in early 1971.  Gray’s letter
388
 began:  
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The Arab terrorist groups based in the Middle East responsible for the 
massacres in Munich, Germany, during the Olympiad and at the Lod 
Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, May 30, 1972, have extensions of their 
organizations in the United States. The Jewish Defense League is an 
American entity which, in the past, has participated in numerous acts of 
violence directed against REDACTED and personnel in the United States. 
We have a report that the Irish Republican Army contemplates terrorist 
acts in this country against British nationals. These organizations have a 
great potential for extensive acts of terrorism which could be performed in 
America.  
 
Understanding the ‘Threat’ 
 
The “extensions” of the organizations considered “terrorist” that were operating in 
the United States were actually Arab student groups and charitable organizations. This 
was the subject featured in two significant FBI manuals on “Fedayeen Terrorism” 
produced in 1970 and distributed to all field offices. The first was intended to provide 
field agents with “a summary of information known to Bureau concerning the 
backgrounds and activities of the major Arab commando groups, commonly known as 
fedayeen, as well as backgrounds of Middle East communist parties which appear to be 
making a belated effort to increase their influence in the fedayeen movement.
389
” The 
second was meant to provide field agents with “a profile of the fedayeen terrorist.
390
” 
Together, the FBI believed, the two “monographs should enable field offices to 
develop more effective informant coverage of Arab activities in the United States, 
including information relating to any plans to conduct terrorist activities here, and to 
better evaluate data received in the context of the potential Arab terrorist.
391
” The data 
collection and spying efforts used to put together these assessments took place during the 
COINTERLPRO era of the FBI most associated with then Director J. Edgar Hoover. 
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Throughout the assessments in the monographs, the obsession with new left groups and 
black nationalists and their connection to Arab students and organizations is evident. 
Sections detailing Arab-American relations with the Black Panther Party, the Student 
National Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Stokley Carmichael, the Progressive Labor 
Party, Students for a Democratic Society, Students for a Democratic Society – 
Weathermen, Socialist Workers Party, Workers World Party, publications like 
“Ramparts” and the “National Guardian and individuals like Leo Huberman and Martin 
Peretz. While the “Palestine question” had been an “apple of discord” between some 
members of “subversive-New Left” groups, “New Left groups, with the cooperation of 
Arab students, have on a sporadic basis organized pro-Arab demonstrations in the United 
States, particularly on college campuses
392
.”  
An FBI analysis of “ten fedayeen terrorist attacks in Europe” allowed them to 
draw several absolutist conclusions about potential terrorists by creating a “terrorist 
profile”. The “terrorist” will almost “invariably be an Arab national,” they can be a 
“member of either sex” and probably “in his/her 20’s or 30’s.” An exception might be 
made for teenagers since “fedayeen feel that a terrorist act committed by a child is 
politically very effective.” The terrorist will “be a student or a teacher who has accepted 
the mission willingly.” There is no “requirement that the terrorist speak the language of 
the target country” since local Arabs could help them along. But there was also a “new 
dimension” added to the problem of “defining the fedayeen terrorist”, some of these acts 
were perpetrated by non-Arabs. The FBI analysis mentions 5 specific cases of 
perpetrators who were Dutch, American, British and German nationals
393
. Still, these 
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cases did not change the overall bent the agency had in its assessment of Fedayeen 
terrorism and which domestic groups it believed it must watch closely.  
Special focus is given to the Organization of Arab Students (OAS) which was 
“most prominent among Arab groups in the United States” and is a “loosely organized 
association of Arab students which has chapters on many college campuses.” They have 
“sponsored meetings, conferences, dinners and similar events either for fundraising or 
providing a forum for Arab speakers, including Al Fatah representatives”
394
. 
Stokely Carmicheal’s FBI file indicates the FBI was tracking his political 
activities as early as 1964 but it was not only after he spoke at the 1968 National 
Convention of the Organization of Arab Students in Ann Arbor, Michigan that the 
timeline of OAS activities began in the FBI’s monographs on Fedayeen terrorism. The 
FBI connected the OAS to Fedayeen terrorism through the political affiliation of some of 
its members with Fatah but noted that this group “most of whom appear to be students 
with OAS connections” were set up to coordinate the “collection of funds, propagandize 
the Palestinian cause, and engage in talent spotting among Arab students who could be of 
use in the ‘struggle’
395
”. Perhaps most importantly, one monograph notes in its summary 
and conclusion “there has been no information developed, however, which would 
establish that terrorist acts have been committed here by any of the fedayeen groups”
396
.  
The monographs make clear that after Carmichael’s speech at the 1968 OAS 
convention in the summer, the FBI continued to monitor and spy on numerous OAS 
events going forward. From gatherings in New York City to Detroit, the FBI was there. 
They also monitored and documented international trips by OAS members. In the 
summer of 1969, FBI informants attended the OAS convention in August at Columbus, 
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Ohio. They characterized it as a “lackluster affair” and that “no speakers from any of the 
Fedayeen groups were noted in attendance”. Also “no direct effort was made to solicit 
funds at the OAS convention” and “no representatives of black extremist groups or 
domestic subversive groups were noted in attendance.
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” 
The COINTELPRO program was designed to disrupt groups the government 
deemed “subversive” or “communist”. Many different tactics were used to do this 
including infiltration and what became known as bad-jacketing or disseminating 
information about individuals or groups in an effort to limit their effectiveness. In short, 
the FBI often sought to divide and conquer.  
One potential opportunity the FBI saw to divide up the New Left movements it 
had infiltrated was rooted in the tension between anti-imperialist sentiments among the 
membership and the number of Jews in the ranks. The FBI believed that when it came to 
Israel, Jewish members would check their anti-imperialism at the door, opting instead to 
robustly defend Israel from worldviews that saw it as an extension of western 
imperialism. While there are multiple examples of this in the COINTELPRO files, one is 
perhaps most illustrative. In September of 1969 the Special Agent In Charge (SAC) in 
New York sent a memorandum
398
 to the FBI Director about a plan to send information 
collected on the pro-Arab sentiment among Black Nationalists and the Black Panther 
Party to Meir Kahane of the Jewish Defense League. As noted previously, the FBI was 
familiar with the Jewish Defense League and its capacity for criminal violence
399
. 
Nonetheless, the SAC in NY sought permission to send Kahane an anonymous letter but 
didn’t feel the JDL could be “motivated to act” if the information gathered by the New 
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York Office “concerning anti-Semitism and other matters were furnished to that 
organization without some embellishment.” 
The SAC proposed sending a fake letter to establish a connection with Kahane 
and then subsequent letters funneling pictures of Black Panther leaders like Eldridge 
Cleaver and Bobby Seale as well as BPP publications. The text proposed to the FBI 
director is as follows: 
Dear Rabbi Kahane: 
 
I am a Negro man who is 48 years old and served his country in the U.S. 
Army in WW2 and worked as a truck driver with “the famous red-ball 
express” in Gen. Eisenhour’s [sic] Army in France and Natzi [sic] 
Germany. One day I had a crash with the truck I was driving, a 2 ½ ton 
truck, and was injured real bad. I was treated and helped by a Jewish 
Army Dr. named “Rothstein” who helped me get better again.  
 
Also I was encouraged to remain in high school for two years by my 
favorite teacher,  Mr. Katz. I have always thought Jewish people are good 
and they have helped me all my life. That is why I become [sic] so upset 
about my oldest son who is a Black Panther and very much against Jewish 
people. My oldest son just returned from Algers [sic] in Africa where he 
met a bunch of other Black Panthers from all over the world. He said to 
me that they all agree that the Jewish people are against all the colored 
people and that the only friends the colored people have are the Arabs.  
 
I told my child that the Jewish people are the friends of the colored people 
but he calls me a Tom and says I’ll never be anything better than a Jew 
boy’s slave.  
 
Last night my boy had a meeting at my house with six of his Black 
Panther friends. From the way they talked it sounded like they had a plan 
to force Jewish store owners to give them money or they would drop a 
bomb on the Jewish store. Some of the money they will get will be sent to 
the Arabs in Africa.  
 
They left books and pictures around with Arab writing on them and 
pictures of Jewish soldiers killing Arab babys [sic]. I think they are going 




I though [sic] you might be able to stop this. I think I can get some of the 
pictures and books without getting myself in trouble. I will send them to 
you if you are interested.  
 





The misspellings pervasive in the draft letter are not found in the rest of the memo 
written by the SAC. It can be presumed they were intentional for the purposes of 
conveying authenticity in a stereotype laden story. The FBI director, however, believed 
the letter was just what they needed. It was “well written and encompasses all the desired 
points,” but, the director cautioned in his approval
400
, “take care to insure that the 
communication is prepared on a manual typewriter using commercially purchased paper. 
Strict security must be maintained.” 
The BPP was of course not the only target of these tactics. The Communist Party 
of the USA (CPUSA) was sent what the FBI referred to as “Irving” letters. Irving was a 
fictional “Jewish member of the CPUSA” that was “writing in a complaining manner.” 
Writers like Kahane who would receive the letter and publish them in Jewish publications 





, 1971, a “pipe bomb exploded outside the headquarters of the Communist 
Party USA” in an attack attributed to the JDL.  
The Students for a Democratic Society were also targeted in a similar manner. 
After becoming aware of an article entitled “Palestine, the Arabs and Zionism” in “Fire” 
the “official publication of the National Offices of the SDS” and knowing that “some 
individuals in the SDS and some potential members of the SDS” are of Jewish 
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background, the Washington Field office of the FBI suggested a “nationwide educational 
program be undertaken by the Jewish community to point out the evil nature of the 
politics of the SDS.” If this was undertaken, they believed, “it would have devastating 




The FBI, The ADL and Intelligence Collection 
 
While the FBI found the 1969 OAS event to be largely innocuous, even for its 
standards during the Hoover/COINTELPRO era, they were not the only ones spying on 
the event. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B’nai B’rith, a national Jewish 
organization based in New York, has dispatched spies as well.  
A 1968 FBI telegram
403
 from the Director to Special Agents in Charge (SAC) 
around the United States noted that the ADL, “is opposed to groups and individuals 
espousing bigotry, prejudice and extremism” and that the ADL “has been very 
cooperative in the past in referring” data on such activities to the FBI. “You are to 
immediately make certain that you have established liaison” with the head of the ADL 
regional office, the memo instructs.  
At least three different ADL informants infiltrated the OAS convention in 1969 
and corresponded under the code names “Adam”, “Eve”, and “Buckeye”. They reported 
on the private happenings at the event, documented personal information, prepared broad 
analysis of the entire convention and then a memo with this information, nearly 40 pages 
long, was submitted to the FBI. It is unclear exactly to whom the memo was sent. The 
sender is identified at the regional director for the ADL in Ohio, so it might seem logical 
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that it was sent to the local SAC. However, a memo from the SAC in New York to the 
FBI Director was cautious, skeptical and dismissive of the ADL provided information 
after having reviewed it.  
“After a review of this ‘memorandum’ by the NYO, it is felt the information 
contained therein in no way adds to the information furnished by the Bureau confidential 
informants who attended the OAS annual convention.” The SAC argues the FBI 
information was of “higher intelligence value” and “furnished from a more objective 
position.” There were more problems with the ADL information as well. “Apart from the 
biased approach,” the SAC wrote, “it very possibly represents a violation of the Foreign 
Agents Registration act (FARA).” He goes on to question the unethical tactics used by 
the ADL including using code named sources, assuming identities and infiltrating and 
recruiting foreign infiltrators as well. “It is incredible to assume,” he continues, “that [the 
information] is not furnished to an official of the Government of Israel, due to the 
extreme close ties between the ADL and Israel.” The SAC closes by writing that the New 
York office isn’t recommending the information be disseminated but left it to the 
discretion of the Director if an investigation of the ADL under the FARA was 
warranted
404
. The ADL’s spying had put the Hoover-era FBI into the unfamiliar position 
of civil liberties advocate. 
How the information was used by the FBI and whether or not the 
recommendation of the New York SAC was heeded or not is unclear. What is clear is that 
the information was kept on record by the FBI and not destroyed. It is also clear that the 
FBI had a relationship with the ADL, routinely received information from them and also 
knew of their close ties with the Government of Israel. Many Arab-Americans believed 
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Israeli intelligence was able to target them through the US law enforcement apparatus. 
While the ADL’s spying and relationship with the FBI is an indirect reflection of that 
suspicion, formal connections between US counter-terrorism and Israeli intelligence were 
established at the very beginning of the Nixon Administrations post-Munich response.  
A Chilling Effect 
 
While the OAS was the primary focus of the FBI’s monitoring of Arab activity in 
the United States, others Arab groups that were monitored were also noted in the 
monograph. The Palestine Arab Fund (PAF), which was active on the US West Coast, 
was next on the list. The FBI was closely monitoring the PAF’s fundraising activities 
down to the dollar. Committees of the PAF had “been established in Los Angeles, San 
Jose, San Francisco, Phoenix, Portland, Seattle and Moscow, Idaho”  to collect funds “to 
aid widows and orphans of Palestinians.” The FBI knew from a PAF financial statement 
that “$79,601 was collected between June of 1968 and August of 1969.” Checks on the 
PAF’s account were also monitored
405
. 
Said Araikat is a Palestinian-American who was directly involved in the 
establishment of the PAF. He traces the impetus of the PAF to the post-1967 feeling 
among Palestinian and Arab Americans and more directly to the March 1968 battle of 
Karameh which renewed energy in the struggle for Palestinian liberation. Shortly 
thereafter, as the FBI notes and as Araikat confirms, the PAF’s Bank Account was 
opened on May 6
th
, 1968 in San Francisco where Araikat was active. “That’s when it 
began – the idea of having a Palestinian organization germinated. So it was really as a 
result of all these things coming together – the rise of the Palestinian struggle, you know, 
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it became almost a given that you had to have an organization for the Palestinians – that’s 
how the Palestine Arab Fund was born.” 
Araikat, who was a student himself at the time, was not surprised that the FBI was 
keeping close tabs on the PAF. In fact, he says “most Palestinian students had had some 
encounter with the FBI.” In one anecdote, he recalls a friend who “had a sticker that said 
‘FATEH’ on it, you know, a bumper sticker, it was just a sticker. He didn’t belong to 
Fateh or anything he just bought it at some event, you know, so he put it on because 
people were in support of the struggle and [the FBI] stopped him and they spoke with 
him, it was that kind of stuff.” 
The effect of the FBI’s presence in and around Arab organizing for Palestine was 
“an intimidating factor, perhaps not for myself,” says Araikat, “or a few others who just 
wanted to do anything possible to help the Palestinians but it definitely kept away others 
because it was all voluntary, you depended on volunteers, so when volunteers thought 
they might get in trouble with the law – because they didn’t understand their rights under 
the law, that you could do this, that you were not breaking any laws, that you were not 
committing any crimes, you are not involved in any kind of violent activities, terrorist 
activities, you don’t belong to any of the you know, subversive organizations, this was 
really working, doing community work. Many were actually scared away from 
participating so you lost out on the energy and abilities and talents of many, no doubt 
about that.” Araikat noted that he and many others assumed that there were informants at 
just about every event or gathering, and as the FBI documentation shows this was likely 
the case, but that didn’t deter most organizers because they knew they were within their 
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rights. Instead, it had a chilling effect on mobilization and expanding the work of the 
organization to include new recruits
406
.  
An FBI directive from September of 1973 sheds light on how the FBI was 
monitoring the PAF and other Arab-American groups. A “source” had determined that a 
meeting “billed as the fifth annual convention of the Palestine Arab Fund, Los Angeles 
Chapter” was to take place on September 21-23, 1973. Clear directives are then made for 
“SAC’s Los Angeles and San Francisco”: 
Immediately ascertain details of Palestine Arab Fund convention and 
furnish results of survey of your informant coverage as it is imperative that 
all individuals in attendance at this convention be identified and their 
connections with Arab terrorist activities ascertained. In addition to 
informant coverage, consideration should be given to photographic 
surveillances or other types of coverage. 
 
The Impact of Establishing the CCCT 
 
 While President Nixon had tasked Rogers with addressing terrorism related 
matters in the aftermath of the Munich attacks, it was not until the establishment of the 
CCCT and its regularly meeting working group that the impact of this effort really began 
to take effect. In the first three weeks of September, Rogers and his assistants had 
coordinated preliminary interagency meetings. These focused primarily on clarifying 
jurisdictional matters as it related to attacks on foreign embassies and looking into new 
visa protocols.  When Nixon established the CCCT he did so based on a deal with Rabin, 
not because he wanted to direct resources toward combating terrorism but rather because 
he wanted relief from Congressional pressure before an election which he believed Rabin 
could get him. Nor did he seem to take the need for the CCCT very seriously. His initial 
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rationale for it was that it would give Secretary of State William Rogers, whose 
supplanting by Henry Kissinger was near complete, “something to do.”  But the diligent 
members of the working group believed in the importance of the task they had been given 
by the President even if the President himself did not. In fact, swinging Presidential 
weight behind the initiative was intentional and orchestrated to ensure full cooperation 
between the agencies or, as Richard Kennedy put it, “harness the bureaucracy and assure 
its full participation and support.” 
It was the CCCT and specifically it’s working group that allowed for the 
coordination of resources that made the committee most effective. Once the working 
group got started it coordinated effective intelligence between agencies and opened the 
door to intelligence sharing with Kilowatt and with direct Israeli sources. It also ensured 
the sharing of data between agencies like the FBI, CIA, INS and others which allowed 
them to “check on all Arab students” and “other Arabs.” Most importantly, the 
Presidential mandate that created the CCCT lent the working group the great impetus to 
strive for results. 
The working group established within it an “Intelligence Evaluation Committee” 
which was directed by the CIA’s representative which would “evaluate terrorist related 
intelligence” and report it weekly to the committee. Under the direction of the working 
group, the FBI also began co-producing, along with the CIA, this weekly report and 
expanded training for agents on reacting to terrorism.  
By its sixth meeting, it became clear that the working group was hearing of the 
civil liberties complaints of the Arab-American community which came under broad 
scrutiny. Working Group Chairman Armin Meyer told the group he was “dealing with 
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letter and telephone complaints as forcefully as possible and urged a positive, non-
defensive stance on the part of other Working Group members.” It was also decided at 
this meeting that the FBI would work with the ATF and the Justice Department to 
“develop a brief background piece on the JDL.” The reason this was done, however, was 
“to show that the recent U.S. initiatives to counter terrorism are not anti-Arab measures”
 
407
. The report that was produced was completed two weeks later and distributed to the 
working group. It entirely focused however on past actions, most that predated the 
creation of the CCCT. This did not stop Armin Meyer from using the JDL as a talking 
point in the press to allay concerns about an anti-Arab focus. He told George Lardner of 
the Washington Post in a front page article which ran in many papers across the country, 
that though the work of the CCCT has “produced some concern among Arab people and 
Arab-Americans” the CCCT doesn’t seek “for a minute to be discriminatory. The Jewish 





, 1972, William Rogers wrote a memorandum to President 
Nixon updating him on the progress of the CCCT and noting the success they achieved in 
“assuring maximum overall effectiveness as governmental agencies execute their 
respective responsibilities.” The report goes on to laud the domestic intelligence effort of 
the FBI which is “contributing weekly input from its nationwide organization.” Though 
there were successes internally, there was lack of progress on the international level. 
Despite “the strenuous exertions of Ambassador Bush and his associates,” Rogers 




Rogers, who had supported the underlying causes argument immediately after 
Munich to both Kissinger’s and Rabin’s dismay, was now disappointed about the United 
Nations coming to the same conclusion. In October of 1972, Rogers’ State Department 
held an academic conference on terrorism. Thomas Thorton, a State Department 
representative to the CCCT working group chaired the conference and much of the 
working group was in attendance. Five academic specialists were asked to address the 
“increasing concern of the U.S. government with the problem of terrorism and how to 
deal with it.” After thinking about the problem, the conferees concluded: 
Almost any group, under sufficient stress of unresolved grievances, 
will resort to terrorism; terrorists may select either symbolic or pragmatic 
targets; terror is very difficult to eliminate – the best move a government 





Thorton briefed the entire working group on the outcome of the conference in the 
working group’s thirteenth meeting though the conclusions seemed to have little impact. 
Rogers concluded his memorandum to the President by writing that “in the game against 
the recent upsurge of international terrorism, the ball has been advanced to mid-field. 




After the hostage taking and killings in Munich, Arabs in the United States began 
to sense that something had changed. While many understood this to be a response to 
Munich, what it was instead was the product of a political trade off with the Israeli 
ambassador. For Arab-Americans who were being interrogated, spied on and deported it 
made little difference. The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism took “counter-
terrorism” to a new level that the United States had not seen before and it had focused its 
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efforts on Arab terrorism even though Arabs had not been responsible for terrorist acts in 
the United States to that point. Much of the data on domestic threats the CCCT relied on 
came from the FBI which had amassed much of it during the controversial and repressive 
COINTELPRO era. Additional information came to the CCCT from international 
intelligence agencies including from Israel. While Arabs had experienced this repressive 
outcome, this was likely not the outcome on the minds of Nixon and Kissinger as they 
were deciding on establishing the CCCT. Instead Nixon and Kissinger were more 
concerned with simply getting the deals with the Soviets done before the election. This 
suggests strongly that the notion that states repress a group because they experience a 
threat from that group is flawed, especially in this case, but also in others. The next and 






Chapter 9- Moving Forward 
 
“Oh, you wouldn’t believe….(tape stops – electricity failure)….” 
-Yitzhak Rabin before a tape is abruptly cut shot. 
 
In this final chapter, I try to glean some conclusions from the evidence discussed 
in the preceding chapters. At the outset of this work, I sought to shed light on the 
question of whether or not the assumptions about the decision calculus in the repression 
literature was flawed. What a survey of cases in the second chapter and more specifically 
a detailed case study of the Nixon administration’s decision to establish the CCCT shows 
was that in deed the assumptions around decisions leading to repressive outcomes are 
lacking. I discuss what this case tells us about the decision calculus behind repressive 
outcomes and also argue that this understanding could only happen through an analysis 
which not only disaggregates the state but also one that separates repressive intents from 
repressive outcomes. Given this new understanding of the decision calculus, I put 






The survey of cases in Chapter Two suggested that there was more to the 
decisions behind repressive outcomes and the curtailment of civil liberties than the 
assumptions in related theories allowed us to imagine.  In the case that was explored in 
the following chapters, I hoped to trace the factors that weighed into the decision calculus 
behind a repressive outcome using primary source data that was rarely available in such 
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complete form. To understand just how unique and important the availability of this data 
is to understanding this case, consider what our understanding of the case would have 
been without it. If we did not have the recordings of Oval Office conversations between 
Nixon and Kissinger, the smoking gun so to speak, what would have been our 
understanding of the motivation behind establishing the CCCT? The historical narrative 
would surely be dominated by a singular document Nixon directly issued establishing the 
CCCT wherein he writes that he is doing so “because of the great importance and 
urgency” he attaches “to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism.” All 
discussion of the Israeli Ambassador’s role in this outcome was spoken and not written. It 
was captured on a clandestine tape recorder in the Oval Office. The only other place any 
tangential mention of this deal exists is in a transcription of a telephone conversation
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between Kissinger and Rabin on September 21
st
, 1972. The transcription however is very 
strangely cut short due to an apparent “electricity failure.”  The phone call, which is 
logged at 10:42am, was cut off after approximately 2-3 minutes of conversation. 
Whatever the nature of the supposed “electricity failure”, it could not have been severe 
since the next call logged in the transcript file was just 5 minutes later. Kissinger made 
the call from the White House. Oval Office recordings place him in that room with the 
President moments before the call to Rabin. The secret recorder in the Oval Office did 
not experience any electricity failures; it recorded uninterrupted during this time. In 
conducting this research, I have poured over hundreds of transcripts of Kissinger 
telephone conversations. This was the only one I came across where a supposed 
malfunction cut the transcript short. It is likely that Kissinger believed the conversations 
about the trade off with Rabin he had with Nixon in the Oval Office would never be 
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known but he was of course aware of his own tape recorder. Kissinger writes in his 
memoirs that he personally only became aware of the existence of the taping system in 
the Oval Office after Alexander Haig became Chief of Staff in late April of 1973 only 
two and a half months before the existence of it became public. Nonetheless, evidence of 
the bargain between Nixon and Rabin survived. 
The case discussed in depth provides insight about both outstanding and 
longstanding questions implicit in the repression literature. Three of these areas involve 
questions about decision calculus, intents vs. outcomes and the unitary nature of the state. 
Below, I will discuss how evidence from the case allows us to think about these 




What we learned from the case study about the calculus behind the decision to 
initiate the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, which led the Nixon 
Administration’s post-Munich “counter-terror” effort, was that multiple, interconnected 
issues weighed into the process. A confluence of events, including changes in Soviet 
domestic policy toward Jews, the lobbying of domestic interest groups and an upcoming 
election all played a role. Nixon, having invested a great deal of time, resources and 
prestige into the détente strategy, did not want to jeopardize the efforts over the whims of 
special interest groups. But given their influence in Congress, the deals negotiated by 
Kissinger stood a real chance of being defeated on the eve of the election. Thus, Nixon 
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struck a deal and agreed to initiate the CCCT in exchange for the cooperation of the 
Israeli ambassador in quieting criticism in Congress.  
A number of unique factors contributed to make this outcome possible. First, 
Nixon was in a position of vulnerability because of the timing of an upcoming election. 
In fact on October 2
nd
, as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was in Washington to sign 
the SALT agreement, the President, Secretary Rodgers and Kissinger were discussing the 
Jewish community’s efforts to sideline the trade bill. Rogers noted that “if it wasn’t for 
the election it wouldn’t be a problem.
412
”  
On another occasion on October 18
th
, the President discussed the matter of 
terrorism in relation to the election with his adviser for domestic affairs John D. 
Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman told the President that David R. Young, one of his assistants and 
a participant in the CCCT working group, had updated him about intelligence that “Al 
Fatah is going to try to put on a spectacular between now and election time” and that they 
believe the primary target was Rabin. Nixon’s immediate reaction, indicative of how he 
never let political opportunism far out of sight, was “its worse if they are gonna put one 
on the day after the election.” Ehrlichman wanted to ensure that should such an event 
occur, blame could be kept away from the White House and that political opponents 
should not be given the opportunity to claim that a delay in communication with the 
President who was busy campaigning allowed a security failure to take place. Nixon told 
Ehrlichman to ensure FBI director Gray was fully ready to act even if the President was 
unreachable: 
You tell [Gray] im going to be busy I’m going to be away but I want him 
to assume that responsibility and I am going to back him up, but if 
anything happens here he is to move in, as quickly as necessary, and he 
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can say he had word from the president, he can say, ill back him up 
whatever he says. 
 
Ehrlichman concurred, noting that when it came to attacks or hostage 
situations “they say the first 10 minutes of these things are most important.
413
” 
Ehrlichman and Nixon wanted to keep blame away from the White House should 
something happen. Within a few days, David Young, sent a memo to CCCT 
working group chair Meyer writing: “after reviewing my notes on the last several 
meetings, I thought it might be useful if I gave you a list of items which I believe 
the Working Group should address.” The list conveyed addressed the concerns 
about potential finger-pointing that Ehrlichman and Nixon had discussed. It 
included “outlining the jurisdictional responsibilities of departments and 
agencies” should an “attack occur in D.C.; outside of D.C.” The “FBI should 
know precisely who they can draw upon and for what assistance. Contact names 
should be on a 24 hours basis.
414
” This demonstrates that even after the creation 
of the CCCT, Nixon was still very much aware of the politics of counterterrorism 
and its potential impact on the election. 
Second, pro-Israel interests group had significant influence in Congress and were 
able to generate pressure on the Administration in a moment of vulnerability. The 
influence was evident in various moments throughout the Nixon’s first term. When 
Rogers announced his plan in December of 1969, Nixon was warned of facing a 
“domestic buzz saw” and Max Fisher, the head of the Council of Jewish Federations, 
demanded he should have seen a copy of the speech ahead of time, an error for which the 
State Department’s Joseph Sisco had to call him an apologize. The influence of these 
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interest groups was so significant; the President likened the Jewish community to hostage 
takers of US Foreign policy. In a conversation
415
 with Rogers and Kissinger about the 
matter and how best to try to persuade the Jewish community to back down on it he said: 
If the trade agreement, or SALT, or anything else is held hostage to exist 
visas there is something to consider for the Jewish community in this 
country, more badly in my opinion. You can’t hold it hostage to the 
visas….what do you think Henry? 
 
Kissinger concurred, saying:    
Well I think Mr. President, first, if they want to serve their own 
Jewish interest, I have a violent objection to one minority group holding 
the foreign policy of this country for ransom, but that’s an argument you 
can’t make. 
 
Seeing no hope in avoiding this pressure from within his own political system, the 
President of the United States, along with his aide for National Security, were only able 
to get relief by going to the Israeli ambassador and offering him a deal so that, as 
Kissinger said, he could “call off [his] Jewish senators.” 
Third, the Administration was keenly aware of the difficulty of trying to navigate 
this challenge in Congress as they had just dealt with the complications of a Jackson 
Amendment on the SALT treaty which took months to work around.  
Fourth, the Kissinger-Rabin relationship was a uniquely close one which had 
developed and strengthened over years through backchannel conversations and the role 
integral role Rabin played in the bond-building crisis moment in Jordan in September of 
1970.  
While the trade-off may not have been the only reason the CCCT was established, 
it was the main reason and without it, it is unlikely Nixon would have taken such as step. 
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In reviewing why they were doing it in an oval office conversation, Kissinger made it 
very clear to the President, “The Israelis want it. It doesn’t cost us a god damned thing”. 
Could there have been an alternative reason why Nixon established the CCCT? It 
is unlikely for several reasons. First, the most plausible alternative reason would be 
because he seriously believed it was needed to combat a palpable terrorist threat. If this 
was the case, we would have seen this type of action much closer to the events in Munich 
and not three weeks later. The President did ask Rogers to come up with “contingency 
plans” in the wake of the Munich events but a Cabinet level committee was not part of 
this. Further, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the reasons why the CCCT is being 
established and Nixon’s reasons are that it will keep Rogers occupied. While he also 
attempted to rationalize the establishment of the CCCT as a response to security threats, 
he did so in the most irrational way. Nixon stated he was alarmed by a vision that a 
soothsayer had which was relayed to him by his personal secretary wherein terrorists 
would kidnap Rabin and demand all blacks be released from prison. Kissinger, the 
President’s National Security aide, also clarified that the reasoning behind the decision 
had little to do with security when he said it was what the Israelis wanted, it was good for 
the President’s meeting with Jewish leaders and it cost nothing. While it is possible 
Nixon may have thought the CCCT would have added in some ways to national security, 
and certainly did not think it would hurt national security, threats posed by terrorism were 
not the main reason the CCCT was established; the trade-off with Rabin was.  
Despite the soothsayer’s vision, the real threat of terrorism, particularly terrorism 
perpetrated by Arabs at the time was negligible. Far more acts of political violence were 
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conducted by other groups such as the Jewish Defense League and many more non-Arab 
groups.  
The way the administration dealt with the Jewish Defense League also tells us 
something about the decision calculus. In this instance, a group with a political agenda 
was using violence on a consistent basis outside the bounds of the law. Significant action 
to bring an end to this did not really begin until an exasperated Soviet Ambassador 
demanded Kissinger do something about it and noted Moscow was incensed at the lack of 
court action against the assailants. Immediately after this complaint was made, high-
ranking Administration officials began discussing how to crack down on the JDL and 
shortly thereafter decided on a path forward. Many indictments and convictions followed. 
In this case, a group that had a proven track record of challenging state security through 
the use of terrorism was not aggressively targeted by the state until the issue became tied 
to a foreign affairs objective that mattered to the executive.  
Additionally, as the conversation between Kissinger and Attorney General 
Mitchell reveals, domestic political considerations also came into play as they determined 
how to go about cracking down on this group. While the JDL had demonstrated a history 
of violent activity, far more caution was used in deliberating how to scrutinize them than 
with Arab-American groups and individuals which had not been involved in violent 
activity to date. This was due to the domestic political repercussions involved with each. 
The lack of effective and organized political interest groups representing the interests of 
Arabs in the United States made the curtailing of their rights far easier for the 
government. On the other hand, when dealing with the JDL, the Attorney General was 
concerned about the “adverse political impact” of appearing “anti-Jewish”. There did not 
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seem to be any similar political price to pay for the appearance of being anti-Arab. Once 
the costs of this did begin to rise through the activities of Arab-American activists and the 
inquiries of a US Senator, the discriminatory “Operation Boulder” program was 
discontinued. This produces an interesting juxtaposition; despite the JDL having been 
engaged in illegal violent activities, the government approach to scrutinizing them was 
more cautious than its approach to scrutinizing Arabs who had not been engaged in 
illegal violent activity. The reason for this varied approach was the unequal perception of 
the costs of scrutiny on the part of the government. In the case of Japanese internment, 
one reason Secretary of War Stimson gave for interning Japanese and not Italian-
Americans was that the “size of Italian population and the number of troops and facilities 
which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in the general plan 
would greatly overtax our strength.” The economic and political costs of interning 
Italians were higher than that of the Japanese even though both posed negligible threats. 
This suggests that the degree of caution a state takes before enacting repressive measures 
is not just a function of the threat a particular group might present but also a function of 















Further, as noted in the opening of this inquiry, the literature on repression 
features a consistent assumption that the state is threatened or perceives a threat from a 
challenging group and thus enacts repressive activity. What this case study has shown is 
that the threat facing Nixon administration from Arab groups in the United States was 
questionable at best, if not outright non-existent, and yet the decision to enact a campaign 
that targeted them was made. What motivated the Nixon administration to make this 
decision was in fact a threat, but that threat did not come from Arab elements in the 
United States. Rather, it was a threat facing the President’s foreign policy plans and 
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Second Red Scare, Truman perceived a real threat but it was not from communists in the 
United States as he explicitly stated in his memoirs. Rather the threat was one posed to 
American geopolitical interests due to vacuums of power being created as the British 
Empire receded. To address this threat, Truman had to galvanize American public 
opinion by “scaring the hell out of them” which lead to a crackdown on American 
communists and others. This suggests that threats can in fact be motivators in decisions 
that lead to repression, but that the direction the threats come from is not necessarily the 
direction of the eventual target of repression. Likewise, Roosevelt’s decision on 
internment was not the product of a deep sense of threat from the Japanese population; 
rather it was strongly encouraged by domestic interest groups and a lobbying campaign 
both inside and outside his administration. Repressive outcomes maybe the results of 
political opportunities or pressures tied not to the threat of the targeted groups but the 
result of other domestic or international political interests. It would follow that such 
outcomes are most likely when the costs of repressive action are cheap, thereby making 
them easier to accept in a tradeoff.  
How many repressive episodes are the product of situations that would fall into 
the lower left quadrant of the above model? What conditions affect the likelihood of 
repressive episodes within this framework? These are important questions that demand 
more attention moving forward. 
The State as a Unitary Actor 
 
In much of the theoretical work on political repression, and in much work in 
comparative politics in general, ‘the state’ is thought of as a unitary actor with agency. 
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While this might be analytically helpful under certain circumstances, it lends to the 
development of theories of repression, for example, which are make it harder to conceive 
of a disaggregated state enacting repressive measures.  
We saw in the Japanese internment case, for example, that there was disagreement 
between two key agencies including the Department of Justice and the War Department. 
Here the agency in charge of the Alien Enemies Bureau, which was the Department of 
Justice, was unwilling to go along with the repressive measures advocated by the War 
Department. This dispute played a significant role in the decision making process and 
was ultimately resolved when the President decided to authorize the Department of War’s 
plans and take responsibility for enemy aliens in the West Coast out of the justice 
department’s hands and give that responsibility to the war department. Understanding 
that the state did not act as one was central to understanding how and why the decision to 
intern was formulated. 
What became clear in the in-depth case study above, which focused on the inner 
workings of decision making by the most important players in the state, was that the state 
was anything but a unitary actor. Structurally, the system of government was more or less 
orderly but different parts of the state acted in different ways and for different reasons. At 
the top, the President related to his different aides differently. Kissinger was his closest 
confidant while Rogers was kept at a distance. Both Kissinger and Rogers had a different 
understanding of what the purpose and origins of the CCCT was. Kissinger, along with 
Nixon, knew it originated in a secret deal with the Israeli ambassador. Rogers didn’t. 
And, while Rogers seemed to take on the task of leading the CCCT genuinely and with 
the goal of combating terrorism, Nixon assigned Rogers to it in part because it “gives him 
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something to do.” The seriousness and understood purpose of the campaign varied 
between key actors in the state.  
Aside from the differences at the top, at the agency level there were differences as 
well. The CCCT managed Operation Boulder as well as other inter-agency counter-
terrorism initiatives. Each agency’s role was different. The CIA provided intelligence. 
The Department of State managed the consular end of the program. The INS provided 
data on resident and non-resident aliens and so on. But when it came to direct interaction 
with targets the FBI and its agents took the lead.  
The differences in approaches by the agencies became most apparent as pressure 
grew to end programs like Operation Boulder under the auspices of the CCCT. While 
many of the agencies involved in the inter-agency effort concluded the value of the 
program did not justify its costs, the FBI took the opposite point of view and fought to 
keep it alive even if, as memos revealed, they had become the “lone voice in the 
wilderness.”  
The role of the FBI is significant as well because of the unique situation the 
agency was in at the time and the impact that situation had on groups that were ultimately 
brought under the microscope after the start of the CCCT. A few months before the 
CCCT was established Hoover had died, ending a long era of his control over the FBI. 
Additionally, the COINTELPRO program which had come to light in 1971 had just 
ended. But the data collection efforts of the COINTELPRO program, which Hoover had 
great control over, clearly influenced the Bureau’s understanding of the ‘terrorist’ threat 
in the United States. A lengthy monograph on the impact of the Fedayeen in the Middle 
East and the U.S. which was put together for field agents was “developed as a result of 
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Bureau investigations of Arab activities in the United States” and it should “enable the 
Field Offices to develop more effective coverage and to better evaluate all information 
received from informants.”  
The document focuses extensively on how the “Arab side of the Palestine 
question” has been affiliated with a range of “subversive” groups. Eldrige Cleaver, it 
notes, spoke at the 1968 convention of the organization of Arab students and “Arabs have 
co-opted black extremists” and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) presented “anti-Israel articles” in their literature. The Progressive Labor Party, 
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the 
Workers World Party (WWP) and others were all listed having published pro-Arab 
articles. The Communist Party of the USA position on the 1967 war was highlighted. 
Under a heading on “Active Support for Arab Position”, the monograph listed teach-ins 
are universities co-sponsored by Arab groups and new left groups. Much of the 
information about Arab groups and the relations with other groups in this monograph on 
terrorism comes straight from the COINTELPRO files. The effect of this was to bring 
activists engaging in perfectly legal activities into circles of suspicion for terrorism or 
subversive activity. Once their names entered FBI databases for connections to 
subversive activities, they would easily be brought up during Boulder queries or other 
checks of the indices.  
Aside from interagency disagreement and the unique role of the FBI in this case, 
perhaps the most important division within the state is between the actors who make the 
decision and those who implement it. The President and his closest confidant made the 
decision to establish the CCCT while the components of it had no idea about what 
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exactly went into this decision. The intent behind the decision for the President was 
related to a political trade off while the agents believed they were being tasked with 
fighting terrorism.  
Repressive Intents vs. Repressive Outcomes  
 
A significant amount of the literature on political repression, particularly the 
quantitative based analysis that addresses larger questions about relationships between 
concepts such as democracy and repression, for example, rely on data sets that are large 
cross-national time-series data sets. While this lends to broader analysis and 
generalizability about the relationship between concepts, the devil is in the details and it 
can often cause mischief.  
How are these data sets put together? Most are based on the creation of scores 
based on the coding of events from annual human rights reports. Based on the number of 
political arrests, tortures, executions, disappearances and so on within a particular state in 
a given year, a score is generated for that state in that year. Several data coding efforts 
have commendably attempted to achieve as much nuance as possible within this approach 
and disaggregated repression scores into subsets that allow for greater analytical value. 
However, one key problem remains. When repressive events are the basis of coded 
scores, we are able to quantify repressive outcomes within a particular state in a given 
year. But this should not be confused with a representation of repressive outcomes 
intended by the state in that given year. Unfortunately, from the level at which the 
quantitative literature approaches these questions, it is often impossible to see the 
difference precisely because repressive intents are assumed to have existed based only on 
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the existence of repressive outcomes. So are all repressive outcomes the product of 
repressive intents of the state? Are the intents and motives of the state uniform 
throughout? 
If we accept the notion that repression is based on a state-challenger relationship 
in which the dynamics are governed solely by the interaction of these two entities then 
perhaps the answer is yes. But we know from case evidence, including the detailed case 
above, that that is not always true. Repressive outcomes can often be the product of 
repressive intents but sometimes they are the product of a decision calculus in which 
various other interests weigh in, perhaps even more decisively than any other factors 
related to the state-challenger dynamic.  
Toward new understandings of political repression  
 
The aim of this study was not to put forward a new theory of political repression. 
Rather, the objective was to look at one case where a great deal of detailed and often 
otherwise privileged information was available and see what insight it could provide for 
further research on repression and the curtailment of civil liberties.  
Most studies on repression and the curtailment of civil liberties think about the 
decision to enact repressive measures or restrict civil liberties as a direct response to a 
challenge or a national security threat. What this case shows is that that is not always 
true. Here, a variety of different factors led an outcome where state agents began to 
intensely focus on some groups. So how should scholars of repression and civil liberties 
now approach their work differently and what new areas of research does it lead to? 
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In the central case of this study, foreign policy issues, the positions of foreign 
states and the pressure created by domestic interest groups weighed in to the decision to 
modify the state’s repressive disposition while the actual behavior of the targeted groups 
did not. This contradicts the central assumptions of most scholarly repression literature. 
While the state-challenger dynamic can determine a significant amount of state behavior 
in relation to repression, so to may interstate dynamics and domestic political concerns.  
Questions for Future Exploration 
 
Under what conditions is the decision calculus behind repression or the 
curtailment of civil liberties more likely to be affected by factors outside the state-
challenger dynamic? In this case, a particular set of circumstances enabled certain factors 
to weigh into the decision more significantly. For example, both the role of domestic 
interest groups and the fact that votes hung in the balance are features of democratic 
institutions. These checks on the executive may or may not exist in different forms in the 
absence of democratic institutions or in autocratic settings but in this case they created 
opportunities for tradeoffs. Further, the case takes place at a moment in US history when 
the country is engaged in both war in Vietnam and experiencing significant anti-War 
dissent. These entanglements shaped both domestic and foreign interests for the state but 
also influence the extent of the limitations around the executive. It is not clear that a 
similar outcome could have occurred during a time of peace.  
Are some types of non-challenger threats more likely to result in repressive 
outcomes than others? If we accept that repressive measures are unpopular and therefore 
unlikely to be enacted without good reason, it follows then that even if a threat does not 
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come from a particular challenger something of significance must motivate decision 
makers to take the decisions that lead to repressive outcomes. For Nixon, the decision 
was motivated by a threat to his election prospects based on a threat to his foreign policy 
agenda by special interest groups on the eve of an election. In Truman’s case for 
example, the decision was in part based on the challenge presented by an American 
public that was unmotivated to support aid to Greece and Turkey and the opportunity to 
weaken political opponents on both his left and right.  
Does the nature of the challenger or target group matter? While the state’s 
behavior toward the JDL and Arab-American groups both changed due to concerns from 
foreign actors, the way in which each group was dealt with varied. With the JDL, where 
suspicion was warranted due to the group’s proven behavior, the political cost of pressing 
this group entered into the calculation. With Arab-Americans, whose behavior did not 
justify the blanket suspicion, the optics of targeting Arabs did not seem to come with a 
political price tag, making this sort of repressive action easier. This suggests that it is 
harder to target certain groups, even if they are small in number, if the perception created 
by it is costly.  
 Why and how do repressive outcomes result from intents that are not strictly 
repressive? When Nixon established the CCCT, he did not do so with the aim of 
curtailing the civil liberties of Arabs and Arab-Americans. Nonetheless, this was a direct 
outcome of that decision. This happened for multiple reasons. First, the ambiguous goal 
of combating terrorism was poorly defined and the concept of terrorism was poorly 
understood even by those tasked with combating it. While the President received periodic 
updates from Rogers there was no sense that combating terrorism was an administration 
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priority. For this reason the agents directing the CCCT and especially the working group 
were operating with little sense of direction or purpose beyond knowing their goal and 
that this goal mattered enough to the President for him to establish the committee. They 
were more or less left to determine on their own how to go about pursuing this aim.  
Second, this permitted agency specific biases to effect the direction of the 
working group. With the group centered in the State department, visa matters came to the 
fore early on. The FBI’s COINTELPRO legacy data informed their understanding of 
networks in the United States and they lobbied hard to keep the Operation Boulder 
program even as the majority of the working group doubted its efficacy and purpose.  
Given this, repressive outcomes may best be understood as the outcome of a 
series of decisions made by a wide range of actors, each with their own interests and 
concerns that may or not be interrelated and even sometimes in competition with each 
other. Probing who those actors are, how they relate to each other, and what their 
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